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 Adequate access to health services remains a fundamental challenge for the U.S. 
health care system.  Ambulatory care sensitive hospitalizations (ACSH) are increasingly 
used as indicators of access in health services research.  Importantly, most empirical 
research on ACSH has overlooked or narrowly defined the role of organizations in 
improving or impeding access.  Using a coordination-and-control theoretical framework, 
this study examined whether the structural characteristics of markets such as provider 
capacity, provider composition, and inter-organizational relationships affect acute care, 
chronic care, and aggregate ACSH rates.  The study used a longitudinal, pooled cross-
sectional design that examined 58 California markets for the years 1998 through 2005.  
The unit of analysis was the market-year and the final analytic sample included 450 
observations.   
The most robust findings pertained to provider composition, where the ratio of 
home health agencies, skilled nursing facilities, and physician organizations to hospitals 
were significantly and negatively associated with ACSH rates.  Provider capacity and 
inter-organizational relationships generally failed to demonstrate significant relationships 
with ACSH rates.  Contrasting results between provider capacity and provider 





Supplementary analysis examined these relationships on a condition-specific basis 
and suggested that the effects of inter-organizational relationships may be limited to 
specific clinical conditions.  Specifically, the analysis found that the proportion of 
hospitals with a formal physician organization relationship was associated with higher 
hospitalization rates for pneumonia, angina, asthma, and congestive heart failure.  In 
contrast, the proportion of hospitals in a market with a formal nursing home relationship 
was significantly associated with lower hospitalization rates for perforated appendix, 
angina, asthma, and hypertension.  Likewise, the proportion of hospitals in a market that 
owned an insurance product was associated with lower hospitalization rates for 
congestive heart failure, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and uncontrolled 
diabetes.  These results suggest that the relationship between market structure and ACSH 
rates may depend upon the medical condition and the type(s) of organizations under 
study.  Overall, these findings raise questions about the appropriateness of combining 
clinical conditions into aggregated hospitalization rates and the conclusions of studies 







Adequate access to health services remains a fundamental challenge for the U.S. 
health care system.  Over 15 percent of Americans lack health insurance (Strunk and 
Reschovsky, 2004) and over 13 percent are estimated to not receive the care they need, 
when they need it (Strunk and Cunningham, 2004).  Conceptual models of access have 
historically placed great emphasis on individual level or societal level factors (Anderson 
and Aday, 1978; Aday and Anderson, 1981). More recent theoretical and policy oriented 
work has called for the application of organizational frameworks to identify systemic 
factors that may affect access to care (Gold, 1998). 
Ambulatory care sensitive hospitalizations (ACSH), defined as hospitalizations 
for health conditions that potentially could have been avoided with timely and effective 
outpatient care, are increasingly used as indicators of access in health services research 
(Billings, 1990; Weissman, Gatsonia, and Epstein, 1992; Institute of Medicine, 1993).  
For example, one commonly studied ACSH is complications related to diabetes, which in 
many cases can be avoided with continuous and coordinated ambulatory care.  Although 
not all ACSH are avoidable, most are unnecessary and have significant cost implications 
for the U.S. health care system.  It has been estimated that $29 billion was spent on 4.4 




(AHRQ, 2005).  Additionally, ACSH exposes patients to unnecessary risks during 
inpatient stays.   
Studies of ACSH have grown in number considerably since beginning in 1990 
and this research has documented a number of factors associated with ACSH.  Despite 
these efforts, rates of ACSH remain higher than one might expect given what we know 
about these factors.  For example, from 1997 to 2004, the number of potentially 
avoidable admissions increased by 3 percent and the total hospital costs for these 
admissions increased 31 percent (AHRQ, 2005).  Furthermore, while ACSH have 
declined for some clinical conditions, they remain high and have increased for other 
conditions (Kruzikas et al. 2004).  ACSH also exhibit considerable variation across 
gender (Paramore and Elixhauser 1999; Rizza et al. 2007), racial and ethnic groups 
(Blustein, Hanson, and Shea 1998), socioeconomic status (Billings, Anderson, and 
Newman 1996; Blustein, Hanson, and Shea 1998), and geographic regions (Magan et al. 
2008; Parchman and Culler 1999), highlighting that much remains to be discovered about 
how to improve outcomes related to ACSH.      
To date, most studies of ACSH have fallen into the same mold as other studies of 
access, primarily examining the role of individual characteristics (e.g., age, gender, race) 
or broad socio-economic characteristics of a market (e.g., income, education, population).  
One consequence of this focus is that the role of organizations has once again largely 
been neglected.  While some access frameworks explicitly include organizations, most 
render them impotent to improve access, instead viewing organizations simply as points 




This study argues that ACSH are about more than just simply access to care.  
After all, the health care literature is replete with empirical and anecdotal accounts of 
patients who have good access to care yet still experience suboptimal outcomes.  Clearly 
what happens to patients once they enter the health delivery system also matters.  The 
study uses concepts of control and coordination to complement access explanations of 
ACSH and shed some light on why ACSH rates may not have improved uniformly over 
time.  It is also hoped that the use of care coordination as an integral part of the causal 
mechanism will help highlight the role of organizations in improving care related to 
ACSH.         
Study Overview and Research Questions 
The study is a longitudinal, market-level study that uses theoretical insights from 
the provider supply and inter-organizational relationship literature to examine how 
structural characteristics of markets such as provider capacity, provider composition, and 
inter-organizational relationships affect ACSH.  The study examines multiple provider 
types in 58 California markets for the years 1998 through 2005.  Several assumptions 
form the basis for choosing this approach.  First, it is assumed that the growing 
complexity and fragmentation of the U.S. health care system requires coordination across 
multiple sectors of the health care field to meet the needs of health care consumers.  
Second, it is assumed that the historical, cultural, and contextual characteristics of a 
market will result in variation in how these different sectors relate to one another to 
coordinate care.  Finally, it is assumed that these variations have important implications 






1. Are more providers associated with better ACSH rates? 
2. Is provider composition associated with ACSH rates? 
3. Is provider supply associated with ACSH rates when multiple provider types are 
considered simultaneously?   
4. How do inter-organizational relationships between provider types in a market 




The growth in ACSH research over the past 15 years precedes a current emphasis 
in health care on eliminating or minimizing avoidable events that compromise quality 
improvement and cost containment efforts.  The health care environment in the U.S., at 
least in certain sectors, is increasingly focused on getting more value for each health care 
dollar.  For example, payers and policy makers are increasingly exploring reimbursement 
options that can achieve more efficient allocation of health care resources.  The Center 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ (CMS) decision to refuse hospital payments for 
‘never events’ is one of the most recent efforts, and given the proportion of hospital 
revenue based on Medicare patients, it is one of the more significant efforts to prevent 
unnecessary care (Francis 2007; Rosenthal 2007).  Arguably equally important is what 
this reimbursement change portends for future efforts to curb avoidable events.  For 
example, CMS is currently considering expanding the list of ‘never events’ (Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services 2008), medical and surgical procedures that would not 
have been necessary if safe and effective care had been provided initially, which may 




similar reimbursement methodologies could be applied to other provider types, such as 
nursing homes and physicians (Abt Associates 2005).  Although ACSH have not been 
specifically targeted yet, one might interpret these efforts by CMS as a sign of things to 
come. 
Given this context, results of this study have potential implications for health care 
management, health policy, and health services research.  From a management 
perspective, a better understanding of how market factors affect ACSH may help 
provider organizations develop strategy that responds to potential changes in their 
environment.  For example, hospitals faced with declining reimbursement related to 
ACSH could consider offering new types of services or partnering with physician 
organizations for these services if the results indicate that these approaches lower the rate 
of ACSH.  The market-level approach should help draw managers’ attention to the 
complex web of relationships that surround and shape their organizations.      
From a policy perspective, the focus on organizations will expand policy 
discussions of access beyond market and individual considerations.  In doing so, it is 
hoped that the study will help policy makers recognize how organizations can affect 
access to care and the importance of expanding the research agenda in ways that explore 
these relationships.  Another policy implication relates to the reimbursement options 
being considered by government payers.  Medicare and Medicaid, especially when 
combined, remain the significant payers for most hospitals, if not most provider health 
care organizations in general.  Results of the study may help policy makers better target 
their measures of access and refine reimbursement methodologies aimed at reducing 




relationships between physicians and hospitals are associated with lower rates of ACSH 
might lead payers such as CMS to construct incentive programs that encourage 
collaborative approaches to improving access. 
Finally, the results have several implications for health services researchers.  First, 
the inclusion of a broad set of organizations recognizes that organizations are embedded 
in webs of competitive and cooperative relationships with other organizations.  This 
approach also recognizes that these relationships likely have important implications for 
how organizations coordinate activities with each other, which is likely to have 
implications for access to care and ACSH.  Finally, the study extends the literature by 
explicitly considering how organizations may improve or impede access.  Like policy 
makers, researchers have tended to overlook the role of organizations, especially 
empirical research on access.  Those studies that have examined the relationship between 
organizations and access have tended to do so in narrow ways, oftentimes looking at 
single organizational types.  This study adds to the literature by explicitly examining the 
role of multiple organizational types. 
Organization of Dissertation 
 The dissertation is organized into six chapters.  This chapter introduced ACSH 
and described the purpose, research questions, and contributions of the study.  Chapter II 
reviews the literature relevant to the study.  Chapter II begins with an examination of the 
ACSH literature, focusing first on the origins and utility of ACSH as an indicator of 
access and then moves on to a discussion of the factors that are associated with ACSH.  
The second half of the chapter discusses some of the strengths and weaknesses of the 




 Chapter III focuses on the conceptual framework used in the study.  The chapter 
begins with a discussion of primary care markets to emphasize the importance of 
examining communities of organizations, and frames the analytic approach used in the 
study.  The chapter also provides an overview of the access frameworks that are 
predominantly used in the literature, followed by a discussion of inter-organizational 
relationships to suggest an alternative explanation.  The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of specific hypotheses that extend from these theories. 
 Chapter IV describes the research design, beginning with the study population and 
sample, followed by a description of the variables and their measurement.  The chapter 
concludes with a description of the statistical models used to evaluate the study 
hypotheses.     
 Chapter V presents the results of the analysis.  The chapter begins by presenting 
the univariate and bivariate analysis results, followed by a discussion of the diagnostic 
tests used to guide the multivariate techniques used in the study.  The chapter concludes 
by presenting the results of the multivariate analysis and a discussion of whether these 
results support the proposed hypotheses.    
 Chapter VI concludes the dissertation with a discussion of the implications of the 
research for health services researchers, health care managers, and policy makers.  The 
chapter concludes with a discussion of the study’s limitations and offers suggestions for 





ACSH Research Limitations and Opportunities 
 Studies of ambulatory care sensitive hospitalizations (ACSH) have grown 
substantially in number since beginning in the early 1990s.  This chapter reviews the 
literature related to ACSH.  The chapter is organized into five sections.  The first section 
provides a more thorough introduction to ACSH, including its development in the health 
services research literature and current use.  The second section presents a critical review 
of the extant literature on the factors associated with ACSH.   The third section describes 
the limitations of the ACSH literature, while the fourth section summarizes the literature 
and suggests some opportunities for future research.  The final section provides an 
overview of how this study addresses the gaps identified in the review.   
Development of ACSH 
 Research on ACSH grew out of early work by Rutstein and colleagues who 
sought to identify ‘sentinel health events’ that could be used to assess differences in 
quality of care across populations (Porell 2001; Rutstein et al. 1976).  These sentinel 
events were believed to be preventable and could potentially serve as a signal that the 
quality of medical care was suboptimal (Rutstein et al. 1983).  These researchers believed 
that the identification of sentinel events would allow researchers, policy makers, and 
managers to isolate the economic, political and social factors associated with these 




Rutstein’s work was reinvigorated in a slightly different form in the early 1990s.  
In 1990, John Billings published a paper that showed uninsured residents in Washington, 
D.C. reporting lower levels of outpatient access and higher rates of inpatient admissions 
for conditions that potentially could have been treated in an outpatient setting (Billings 
and Teicholz 1990).  A second study by Billings and colleagues examined the effects of 
socioeconomic status on hospital use in New York City (Billings et al. 1993).  This study 
found that lower income areas and areas with higher percentages of African-Americans 
were associated with higher rates of ambulatory sensitive admissions, concluding that 
“access to ambulatory care and the performance of the outpatient care delivery system 
may have a substantial effect on admission rates for a broad range of medical and 
surgical conditions” (Billings et al. 1993).   
The publication of this study was important in several respects.  First, it further 
established ambulatory care sensitive conditions as a viable stream of health services 
research and served as a catalyst for subsequent research in this area.  Second, the study 
shifted the emphasis to access to care, where the stated objectives were “to determine 
whether small-area analysis might become a useful tool for assessing barriers to 
outpatient care and for evaluating the effectiveness of programs designed to improve 
access to care” (Billings et al. 1993).  Third, the emphasis on access to outpatient care in 
a community opened the door to the use of small area variation techniques.     
Two additional conclusions from Billing’s initial studies are also notable.  First, 
the authors called attention to the fact that a broad range of personal factors are likely to 
contribute to access.  Second, they pointed out that the outpatient care delivery system, 




and ambulatory care sensitive admissions.  Both were suggested as areas of research 
deserving more attention.  Since 1990, research on ACSH has flourished, with over 100 
peer-reviewed, empirical articles using some variation of ACSH as an outcome (Table 1).  
This body of research has done an impressive job of identifying and expanding our 
knowledge of how personal factors are related to ACSH; however, the ACSH literature is 
somewhat lacking with respect to the second barrier - the health care delivery system.  
The following sections will elaborate on these gaps by describing the conceptual 
frameworks used to explain ACSH, the factors most often studied in the ACSH literature, 
and the methods used to study these factors.   
Table 1:  Number of reviewed articles by year  
  Number of articles % of Total 
2009 1 1.0% 
2008 13 12.9% 
2007 12 11.9% 
2006 10 9.9% 
2005 7 6.9% 
2004 8 7.9% 
2003 12 11.9% 
2002 4 4.0% 
2001 8 7.9% 
2000 2 2.0% 
1999 6 5.9% 
1998 5 5.0% 
1997 4 4.0% 
1996 4 4.0% 
1995 1 1.0% 
1994 2 2.0% 
1993 1 1.0% 
1992 0 0.0% 
1991 0 0.0% 
1990 1 1.0% 






Conceptual Framing of ACSH 
The use of ACSH as an indicator of access to outpatient care draws significantly 
from the small area variation (SAV) literature.  One of the fundamental objectives of 
small area variation studies is to document and explain variations in hospital utilization 
across communities (Wennberg and Gittelsohn 1973; Wennberg 1984).  Implicit in these 
approaches is a concern that variation may reflect inappropriate use of health services 
that unnecessarily deplete resources and expose patients to unnecessary risks associated 
with care (Goodman and Green 1996).  Consequently, the identification of factors that 
contribute to variations in utilization is believed to be important for improving the quality 
and costs of care.   
Three general explanations have been offered to explain small area variations.  
Early studies by Wennberg and colleagues attributed variations in utilization to physician 
practice style (Wennberg 1984; Wennberg, Freeman, and Culp 1987).  Differences in 
physician practice style are believed to emerge due to differences in attitudes, values, and 
opinions about the practice of medicine (Hardwick et al. 1975; Rothert et al. 1984; 
Williams et al. 1982).  These differences, combined with ambiguity surrounding the 
appropriate care for many clinical conditions, are associated with different norms of 
practice across communities, which manifest as variations in utilization (Fisher et al. 
2004; Wennberg, Fisher, and Skinner 2002).   
Other studies link variations in care to population characteristics such as 
socioeconomic status and education (Escarce 1993; Gottlieb, Beiser, and O'Connor 1995; 




varying degrees of need and ability to obtain health services, which in turn are associated 
with variations in utilization.   
The third and most recent stream of research that attempts to explain small area 
variations relates to provider supply.  In this literature, the relationship between provider 
supply and variations in care seems to depend upon the outcome being examined and 
how supply is measured.  ‘Generic’ studies of hospital admissions often argue that 
provider supply increases variation due to the supply sensitive nature of many medical 
services such as diagnostic testing and physician visits (Fisher et al. 2004; Wennberg, 
Fisher, and Skinner 2002).  However, most ACSH studies start with the assumption that 
greater provider supply improves outcomes and reduces variations because it increases 
the likelihood of getting care on an outpatient basis.     
Factors Associated with ACSH 
One of the most commonly used access frameworks is the Behavioral Model of 
Access, developed by Ronald Andersen in the late 1960s to explain why families use 
health services (Aday and Andersen 1974; Andersen and Aday 1978; Andersen 1995).  
The model has undergone several refinements over the years and remains one of the 
major frameworks used to understand health service utilization.  In its most recent 
version, access is considered a function of four dimensions: (1) environment; (2) 
population characteristics; (3) health behavior; and (4) outcomes (Figure 1) (Andersen 
1995).  This section utilizes this framework to synthesize the factors used to study ACSH.  
The following discussion considers the first three dimensions in order of their prevalence 
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Population characteristics are the most frequently studied dimension of access in 
the ACSH literature.  Population characteristics consist of predisposing, enabling, and 
need characteristics of the population at risk.  Amongst these characteristics, enabling 
characteristics are the most frequently studied, with over two-thirds of all studies 
including some type of enabling characteristic (Table 2).  Enabling characteristics refer to 
factors that describe a person’s means or ability to seek care, such as income, insurance 
coverage, or geographic proximity of health care providers.  Enabling characteristics are 
followed closely by predisposing characteristics, with two-thirds of all reviewed articles 
including predisposing characteristics.  Predisposing characteristics refer to those 
attributes that affect a person’s propensity to seek care, such as age, sex, race, or attitudes 
regarding health and illness.  Need characteristics are the least frequently studied 
population characteristic, with approximately one-quarter of all reviewed studies 
including need characteristics.  Need characteristics refer to a person’s illness burden.  
Examples of need characteristics include illness severity and comorbid conditions.       
In general, research has found population characteristics to be a consistent 
predictor of ACSH rates, although the direction of the relationships varies considerably 
across enabling, predisposing, and need characteristics.  Enabling characteristics display 
the most consistent results, with characteristics that reflect greater ability to seek out 
health services generally associated with lower rates of ACSH.  An interesting exception 
is insurance coverage, where studies have found newly covered Medicaid recipients to be 
positively associated with ACSH (Friedman et al. 1999; Saha et al. 2007).  Predisposing 
and need characteristics display more inconsistent results, typically depending upon the 





race and ethnicity is relatively unambiguous, with a great majority of the studies showing 
minorities to have more barriers and a lower propensity to seek care, and consequently 
higher rates of ACSH (Correa-de-Araujo, McDermott, and Moy 2006; Friedman and 
Basu 2004; Laditka and Laditka 2006; Oster and Bindman 2003).  In contrast, other 
predisposing characteristics such as age and gender exhibit conflicting relationships with 
ACSH rates, with studies finding these characteristics both positively and negatively 
associated with ACSH rates.  Similarly, the relationship between need and ACSH is 
conflicting, often depending upon how need is assessed.  Most studies find that the 
presence of a comorbid condition is positively associated with ACSH, while studies using 
specific case mix measures (e.g., Deyo-Charlson, DxCG) find a negative relationship 
between illness severity and ACSH. 
The environment is the second most prevalent dimension in the ACSH literature.  
The environment dimension consists of two primary characteristics, the health care 
system and the external environment.  The external environment refers to the economic, 
political, and social aspects of the health care environment; the health care system 
encompasses the structure and distribution of health care organizations and resources that 
make up the delivery system.  Within the overall environment dimension, studies of 
health care system characteristics are most popular.  Slightly more than one-third of all 
articles published since 1990 include some variable associated with the health care 
system, while only one-tenth of all studies include some external environment 








Table 2:  Number of reviewed articles by variable type  
  Number of articles % of Total 
External environment 11 10.9% 
Health care system 38 37.6% 
   Organizational characteristics 27 26.7% 
   Provider supply 27 26.7% 
Population characteristics 81 80.2% 
   Predisposing 67 66.3% 
      Age 39 38.6% 
      Attitude/knowledge of health services 10 9.9% 
      Gender 34 33.7% 
      Race/ethnicity 50 49.5% 
   Enabling 69 68.3% 
      Education 10 9.9% 
      Employment status 4 4.0% 
      Geography 24 23.8% 
      Income 39 38.6% 
      Insurance coverage 42 41.6% 
      Marital status 6 5.9% 
   Need 23 22.8% 
      Illness severity/comorbidities 23 22.8% 
Use of health services 33 32.7% 
Total  101   
 
Most external environment studies focus on the policy environment, typically 
examining whether a change in policy (e.g., Medicaid expansion) resulted in a significant 
change in access, measured as ACSH.  In general, these studies have found inconsistent 
results.  For example, a recent study by Bindman and colleagues (2008) demonstrated 
that an extension of the Medicaid enrollment period in California was associated with an 
11 percent reduction of ACSH in the two year period following implementation of the 
revised enrollment policy.  The analysis also indicated that the decrease in ACSH was 
associated with approximately $17 million in hospital savings across two years.  In 





that extended Medicaid coverage to all adults with incomes under the federal poverty 
level was associated with an increase in ACSH.  Additional analysis by Saha and 
colleagues indicated that the increase among Oregon residents was attributable to the 
newly insured (i.e., previously uninsured).   
Similar to studies of external environment characteristics, studies of the 
relationship between health care system characteristics and ACSH are best described as 
inconsistent.  This is not surprising given the broad range of characteristics included in 
the health care system category.  However, this description applies even when study 
variables are broken down into more specific characteristics.  Health care system 
variables within the ACSH literature can be grouped into two general categories: provider 
supply and organizational characteristics.  Provider supply studies focus on the number of 
medical resources in a market, such as physicians per capita or hospital beds per 1,000 
market residents.  Studies that include organizational characteristics typically focus on 
attributes of the provider organizations in a market.  Examples of organizational 
characteristics include hospital or nursing home ownership type, system or chain 
affiliation, and service mix of provider organizations.   
Provider supply studies predominantly assume that a greater number of providers 
will improve ACSH rates; however, results are conflicting.  Conflicting results appear to 
be due, in part, to different provider types that offer care in a community.  In other words, 
the effect of provider supply often depends upon the type of provider being examined.  
For example, Basu and colleagues (2002) found that each additional primary care 
physician per 1,000 market residents was associated with 80 percent lower probability of 





associated with a 40 percent greater probability of an ACSH.  Likewise, studies have 
found hospital supply, measured as hospital beds per capita, is both positively and 
nonsignificantly associated with ACSH rates, while community health center supply is 
consistently associated with lower rates of ACSH (Epstein 2001; Garg et al. 2003; Zhang 
et al. 2006).   
More recent research also suggests that overall supply may not be as important as 
the mixture of providers.  Mobley and colleagues (2006) found that markets with higher 
proportions of non-physician clinicians and higher proportions of international medical 
graduates were associated with lower rates of ACSH.  The authors suggest that these 
provider types have traditionally been more likely to locate in underserved areas and help 
satisfy unmet health demands.  Likewise, Laditka (2004) examined whether the racial 
diversity of physicians and threshold levels of physician supply were associated with 
ACSH among elderly living in 33 metropolitan areas.  Laditka found that physician 
diversity was associated with lower risks of ACSH and the overall supply of primary care 
physicians exhibited a nonlinear relationship with ACSH, where individuals in markets 
with low and high primary care physician supply had high ACSH risks, while residents of 
markets with intermediate levels of primary care physician supply were associated with 
lower risks. 
Studies that include organizational factors reflect even more heterogeneity than 
provider supply studies, at least in terms of the types of characteristics that are examined.  
As a consequence, there has been very little accumulation of research around specific 
organizational characteristics.  For example, only four studies focused on ownership type, 





homes.  One hospital and one nursing home study found a significant, positive 
relationship between for-profit ownership and ACSH, while the remaining two studies 
did not find any significant relationships.   
The least prevalent dimension in the ACSH literature is health behavior.  Health 
behavior includes two characteristics: personal health practices and use of health services.  
Personal health practices refer to a person’s lifestyle that may impact health outcomes, 
such as nutrition, smoking status, or alcohol use.  No studies were identified that included 
personal health practices.  Use of health services refers to the actual utilization of health 
care services.  Examples of health service use include physician visits and preventive 
health services.  Nearly one-third of the ACSH studies included measures of health 
service use.  The majority of these focused on outpatient service utilization, typically 
measuring the number of physician visits by individuals.  Contrary to most assumptions 
about outpatient care, most studies failed to find a significant association between 
outpatient utilization and ACSH.  In contrast, studies of inpatient utilization displayed 
mixed results, with an equal number of studies exhibiting positive and negative results.                
Research Methods Used to Study ACSH 
Research design   
ACSH studies are nearly exclusively quantitative in design, likely due to the 
dependence upon hospital discharge data to identify ACSH.  Researchers have also relied 
heavily on cross-sectional designs to evaluate the effects of different factors on ACSH.  
Since 1990, nearly three-quarters of all studies have performed cross-sectional analyses 
(Table 3).  Furthermore, trends indicate that the number of studies using cross-sectional 





use of population characteristics, with both types of studies using these variables in 
approximately 80 percent of their respective studies.  Cross-sectional studies were more 
likely to incorporate health care system characteristics (44.4%) than longitudinal studies 
(20.7%).  The opposite relationship exists for external environment characteristics, with 
only 8.3 percent of all cross-sectional studies including these characteristics compared to 
17.2 percent of all longitudinal studies.  Cross-sectional studies (70.8%) were slightly 
more likely than longitudinal studies (62.1%) to utilize outcomes aggregated across 



























Cross-sectional 1 100.0% 8 100.0% 13 76.5% 23 71.9% 27 64.3% 
Longitudinal 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 4 23.5% 9 28.1% 15 35.7% 
Market-level 0 0.0% 6 75.0% 7 41.2% 15 46.9% 11 26.2% 
Organization-level 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 3 17.6% 2 6.3% 3 7.1% 
Patient-level 1 100.0% 2 25.0% 8 47.1% 16 50.0% 31 73.8% 






Measurement of ACSH 
Several studies have validated the use of ACSH as a measure of access by 
comparing ACSH rates to self-rated assessments of access (Ansari, Laditka, and Laditka 
2006; Bindman et al. 1995).  Likewise, a number of studies have used Delphi panels of 
clinical experts to identify potentially avoidable hospitalizations and these panels have 
identified consistent conditions (Ansari, Laditka, and Laditka 2006; Billings et al. 1993).  
The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality also makes analytic tools readily 
available to researchers and practitioners, which creates consistency around the 
measurement of ACSH.  Based on this work, studies generally display a high level of 
consistency with respect to the data sources and methods of used to derive ACSH 
outcomes.   
The operationalization of ACSH also displays considerable consistency across the 
literature.  ACSH is typically operationalized as an event (e.g., admission) at the 
individual-level of analysis or a rate (e.g., number of admissions per capita) at the 
market-level.  There is more variation with respect to the level of analysis.  Over one-half 
of all reviewed articles measured ACSH at the individual-level, followed by market-level 
analyses (39 studies) and organizational-level analyses (8 studies) (Table 4).  Among the 
market-level studies, researchers tend to define the market differently.  The county was 
the most common definition with nearly one-quarter of all studies using this designation 
to demarcate a market, followed by the zip code, the health service area, and the state.  
Nearly 70 percent of all studies operationalized and modeled ACSH as an aggregated 





Table 4:  Number of reviewed articles by outcome variable characteristics  
  Number of articles % of Total 
Type of measurement     
   Event 47 46.5% 
   Number 10 9.9% 
   Rate 43 42.6% 
Level of analysis   
   Market 39 38.6% 
   Organization 8 7.9% 
   Individual 58 57.4% 
Clinical separation     
   Acute 3 3.0% 
   Chronic 22 21.8% 
   Acute/chronic combined 75 74.3% 
Outcome aggregation     
   Aggregate clinical conditions 69 68.3% 
   Separate clinical conditions 27 26.7% 
   Both separate and aggregate clinical 
conditions 8 7.9% 
Total  101   
 
Assessing the effects of provider supply 
Research on provider supply has typically focused on physicians, hospitals, or 
community health centers.  Approaches to measuring physician supply typically use some 
sort of physician count divided by the number of market residents (e.g., physicians per 
1,000 market residents).  Initial efforts used aggregated measures of physician supply that 
included all types of physicians.  Research indicating that aggregated measures conceal 
differences between primary care physicians and specialist physicians has resulted in 
more recent research separating these types of physicians when examining the 
relationship between physician supply and ACSH.   
Studies of hospital supply have taken an approach similar to physician supply 





community health center supply have taken a simpler approach, typically measuring 
whether a community health center is present in a market.  Only two studies were 
identified that looked at nursing homes; both of which looked at attributes of the nursing 
home as opposed to the number of nursing homes or supply of nursing home beds in a 
market.  Studies of health maintenance organizations are present in the ACSH literature; 
however, these studies have focused on enrollment in different types of health insurance 
products (e.g., HMO vs. traditional indemnity) or HMO penetration rate in a market 
rather than the number or supply of HMOs per se.   
Limitations of ACSH Research  
Conceptual framing of ACSH 
Thus far, no explanation has emerged as the definitive explanation of small area 
variations.  Moreover, research in all three areas suggests that each explanation has merit, 
leading some analysts to call for evaluations that consider all three perspectives (Davis et 
al. 2000; Stano 1991).  Evaluation of the independent and joint effects of physician 
practice patterns, socioeconomic status, and provider supply is important for several 
reasons.  First, some research suggests that variations may be a mixture of these 
explanations that are contingent upon different factors.  For example, Gittelsohn and 
Powe (1995) found that the rate of nondiscretionary surgery was affected more by 
morbidity, while the rate of discretionary surgery was affected more by provider supply.  
Other research has found that the effect of market and population characteristics on 
variations in care may depend upon the medical condition, with socioeconomic 
characteristics playing a stronger role than physician practice style for chronic medical 





  Studies using multiple perspectives are also important because the managerial 
and policy recommendations that flow from this type of research are likely to differ 
depending upon the explanation that is offered.  For example, studies indicating that 
physician practice style is the most significant predictor of variation may result in efforts 
to reduce variation via utilization review or physician education.  In contrast, studies 
indicating that provider supply is a better predictor of variation might result in policy to 
modify or regulate the number of providers in market or reallocate providers.  Examples 
of such policies are certificate of need regulations and programs to increase the number 
of primary care providers in health professional shortage areas.          
Although some work has been done to broaden the analysis in the general small 
area variation literature, thus far most ACSH research has not incorporated multiple 
perspectives.  Some notable exceptions provide examples of what these studies would 
look like.  Bindman and colleagues’ (1995) examination of the relationship between 
perceptions of access and ACSH in California communities provides a good example 
from the ACSH literature that includes all three perspectives.  In this mixed method 
study, the researchers attempted to separate the effects of physician practice style and 
perceptions of access while controlling for population characteristics.  The results showed 
that both perceptions of access and physician practice style have independent effects on 
the rate of ACSH.  Other studies in the ACSH literature that utilize multiple explanations 
typically focus on provider supply and population characteristics.  For example, Laditka 
(2004) examined the effects of physician supply and physician diversity on ACSH while 
controlling for the predisposing, enabling, and need characteristics of market residents.  





and ACSH while controlling for a number of population characteristics such as age, race, 
and gender.   
While most ACSH research to date has taken a narrow perspective in its empirical 
investigation, a somewhat paradoxical limitation exists with respect to the conceptual 
work on ACSH.  ACSH research is often overly broad in its framing as an issue of 
access.  Access research encompasses a broad range of theoretical, empirical, and 
disciplinary traditions (Berk and Schur 1998; Gold 1998).  One interpretation of the 
ACSH research is that its generic appeal to a broad and diffuse literature has left the field 
relatively void of formal theoretical explanations of how specific factors actually affect 
ACSH.  In other words, studies often settle for identifying factors that are associated with 
ACSH with far less attention to exploring the underlying mechanisms by which 
characteristics such as provider supply affect hospitalization rates (Stano 1991; Westert 
and Groenewegen 1999).  If research is to fulfill its promise to inform policy and 
managerial decision making, then there is a need to provide more focused, theoretically 
based explanations of the relationship between these factors and ACSH.  Among the 
studies that actually utilize a formal theoretical perspective, the Behavioral Model of 
Access is the most common framework adopted.  However, even this framework is broad 
and focuses on what factors are associated with access more so than how these factors 
affect access.  
Factors used to study ACSH   
There are a number of limitations related to the content of ACSH studies.  First, 
these studies have predominantly focused on population characteristics.  Researchers 





vs. insured, Medicaid vs. private, continuous vs. interrupted) and whether these 
differences are associated with higher or lower ACSH rates.  This narrow focus is 
problematic for several reasons.  First, many of the population characteristics are 
immutable and the policy or managerial interventions available to address these 
relationships are unclear at best.  For example, it is unclear what types of policy options 
exist to address results suggesting that males have higher rates of ACSH.  
Also problematic is the fact that more nuanced examinations of population characteristics 
may come at the expense of exploring how other factors affect ACSH.  Largely missing 
in the literature is the role of the delivery system.  The delivery system is important 
because it represents an intermediate and interfacing role between the broader policy 
environment and the actual consumption of health services by consumers.  Given this 
interfacing role, the structure of the delivery system is likely to have important 
implications for the fit between what services are offered and what services are needed by 
consumers.   
More recent work has begun to include structural characteristics, particularly how 
provider supply improves or impedes access (DeLia 2003; Epstein 2001; Krakauer et al. 
1996; Kronman et al. 2008).  The basic theoretical argument offered in these studies is 
that higher levels of provider supply open up more points of access, giving consumers 
more opportunity to seek out care from these providers and reduce the likelihood of a 
medical condition escalating to the point of needing inpatient care (Laditka and Laditka 
2001; Laditka and Laditka 1999).  However, conflicting relationships between ACSH and 





hospital supply suggest that provider supply may actually increase ACSH under some 
circumstances (Chang, Mirvis, and Waters 2008; Laditka, Laditka, and Probst 2005).   
Another limitation of the ACSH research to date is that it has explored a very 
narrow set of health care system characteristics.  Specifically, studies that include health 
care system characteristics typically examine physician supply.  Such a narrow focus 
ignores many other types of health care providers that offer primary care in a market and 
ignores much of the care coordination that occurs between these providers.  For instance, 
only four studies were identified that included nursing homes and no studies examined 
whether home health agencies were associated with ACSH.   
Another consequence of this narrow focus is an absence of research that considers 
how organizations affect access and ACSH.  Most ACSH studies include organizational 
characteristics as control variables, which significantly limits attempts to explore the role 
of health care organizations in explaining variations in ACSH.  In other words, most 
studies are concerned with controlling for the effects of organizations with far less 
attention devoted to explaining how organizations might actively contribute to problems 
of or improvements in access.  Furthermore, when controlling for organizations, 
researchers have typically focused on characteristics that suffer from some of the same 
limitations of studies focused on population characteristics.  Specifically, they often focus 
on relatively stable characteristics such as ownership, teaching status, or geographic 
location.  While these characteristics are not as immutable as some of the population 
characteristics such as race or gender, they still display a fair amount of stability over 





managerial interventions.  More tractable organizational options, such as service offering 
and strategic partnerships, are significantly underrepresented in this literature.   
Research design  
There are two notable and related limitations to the use of cross-sectional designs 
to study ACSH: causality and temporal trends.  First, a number of reports have 
documented changing rates of ACSH over time (Kozak, Hall, and Owings 2001; 
Kruzikas et al. 2004).  The use of cross-sectional designs may only provide a snapshot of 
the relationship in time and lead to spurious results.  Second, cross-sectional designs have 
limitations with respect to causality.  It is worth noting that concerns about reverse 
causality may not be equally distributed across the ACSH literature and will likely vary 
by the relationship under study.  Studies of the relationship between individual, 
immutable characteristics such as race and gender are not likely to suffer from these 
issues of causality.  For example, a person’s race or gender cannot be changed based on 
the ACSH rate in a market.  However, studies of more mutable characteristics, such as 
insurance coverage or provider supply need to attend to these issues.  For example, an 
increasing number of ACSH might lead hospitals to increase the number of beds 
available in a market.  As more and more studies expand beyond the immutable 
characteristics of individuals and markets, there is a need to utilize more rigorous, 
longitudinal designs to control for these issues.                  
ACSH Measurement  
Although the literature displays remarkable consistency in its approach to 
measuring ACSH, there are several methodological issues that deserve attention.  First, 





clinical conditions and model ACSH as an aggregated outcome.  Aggregation can be 
problematic in several ways.  If aggregation mutes underlying variation across different 
clinical conditions, then results may be more likely to be nonsignificant.  Similarly, 
aggregating outcomes may conceal relationships that exist between predictors and 
separate clinical conditions.  For example, a study by Howard and colleagues (2007) 
compared the rates of hospitalization between African-American and white Medicare 
beneficiaries in North Carolina for 8 different ambulatory care sensitive conditions across 
4 years.  The study found that African-American beneficiaries had higher rates for 
diabetes, adult asthma, urinary tract infection, dehydration, and congestive heart failure; 
white beneficiaries had statistically significant higher rates for chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease, bacterial pneumonia, and angina.  Future studies should consider if 
and how aggregated outcomes might obscure underlying variation.   
Provider Supply Measurement 
Most ACSH research has typically focused on a single provider type, such as 
physicians or community health centers, which means that most studies of ACSH ignore 
the effects of other provider types that offer primary care in a market.  The complex, 
fragmented nature of the health care system means that comprehensive primary care 
likely requires services from multiple provider types.   For example, an elderly adult with 
diabetes living independently may depend upon a primary care physician for routine 
services, a home health agency for support services, and an outpatient hospital for case 
management and laboratory services.  Research is needed that reflects multiple provider 
types that provide care in a market. 





A review of the ACSH literature reveals a body of research that has experienced 
considerable growth over the past 20 years.  This research displays remarkable 
consistency in its conceptualization as a phenomenon of access.  However, this 
conceptualization appears to have had some consequences with respect to the theoretical 
and empirical relationships that have been examined.  From a content standpoint, most 
research has focused on population characteristics and we know the most about how 
these characteristics improve and impede access to care and affect ACSH.  Far less is 
known about how other aspects of care, such as the health delivery system, affect ACSH.  
Although researchers have begun to turn their attention to some aspects of the health 
delivery system, thus far the focus has been relatively narrow.  Similarly, from a 
theoretical standpoint, most research heavily depends upon access frameworks that 
consistently appeal to greater levels of provider supply as the solution to ACSH.  To date 
there has been little exploration of other theoretical frameworks that might explain how 
the structure of the health delivery system may affect access and ACSH.   
In sum, this review has identified a number of limitations and gaps that future 
research should address.  The following list summarizes these gaps as well as a number 
of questions that extend from these limitations.     
1. Research often utilizes access frameworks that invoke overly broad causal factors 
and have considerably less to say about  the underlying causal mechanism(s) by 
which these factors affect ACSH.  Furthermore, research is often overly 
dependent upon access frameworks that emphasize greater levels of provider 
supply as the solution to ACSH.     





2. Predominant focus on population characteristics has led to more and more 
nuanced explorations of population characteristics and relatively little 
understanding of the effects of the health care delivery system.  Among the 
studies that do include health care system characteristics, there is a narrow focus 
on physician supply.  Furthermore, these studies often focus on provider supply in 
isolation without consideration of other provider types.   
- Does the relationship between provider supply and ACSH differ when the 
effects of other provider types are controlled for?      
- Are there other aspects of market structure, other than provider supply, 
that may be important for improving ACSH outcomes?    
 
3. Use of aggregated ACSH outcomes may conceal significant effects of health care 
system characteristics. 
- Does the relationship between market structure and ACSH vary by the 
method of measuring ACSH? 
4. Extensive use of cross-sectional designs do not account for changing ACSH rates 
over time.  
- Does the relationship between market structure and ACSH persist after 
controlling for changes in ACSH over time? 
Limitations Addressed in the Study 
This study addresses these gaps with a market-level analysis of the effects of 
primary care market structure on ACSH rates.  In doing so, the study addresses two 





multiple perspectives that analysts have identified as important for advancing research on 
small area variations but are often missing in the literature.  It does this by controlling for 
population characteristics and use of health services while examining the effects of 
provider supply and inter-organizational relationships on ACSH rates.  The second 
conceptual limitation addressed in the study is the appeal to overly broad access 
frameworks that often lack detail regarding the underlying mechanism by which market 
structure may affect access and ACSH.  The study addresses this limitation by specifying 
a ‘control-and-coordination’ mechanism by which provider supply and inter-
organizational relationships may affect access and ACSH.  This mechanism also provides 
an alternative to the ‘more points of access’ explanation typically used in the literature.    
There are two primary content limitations addressed in this study.  First, the focus 
on two health care system characteristics, provider supply and inter-organizational 
relationships, expands the focus beyond population characteristics that have dominated 
the literature to date.  The focus on multiple provider types also extends the literature 
beyond relatively narrow examinations of physician supply.  Second, the study’s focus on 
the effects of organizations on ACSH extends previous research that simply attempted to 
control for the effects of organizations.  Furthermore, the focus on inter-organizational 
relationships arguably represents a more mutable aspect of the local delivery system, one 
that may be more amenable to influence by local stakeholders. 
Three methodological limitations that exist in the ACSH literature are addressed 
in this study.  First, the study uses a pooled, cross-sectional time series design.  Although 
this design does not permit as strong of a statement regarding causality as more 





temporal trends that may confound pure cross-sectional designs.  Second, the inclusion of 
multiple provider types in the regression models controls for the effects of other provider 
types that may provide competitive or complementary services in a market.  Likewise, 
the modeling strategy used in the study allows one to isolate the effects of health care 
system characteristics from the effects of population characteristics and health service 
utilization.  Finally, the study includes a supplemental analysis that examines whether 
aggregated ACSH rates conceal variation that exists at the level of specific clinical 
conditions.   
The following chapter describes the theoretical perspective used in the study and 
develops hypotheses related to the gaps identified above.  The methods chapter describes 






Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses 
 Ambulatory care sensitive hospitalizations (ACSH) have been recommended as 
indicators of the adequacy of the primary care system (Institute of Medicine 1996).  
Access frameworks have been the predominant theoretical approach used to study ACSH.  
This research has generally emphasized barriers to entry, often focusing on either how 
health care is financed for individuals (e.g., uninsured, health maintenance organization, 
Medicare) or demographic (e.g., race, gender) and socioeconomic (e.g., income, 
education) characteristics of individuals.  In contrast, relatively little empirical research 
has examined the structural features of the health care system and how health care 
providers are organized.  This study addresses this gap by examining two features of 
market structure, provider supply and inter-organizational relationships.  The study 
utilizes a structure-conduct-performance framework and uses insights from the provider 
supply and inter-organizational relationships literature to supplement this framework and 
explain how market structure may influence care coordination and ACSH in a market.     
This chapter develops formal hypotheses regarding ACSH.  The chapter begins 
with a discussion of the structure-conduct-performance framework.  The second section 
examines how the market is defined and the types of organizations considered in the 
study.  The third section discusses the connection between market structure, coordination, 
and ACSH, followed by the development of formal hypotheses.  The chapter concludes 






 The structure-conduct-performance framework was developed in the industrial 
organizations literature in the 1930s by Edward Mason (Grimm, Lee, and Smith 2005).  
The fundamental premise of the structure-conduct-performance (S-C-P) framework is 
that the structure of an organization’s external environment determines organizational 
behavior, which in turn dictates performance (Grimm, Lee, and Smith 2005; Hoskisson et 
al. 1999; Porter 1981).  In its early formulation, structure referred simply to the number 
of buyers and sellers in an industry, conduct referred to the strategic and tactical 
decisions made by firms, and performance typically referred to profit.  This framework 
was extended in the 1950s and 1960s by Joe Bain, who broadened the structure category 
to include things such as product differentiation, cost structure, and vertical integration in 
an industry (Grimm, Lee, and Smith 2005).  This framework was extended further in the 
1980s by Michael Porter.  Porter’s Five Forces framework (1980) was developed to 
describe the competitive structure of an industry and help firms determine a competitive 
strategic position vis-à-vis other firms in the industry.   
Researchers using the S-C-P framework assume that strong linkages between 
structure-conduct and conduct-performance result in predictable relationships between an 
organization’s environment and its performance.  Therefore, empirical studies using this 
framework have typically examined the relationship between structure and performance 
(Conner 1991; Hoskisson et al. 1999).  This study uses a modified S-C-P approach by 
evaluating the relationship between local market structure and ACSH.  It differs from 
other S-C-P research in that it uses coordination of care to describe some of the 





is also differs from other S-C-P research because of its examination of market structure in 
multiple industries within the same study (e.g., acute care hospitals, long-term care 
organizations, physician organizations).   
Defining a Primary Care Market 
This study defines a primary care market as the set of primary care organizations 
in a county responsible for providing or coordinating primary care.  The definition of a 
primary care market used in the study is more inclusive than previous definitions.  
Specifically, it includes multiple types of provider organizations that provide or 
coordinate primary care.  The decision to use a more inclusive definition was based on a 
number of considerations.  First, the definition used in the study aligns with emerging 
primary care frameworks that emphasize the role of health care organizations, either as 
direct providers of primary care services or as employers of health care practitioners who 
provide primary care services (Hogg et al. 2007; Starfield 1998, 2001).  These newer 
frameworks can be contrasted with older frameworks that characterized primary care 
principally as a function of individuals such as physicians and non-physician clinicians 
who provide health care (Institute of Medicine 1996).  Organizations play an important 
intermediary role between the socioeconomic and political environment and consumers.  
Organizational decisions about what services to offer and how they are offered are just a 
couple of the decisions that make up the structure of a primary care market and are likely 
to affect how people interact with the local primary care system.    
Second, a more inclusive definition of a primary care market is consistent with the 
evolution of the health care delivery system that increasingly relies on communities of 





complex and turbulent health care environments have given rise to coalitions and 
strategic partnerships to meet the complex health care needs of an older population facing 
more chronic diseases.  An emphasis on communities of organizations highlights several 
important considerations that affect access to and outcomes of care.  First, transitions in 
care and coordination occur between multiple provider types in a community (Hogg et al. 
2007; Starfield 2001, 2008).  To ignore these considerations misses an important aspect 
of the health care system where breakdowns in quality often occur (Coleman 2003; 
Coleman and Berenson 2004).  Second, provider’ decisions are not made in a vacuum 
and are based on opportunities afforded by the market and the actions of other 
organizations in a market.  A focus on communities of organizations more accurately 
reflects the systemic nature of health care.     
Importance of Primary Care Organizations for Improving Access & ACSH 
Most research has conceptualized ACSH as reflective of access to primary care in 
a market (Billings and Teicholz 1990; Billings et al. 1993).  Primary care refers to the 
level of the health system where a person can access frontline, continuous, 
comprehensive, and coordinated care (Starfield 1993, 1998).  For purposes of this study, 
the set of organizations that make up a primary care market includes community health 
centers (CHC), group/staff model health maintenance organizations (HMO), medical 
groups/physician organizations (PO), nursing homes (NH), and home health agencies 
(HHA).  These organizations were selected due to their role in providing or coordinating 
primary care services in a community.  Although no other studies have examined these 
organizations collectively, with the exception of home health agencies, all organizations 






Hospitals have been and continue to represent one of the largest components of 
the health care delivery system.  In 2005, over $611 billion were spent on hospital 
services, representing 31 percent of the total health care expenditures in the U.S. 
(National Center for Health Statistics 2007).  Furthermore, the shift in services offered by 
hospitals, from inpatient to outpatient services, means that hospitals are increasingly 
playing an important role in improving access to care at the community level.   
The hospital population is limited to all general, acute care hospitals in the state of 
California.  Military and specialty hospitals are excluded from the analysis.  General, 
acute care hospitals have been selected because they provide the majority of acute care 
services to the general population.  Moreover, general, acute care hospitals also provide 
similar services (acute inpatient; general outpatient) and face similar regulatory and 
competitive pressures, making comparisons across hospitals more valid. 
Community health centers (CHCs) 
For purposes of this study, community health centers include federally qualified 
health centers (FQHC), look-alike federally qualified health centers, and free clinics.  
Community health centers play a critical role in a community by being the predominant 
provider of primary care for medically underserved populations.  In 2007, approximately 
6,600 CHCs across the United States accommodated over 63 million visits by 16 million 
patients (NACHC, 2008).  California alone has nearly 800 CHCs, which provided 
services to over 2.3 million California residents in 2007.  With nearly one in three 





minorities, and one in nine patients being rural residents, CHCs play a pivotal role in how 
community residents access the health care delivery system.  
Physician organizations  
A physician organization is defined as a formal organization used for the purposes 
of achieving clinical or administrative integration on behalf of physicians (Kongstvedt, 
1997; Robinson and Casalino, 1996).  In this study, physician organizations include both 
medical groups and independent physician associations.  While physician organizations 
often do not directly provide patient care to patients, physician organizations help their 
physician constituents formally connect with other health care organizations.  For 
example, physician organizations may negotiate and manage contracts with health plans 
on behalf of physician members.  Likewise, physician organizations are increasingly used 
as a conduit to help physicians connect electronically with hospitals and other physicians 
in a community (Casalino et al. 2003; Gans et al. 2005).  Increased emphasis on health 
information technology, along with the large capital costs of this technology, has given 
physician organizations a new facilitative role among physicians.  Their ability to 
coordinate collective action on the part of individual physician practices makes physician 
organizations an integral part of the local health care community.  This is particularly true 
in California where physician organizations tend to be better organized and more 
effective at representing the interests of physicians (Enthoven and Singer, 1996).   
Staff/group model Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs)   
In 2006, nearly 50% of all California residents were enrolled in a health 
maintenance organization (HMO), the most of any state in the United States (National 





group model HMOs.  A staff model HMO is an organization that delivers health services 
through a physician group that is employed by the HMO, while a group model HMO is 
an organization that contracts with one independent physician group to provide health 
services (InterStudy, 2000).  Staff and group model HMOs were chosen for several 
reasons.  First, group model HMOs, such as Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, are more 
prevalent in California than other states.  This, combined with the fact that staff and 
group model HMOs directly provide medical care to a large number of California 
residents, makes them an important organizational type to consider when evaluating 
access to ambulatory care in a community.  Finally, staff and group model HMOs differ 
from IPA and network HMOs in that they exclusively contract with a physician group for 
the provision of health services.  Exclusive contracting by staff and group model HMOs 
allows one to isolate the physicians practicing in these settings from community health 
centers and physician organizations, which may hold contracts with multiple IPA and 
network HMOs.  In other words, physicians practicing in staff and group model HMOs 
would not be accounted for by community health centers, independent physician 
associations, and medical groups. 
Home health agencies (HHAs)   
A push for more outpatient-based services, combined with an aging and more 
chronically ill population, has increased the demand for home-based services.  In 2006, 
there were nearly 9,000 Medicare-certified home care agencies in the U.S. that made 
nearly 104 million visits to 3.3 million clients (National Center for Health Statistics 





Importantly, over 50% of these visits were to patients with diagnoses related to 
preventable conditions (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 2007).   
Home health agencies coordinate a wide range of health and social services in a 
home environment.  These services range from registered nursing services for post-acute 
care to nursing aide services to assist with daily activities that can no longer be conducted 
independently.  Given the wide range of services offered by these organizations, the 
home health agency category is defined to include only Medicare-certified home health 
agencies to make comparisons across agencies more valid.   
Nursing homes   
Over 1.4 million people were residents of nursing homes in 2004 (National Center 
for Health Statistics 2006).  It is estimated that the U.S. health care system spent nearly 
$122 billion on nursing home care in 2005, approximately 6.1% of all health care 
expenditures (National Center for Health Statistics 2007).  Grabowski and colleagues 
(2007) found that New York nursing home residents had over 23,000 hospitalizations 
related to ambulatory care sensitive conditions, accounting for over $223 million dollars 
in total costs in 2004.  Given the increasing number of elderly and the elevated health 
needs of an older population, these facilities hold considerable potential to improve 
access by coordinating primary care and providing support services that help residents 
obtain medical services.  For example, nursing homes may contract with pharmacists to 
make rounds at the nursing home and provide consultations that are not directly provided 
by the nursing home staff.  Likewise, nursing homes may coordinate special medical 
services with specialist physicians or ancillary providers such as physical therapy.  A 





may have important effects on ACSH rates by affecting the quality and timeliness of non-
hospital based care received by nursing home residents.  Similar to home health agencies, 
the nursing home category is defined to include only Medicare-certified skilled nursing 
facilities.       
Market Structure, Coordination, and ACSH 
Market structure is defined as the supply of and relationships between 
organizations in a defined geographic area.  Although broader than many definitions of 
market structure used in the health services literature, it is consistent with other work that 
considers structure to be made up of multiple dimensions (Luke and Walston 2003; Scott 
et al. 2000).  The premise of the study is that provider supply and inter-organizational 
relationships shape the care coordination activities that occur in a market, which in turn 
affects ACSH.  Coordination of care is defined as the set of activities that link health care 
providers, health services, and relevant clinical information to meet some stated health 
goal or patient need (Institute of Medicine 2001; Starfield 1993).  Examples of 
coordination activities include nurse case managers that distribute information to 
physicians and information technology that provides diagnostic results to practitioners.  
Research has found care coordination to be associated with greater efficiency and 
improved clinical outcomes (Aiken, Sochalski, and Lake 1997; Gittell, Fairfield, and 
Bierbaum 2000; Knaus, Draper, and Wagner 1986; Shortell, Jones et al. 2000; Shortell et 
al. 1994).   
It should be noted here that coordination serves as a latent, intermediate 
mechanism between market structure and ACSH; thus, the study does not directly 





both reflects and shapes coordination in important ways that affect access and can be 
used as a proxy for coordination (Macinko, Starfield, and Shi 2003; Starfield, Shi, and 
Macinko 2005).  There are several mechanisms by which market structure might affect 
care coordination.  The following sections describe these mechanisms and develop formal 
hypotheses surrounding the effects of provider supply and inter-organizational 
relationships.  
Provider supply  
Provider supply is a robust area of health services research and policy 
development.  Provider supply plays an important role in the overall health care system in 
part because it reflects access to care (Cunningham and Hadley 2004; Grumbach and 
Bodenheimer 2002; Macinko, Starfield, and Shi 2007).  However, ongoing debates 
surrounding the existence of provider shortages (e.g., physicians, community health 
centers) and oversupply (e.g., certificate of need requirements for hospitals and nursing 
homes) call attention to the uncertainty that exists with respect to the ‘right’ level of 
provider supply (Blumenthal 2004; Cunningham and Hadley 2004; Forrest 2006).  These 
debates and the uncertainty that they highlight also raise questions of the actual impact of 
provider supply on outcomes of care.  Thus, the first dimension of market structure 
examined is provider supply.  Two aspects of provider supply are examined in the study: 
(1) provider capacity, or supply relative to the population base; and (2) provider 
composition, or supply relative to other health care providers in the market.   
Provider capacity 
Consistent with most provider supply research, the effects of provider supply on 





consumers gain entry into the delivery system.  These explanations propose that ‘more 
points of access’ in the form of greater provider supply will reduce barriers to care and 
allow patients to receive more timely care on an outpatient basis.  Such arguments are 
based on supply and demand relationships that are concerned solely with the capacity of a 
local market to meet the basic health care needs of its residents.  However, there are 
considerations in addition to capacity that likely affect whether care offered by these 
providers ultimately improves outcomes.  Coordination of care is one such consideration.   
From a coordination of care perspective, there may be disadvantages to a large 
number of providers in a market.  More organizations in a market add complexity to the 
local delivery system.  Increased complexity increases the cost and effort associated with 
communicating and coordinating activities across providers.  A provider’s ability to 
cultivate relationships may decrease as markets become heavily populated with health 
care organizations, further diminishing communication and coordination across 
providers.  For consumers, a proliferation of multiple, duplicative providers may also 
diminish their ability to navigate an already complex delivery system.     
In contrast, a limited number of providers in a market may be associated with 
better control over how consumers and providers engage the health care delivery system 
and utilize resources (Provan and Milward 1995).  For example, the quality of a patient 
referral may be enhanced if a physician is more aware of the various care options.  This 
awareness may be diminished when the number of choices is expansive.  Similarly, 
physicians and patients may be better able to assess the quality of provider care when 
there is a more manageable set of options, which in turn may enhance care seeking 





A limited supply of providers may also enhance the effectiveness of primary care 
delivery by increasing the frequency and quality of interactions among providers in a 
market (Starfield et al. 2005).  More frequent interactions are likely to create greater trust 
and familiarity between providers and improve the quantity and quality of shared 
information (Coleman 1988; Krackhardt 1992; Uzzi 1997).  This is an increasingly 
important consideration in health care where patients often receive care from a number of 
different providers in a community and patient ‘handoffs’ are a noted problem for care 
coordination (Coleman and Berenson 2004; Dudas et al. 2001; Moore et al. 2003).  
Another benefit of frequent interactions and the trust that ensues is decreased transaction 
costs associated with care coordination (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Williamson 1981).   
Greater trust and familiarity decreases the costs of monitoring the behaviors of exchange 
partners and may result in more or better coordination across local providers.  For 
example, primary care physicians may be more likely to make referrals if they trust 
specialists to refer patients back when treatment is completed or not necessary.   
Given these considerations, this study examines whether the relationship between 
provider supply and ACSH is a combination of the ‘more points of access’ and ‘control-
and-coordination’ perspectives.  Based on this combined perspective, it is hypothesized 
that additional provider options may open up more points of access to a certain point; but 
beyond that point, more services compromise efforts to coordinate services and navigate 
the local delivery system.  In other words, access to care at the extremes (too few 
providers and too many providers) is associated with higher rates of ACSH.   At the low 
end, consumers may not be able to receive primary care services in a timely manner that 





coordination is compromised because there are too many points of access.  In sum, it is 
expected that:    
Hypothesis 1a:  The rate of ACSH in a market will exhibit a U-shaped, non-
monotonic relationship with community health center capacity.      
Hypothesis 1b:  The rate of ACSH in a market will exhibit a U-shaped, non-
monotonic relationship with home health agency capacity.      
Hypothesis 1c:  The rate of ACSH in a market will exhibit a U-shaped, non-
monotonic relationship with staff/group HMOs capacity.      
Hypothesis 1d:  The rate of ACSH in a market will exhibit a U-shaped, non-
monotonic relationship with hospital capacity.      
Hypothesis 1e:  The rate of ACSH in a market will exhibit a U-shaped, non-
monotonic relationship with nursing home capacity.      
Hypothesis 1f:  The rate of ACSH in a market will exhibit a U-shaped, non-
monotonic relationship with physician organization capacity.      
Provider composition 
By definition, care coordination entails a relationship between two or more 
providers (Gittell et al. 2000; Institute of Medicine 1996; Starfield 2001).  The 
importance of inter-organizational relationships for coordinating care suggests that 
provider supply relative to other organizations in a market may be another important 
consideration for understanding ACSH.  Therefore, another feature of provider supply 
considered in the study is the composition or ratio of organizations in a market.  





agencies, nursing homes, physician organizations, and staff/group model HMOs relative 
to hospitals.   
Hospitals are used as the reference provider type because they differ from the 
other provider types in several important ways that may affect their ability or willingness 
to coordinate care in ways that affect ACSH.  First, there is research showing hospital 
capacity associated with higher ACSH rates (Laditka, Laditka, and Probst 2005; Penfold 
et al. 2008; Schreiber and Zielinski 1997), which some have suggested is a result of 
conflicting financial incentives with respect to ACSH (Siu et al. 2009).  ACSH 
undoubtedly contribute to a hospital’s inpatient revenues.  A reduction in ACSH could 
represent a significant challenge for a hospital depending upon the balance of inpatient 
and outpatient services and a hospital’s ability to offset losses in inpatient revenue by 
providing more outpatient services.  In contrast, other primary care organizations such as 
those considered in this study likely face less ambiguous incentives to provide care on an 
outpatient basis, sometimes even in the form of direct financial incentives to avoid these 
types of admissions.  This contrast in financial incentives may create a ‘pull-pull’ 
dynamic between hospitals and other provider types, with hospitals seeking ways to 
secure inpatient stays and ambulatory provider types seeking ways to prevent them.   
Hospitals also differ from other care providers in the types of relationships 
established with patients and the coordination opportunities that extend from these 
relationships.  Coordination of care typically entails a continuous care relationship 
between a provider and a patient (Grumbach and Bodenheimer 2002; Starfield 1998; 
Starfield and Shi 2004).  However, the organizations examined in this study are not likely 





Differences emerge due to the types of services offered by providers (e.g., short-term 
acute care), financing mechanisms that encourage certain long-standing relationships 
between patients and providers (e.g., designated primary care physicians in HMOs), and 
even normative expectations about the care that should be provided by these different 
provider types.  As a result, these organizations may be more likely than hospitals to 
establish long-term relationships with patients that allow these provider types to exercise 
better control over how patients access health services.  In combination, it is expected 
that a greater supply of ambulatory provider types relative to hospitals will be associated 
with lower rates of ACSH.   
Hypothesis 2a:  The rate of ACSH in a market will be negatively associated with 
the community health center-to-hospital ratio.      
Hypothesis 2b:  The rate of ACSH in a market will be negatively associated with 
the home health agency-to-hospital ratio.      
Hypothesis 2c:  The rate of ACSH in a market will be negatively associated with 
the nursing home-to-hospital ratio.      
Hypothesis 2d:  The rate of ACSH in a market will be negatively associated with 
the physician organization-to-hospital ratio.      
Hypothesis 2e:  The rate of ACSH in a market will be negatively associated with 
the staff/group model HMO-to-hospital ratio.      
Inter-organizational Relationships   
The U.S. health care system is becoming more interconnected.  Spurred by 
increasingly specialized environments and more complex health care needs, health care 





across the service delivery continuum and recent years have witnessed a proliferation of 
collaborative organizational forms.  Such changes raise questions of whether 
collaborations between organizations are having any meaningful effect on the delivery of 
health services.  Therefore, the second dimension of market structure considered in this 
study is inter-organizational relationships.  Two specific types of inter-organizational 
relationships are examined in the study: (1) horizontal integration between hospitals and 
(2) vertical integration between hospitals and physician organizations, nursing homes, 
and insurance products.   
Organizations establish inter-organizational relationships for a number of reasons.  
Some analysts suggest that inter-organizational relationships help reduce uncertainty in 
the external environment (Aldrich 1979; Pennings 1981; Whetten 1981).  In a related 
vein, inter-organizational relationships can help an organization acquire resources, both 
economic (e.g., clients, raw materials) and non-economic (e.g., information, legitimacy) 
(Aldrich and Pfeffer 1976; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978).  Finally, inter-organizational 
relationships can help align goals and reduce transaction costs, thereby improving 
operational efficiency (Mick 1990; Williamson 1981).  
Previous arguments suggested that provider supply is related to ACSH by means 
of coordination.  Implicit in these arguments is the presence of a relationship between 
two organizations, a precursor to actual coordination.  Inter-organizational relationships 
may provide a more proximate assessment of coordination in a market by examining 
whether a relationship actually exists between organizations.  The general hypothesis is 
that markets with a greater degree of inter-organizational relationships will be associated 





divided across multiple provider types, inter-organizational relationships should facilitate 
greater control over care coordination activities across settings.   
Horizontal integration.  Horizontal integration is defined as the combination of 
similar organizations that changes the scale of services and operations of the integrating 
organizations (Chandler 1990; Clement 1988).  For hospitals, horizontal integration 
encompasses a broad array of organizational forms, including multihospital systems, 
networks, mergers and acquisitions, and strategic alliances between local hospitals (Burns 
and Pauly 2002; Clement 1988).  This study focuses on multihospital systems because of 
their extensive growth over the time period examined (Cuellar and Gertler 2006; Spetz, 
Mitchell, and Seago 2000) and their potential to improve resource coordination and 
control (Ermann and Gabel 1984; Zuckerman 1979).     
There are several reasons to believe system affiliation will be negatively 
associated with ACSH.  First, system affiliation is argued to increase efficiency by 
consolidating and centralizing administrative functions (Ermann and Gabel 1984; Luke, 
Ozcan, and Olden 1995; Zuckerman 1979).  This centralization should help coordinate 
activities across system affiliated hospitals in a market.  For example, some studies have 
found that multihospital systems are more likely to adopt health information technologies 
with the potential to improve communication of clinical information across affiliated 
hospitals (Burke et al. 2002; Furukawa et al. 2008).  Others have suggested that hospitals 
are using new technology like electronic health records to bond physicians to the hospital 
(Grossman, Bodenheimer, and McKenzie 2006).  If multihospital systems are more likely 





markets with a larger proportion of system affiliated hospitals should be better connected 
overall. 
Consolidation of hospitals into multihospital systems may also help organizations 
manage the overall complexity of the local delivery system (Alexander 1991; Dranove 
and Shanley 1995).  Under circumstances of greater consolidation, a community of 
providers has more opportunities to interact and refine coordination processes.  Repeated 
transactions between providers may facilitate trust, improve the robustness of information 
communicated, and result in better patient handoffs between providers (Krackhardt 1992; 
Uzzi 1997).  These improvements should result in both fewer initial admissions and 
fewer readmissions related to ambulatory care sensitive conditions.    
It is expected that the effects of system affiliation will pertain predominantly to 
hospitals that are within the same market.  While some benefits of system affiliation may 
apply across all member hospitals (e.g., access to capital, administrative services), it is 
expected that clinical integration efforts are more likely to occur among hospitals that are 
in closer geographic proximity.  In other words, opportunities to take advantage of 
improved coordination are likely to be limited to hospitals that are part of the same 
system and operate in the same market.  For example, a system that shares clinical staff to 
offer cardiac services is likely limited to sharing these resources in a limited geographic 
range.  Therefore, it is hypothesized that:   
Hypothesis 3:  The rate of ACSH in a market will be negatively associated with 
the proportion of system-affiliated hospitals in a market that belong to the same system. 
Vertical integration.  Hospitals have long recognized the important role played by 





forms to affiliate with physicians.  Vertical integration between hospitals and physicians 
received the most attention in the 1990s in the wake of managed care growth.  Vertical 
integration was seen as a response to market and regulatory forces that created a need for 
organizational forms that could link services across the continuum of care with the 
promise of lower cost and increased quality (Budetti et al. 2002; Conrad et al. 1988; 
Zuckerman et al. 1998).   
Relationships with physician organizations are important for aligning physician’ 
and hospital’ goals (Alexander et al. 2001).  Hospitals and physicians acting in concert 
toward common goals can more easily find agreement on the appropriate activities to 
pursue those goals.  One hypothesized example of such goal alignment exists for 
organizations with capitated risk contracts, where it is predicted that systems with 
integrated physician organizations will perform better due their ability to forgo high cost 
admissions for more cost-effective outpatient physician care.  Even without capitation 
risk, other business opportunities, such as joint ventures for new services, demonstrate 
how integration and alignment are intertwined for physicians and hospitals.  Greater 
integration and alignment also helps reduce market uncertainty by securing resources in 
the form of patients and providers.  In doing so, physician-hospital integration may 
increase the frequency and quality of exchange between physicians and hospitals, thereby 
reducing monitoring and coordination costs associated with caring for a patient across the 
continuum of care.  Therefore, it is hypothesized that:  
Hypothesis 4:  The rate of ACSH in a market will be negatively associated with 





Similar benefits have been proposed to exist for hospital ownership of insurance 
products and nursing homes.  Vertical integration through ownership of insurance 
products and long-term care facilities ostensibly aligns financial and utilization goals.  
For example, a hospital that owns an HMO may have more control over utilization 
targets that favor care among hospital affiliated providers.  Not only do these incentives 
help the hospital retain financial resources, but they may also motivate coordination 
across providers affiliated with the hospital.  Similarly, hospitals that own a nursing home 
may have more control over admissions from nursing homes as well as discharges to 
nursing homes.  In sum, it is expected that: 
Hypothesis 5:  The rate of ACSH in a market will be negatively associated with 
the proportion of hospitals that own an insurance product. 
Hypothesis 6:  The rate of ACSH in a market will be negatively associated with 
the proportion of hospitals that own a nursing home. 
Additional Factors 
 The fundamental relationship examined in this study is the relationship between 
market structure and rates of ACSH.  In the terms of the Behavioral Model of Access, it 
is focused on how attributes of the health care system are associated with an outcome of 
care that reflects access to primary care.  Given this focus and the relationships outlined 
by the Behavioral Model, there are a number of characteristics that need to be considered 
and controlled for.   
Predisposing Factors.  Predisposing factors are those characteristics that reflect a 
person’s propensity to seek out formal health care services.  Three predisposing factors in 





care needs increase as one grows older, and age is believed to be associated with greater 
utilization of health services.  However, conflicting empirical results have been explained 
differently.  On one hand, an older population could be associated with higher rates of 
ACSH simply because there are more complex health care needs; on the other hand, an 
older population might be expected to utilize more health services on an outpatient basis, 
which presumably will result in lower rates of ACSH.   
Health services researchers have extensively documented differences between 
males and females in both health status and care seeking behavior.  Of interest for this 
study are findings suggesting that males tend to delay seeking care, which can result in 
conditions escalating to the point of hospitalization (Laditka and Laditka 1999; Magan et 
al. 2008; Robbins, Valdmanis, and Webb 2008).   
Finally, an extensive body of health disparities research indicates that the 
resources available and attitudes among different racial and ethnic groups can have a 
profound effect on how individuals engage and interact with the health system (Weinick, 
Zuvekas, and Cohen 2000; Williams and Collins 1999; Williams and Rucker 2000).  In 
general, most studies have found that minority groups face more significant barriers to 
access (Ash and Brandt 2006; Cable 2002; Laditka and Laditka 2006).   
    Enabling Factors.  Enabling factors refer to a person’s ability to seek out and 
obtain health services.  Education is believed to affect the propensity to seek care through 
the knowledge base available to identify problems and the resources available to treat 
these problems (Epstein 2001; Laditka, Laditka, and Probst 2005; Zhan et al. 2004).  
Income is argued to affect care seeking behavior by providing or limiting the financial 





to be an important component of access and is believed to mitigate some of the financial 
barriers to seeking out health care services.  Furthermore, some types of insurance (e.g., 
HMO) emphasize certain types of primary care services that may affect care seeking 
behaviors and ACSH (Basu, Friedman, and Burstin 2002; Friedman and Basu 2001; Zeng 
et al. 2006).  Finally, geography is believed to affect a person’s propensity to seek out 
care.  Rural residents are often more isolated and have a more difficult time obtaining 
access to adequate primary care (DeLia 2003; Laditka and Laditka 1999; Penfold et al. 
2008).       
Need Factors.  A third aspect of the patient population to be considered is need.  
Need factors refer to characteristics that reflect a person’s health and functional status.  In 
general, greater illness burden and lower health status are associated with higher use of 
health services, including ACSH.   
Use of health services.  A final consideration is the use of health services.  
Patients receiving care on a timely, outpatient basis may be less likely to need more 








 This chapter describes the research methods used to investigate the relationship 
between market structure and ACSH.  The first section describes the study context, 
followed by a description of the population and analytic sample, including data sources 
and how the data are merged to create the analytic sample.  The third section describes 
the measurement of study variables and is divided into two parts corresponding with the 
groups of hypotheses: provider supply and inter-organizational relationships.  The fourth 
and final section discusses the analytic strategy used in the study, model specification, 
and the steps taken to test the hypotheses.      
Study Context 
The study examines 58 markets in California between 1998 and 2005 (Appendix 
1).  California markets have been selected for several reasons.  First, the large geographic 
size of California represents an opportunity to study multiple sources of variation across 
markets (e.g., urban versus rural, racial and ethnic composition) while controlling for 
state-level factors that may influence access (e.g., differences in Medicaid coverage).  
Second, California tends to be an early adopter with respect to new advancements in 
health care.  For example, California is often cited in the health services literature for the 
proliferation of physician organizations in the mid-1990s (Robinson and Casalino 1995, 





(OSHPD) collects extensive data on hospitals and other health care providers 
across the state, which is critical for the analytic approach adopted in this study that 
controls for multiple provider types.  Also, the OSHPD data has been used extensively in 
the health services literature, including studies of ACSH, providing opportunities for 
external comparison of results. 
Population and Sample 
 
The study utilizes a pooled, cross-sectional dataset for the years 1998-2005.  The 
1998-2005 period was selected for a number of reasons.  First, it coincides with increased 
attention to ACSH.  The study of ACSH did not begin in earnest until the early 1990s 
(Billings, 1993; IOM, 1993) and recent research indicates that attempts to curb ACSH 
rates have had only modest success (AHRQ, 2004).  Furthermore, this period is also 
characterized by increasing costs associated with ACSH as well as increasing rates of 
ACSH for some conditions (AHRQ, 2005).  Finally, the study spans a period of time in 
the U.S. health care system when the relationships between provider organizations were 
undergoing significant change (Cebul et al. 2008).   
A pooled time series design was chosen for a number of reasons.  Pooled time 
series designs are quasi-longitudinal designs that entail “stacking” cross-sectional 
datasets across a period of time.  Pooled time series designs are generally used when the 
sample of cross-sections is modest in size or the time series length is too short for 
conventional longitudinal techniques (Sayrs 1989).  In this case, a pooled time series 
design was preferred over more traditional cross-sectional designs because of the 
organizational and ACSH changes that occurred over the study period.  Specifically, a 





other secular trends that may affect the study’s relationships.  Admittedly, pooled, cross-
sectional designs do not enjoy some of the same benefits as panel designs, especially with 
respect to cause-and-effect relationships.  Initial attempts to apply panel design 
techniques (i.e., latent growth curve models) failed to converge on a solution for the 
models, indicating a problem with the underlying covariance structure and a potential 
poor fit with the data.  Subsequent analysis indicated that the lack of convergence is due, 
in part, to insufficient variation in the outcomes across the study period.    As noted 
above, true panel designs often require a significant number of waves (Sayrs 1989); thus, 
it may be that the study did not include enough years to adequately model the 
relationships with these panel design techniques.  Given these limitations, a cross-
sectional, time-series analysis was chosen instead and variables corresponding with each 
year of the sample are used to account for observed changes in ACSH rates over time.   
Data Sources 
Data for the study are drawn from nine sources: (1) annual discharge datasets 
from the Office of Statewide Healthcare Planning Department (OSHPD) for all 
California hospitals; (2) OSHPD annual utilization datasets for hospitals; (3) OSPHD 
annual utilization datasets for primary care clinics; (4) OSHPD annual utilization datasets 
for long-term care facilities; (5) OSHPD annual utilization datasets for home health 
agencies; (6) the American Hospital Association (AHA) Annual Survey of Hospitals; (7) 
the 2006 Area Resource File (ARF), (8) InterStudy Competitive Edge HMO Directory, 
and (9) Cattaneo and Stroud Physician Organization and Medical Group Survey.   
The OSHPD annual discharge datasets contain patient-level data such as patient 





services provided to a patient during an inpatient stay and the diagnoses that were 
documented at the time of admission.  Discharge information is collected every six 
months from all licensed California hospitals, but is available for purchase on a calendar 
year basis.   These data are used to identify discharges related to ambulatory care 
sensitive conditions and derive rates of discharge used as outcomes.  Discharge data are 
available for all years of the study.   
The OSHPD annual utilization datasets for hospitals contain organization-level 
statistics on: (1) hospital ownership; (2) geographic location, including county and health 
service area; (3) number of inpatient beds; (4) inpatient and outpatient utilization; and (5) 
personnel on payroll.  California hospitals are required to submit data to OSHPD within 
45 days of the conclusion of a calendar year.  Hospitals submit data through an internet-
based reporting system known as ALIRTS (Automated Licensing Information and Report 
Tracking System) to ensure that data are submitted in a standard format.  Data are made 
publicly available following quality audits by OSPHD, which contacts report preparers 
and administrators when errors and inconsistencies are discovered.  Data are available for 
all years of the study.  While exact response rates are not available, the mandatory nature 
of reporting and its potential connection to future licensure has resulted in high response 
rates.  More often than non-response are late responses, which are pursued directly by 
OSPHD staff and subsequently added to the dataset.      
The OSHPD annual utilization datasets for primary care clinics contain audited, 
organization-level statistics for community health centers, including federally qualified 
health centers (FQHC), look-alike FQHCs, and free clinics.  Each data file includes data 





service area; (3) types and number of services offered; (4) personnel; (5) patient 
demographics; and (6) revenues and expenses.  Each clinic is required to submit data to 
OSHPD within 45 days of the conclusion of a calendar year.  Like hospitals, clinics 
submit data through the ALIRTS internet-based reporting system to ensure that data are 
submitted in a standard format.  OSHPD makes data publicly available following quality 
audits by OSPHD and contacts report preparers and administrators when errors and 
inconsistencies are discovered.  Data are available for all years of the study.   
The OSHPD annual datasets for long-term care facilities contain audited, 
organization-level statistics for all California licensed long-term care facilities, including 
nursing homes, residential care facilities, and continuing care retirement communities.  
Each data file includes data on: (1) ownership and license type; (2) geographic location, 
including county and health service area; (3) types of services offered; (4) number of 
admissions and discharges; (5) personnel; and (6) patient demographics.  Similar to 
hospitals, each facility is required to submit data to OSHPD within 45 days of the 
conclusion of a calendar year.  The data is also submitted through ALIRTS to ensure that 
data are submitted in a standard format.  Data are made publicly available following 
quality audits by OSPHD.  Data are available for all years of the study.   
The OSHPD annual utilization datasets for home health agencies contain audited, 
organization-level statistics for all California licensed home health agencies.  Although 
hospices are often included in this organizational category, organizations that exclusively 
provide hospice care are excluded from the final sample.  The nature and objective of 
hospice care should result in very few, if any, hospital referrals from hospices.  Each data 





county and health service area; (3) types of services offered; (4) number of visits; (5) 
personnel; and (6) patient demographics.  Each agency is required to submit data to 
OSHPD within 45 days of the conclusion of a calendar year.  Agencies submit data 
through an internet-based reporting system known as ALIRTS (Automated Licensing 
Information and Report Tracking System) to ensure that data are submitted in a standard 
format.  Data are made publicly available following quality audits by OSPHD.  OSHPD 
contacts report preparers and administrators when errors and inconsistencies are 
discovered.  Data are available for all years of the study.   
The AHA Annual Survey of Hospitals is an annual survey of all U.S. hospitals 
and is commonly used in studies of U.S. hospitals.  AHA Annual Survey data include:  
(1) hospital ownership and control type; (2) geographic location; (3) services offered by 
the hospital, both inpatient and outpatient; (4) inpatient beds and utilization; (5) financial 
expenses; and (6) personnel.  Items in the survey vary from year to year, especially 
service-related items; however, this study utilizes only those items that are consistently 
available each year.   
The Area Resource File (ARF) is a comprehensive dataset relating to health care 
utilization and resource availability in all U.S. counties.  Specific data include: (1) health 
professionals; (2) health facilities; (3) health care utilization; (4) population; and (5) 
general environment (e.g. land area, climate).  The ARF is a cumulative dataset that 
includes historical data.  In other words, even though the study uses the 2006 ARF data, 
study variables from previous years are available in the dataset.   
The InterStudy Competitive Edge HMO Directory is a well established data 





conducts an annual survey of all HMOs in the U.S., with an annual response rate in the 
range of 80 to 85 percent.  The Competitive Edge HMO Directory includes data on health 
maintenance organization (HMO) characteristics such as type of HMO, products offered, 
number of provider contracts, counties served, and enrollment.  A county-level dataset is 
created by coding whether an individual HMO provided services in each California 
county and then aggregating these data to the county level.    
Finally, a physician organization dataset is created from survey data provided by 
Cattaneo and Stroud, a California consulting company.  Cattaneo and Stroud, in 
partnership with the Pacific Business Group on Health, conducts an annual survey of all 
California medical groups and independent physician associations that have at least 6 
primary care physicians and have at least one contract with a health maintenance 
organization.  The survey inquires about the counties served by the physician 
organization, number of physicians who are members of the organization, number and 
types of contracts, and which hospitals the organization has a formal relationship with.  
Similar to the HMO data, a county-level dataset is created by coding whether a physician 
organization provided services in each California county and then aggregating these data 
to the county level.     
Construction of the Analytic Dataset  
Data from these sources are merged to create a dataset of annual observations.  To 
construct the dataset, first the hospital discharge data are merged with the OSHPD annual 
utilization data for hospitals using a unique hospital identifier assigned by OSHPD.  
These combined data are then merged with the AHA Annual Survey data.  To merge the 





identification numbers are linked with AHA-assigned identification numbers using 
hospital name and address from the respective datasets.  Hospitals that cannot be matched 
during this ‘crosswalk’ process are removed from the sample.  Four hospitals could not 
be matched by crosswalk, resulting in a loss of 14 market-year observations across all 
years of the study.     
  The combined hospital dataset is next merged with the datasets for the other 
organizations at the county-level.  All OSHPD dataset observations include a county 
name indicating where the facility is located.   Using these counties as identifiers, 
organizations are assigned to one of the 58 counties in California.  This combined dataset 
is merged with the ARF using the federal information processing standard (FIPS) county 
code.  All hospitals were successfully assigned to a county during this merge process.     
The merge process is repeated for each year of the study and datasets are 
appended to each other to create a long-form dataset.  Replication of the process for each 
year of the study results in repeated observations for markets and the final analytic 
dataset consists of eight years of observations.  The unit of analysis is the market-year 
hospital discharge rate related to ambulatory care sensitive conditions.  
Notably, not all markets include the primary care organizations considered in this 
study.  For example, in 1998, one county did not have a hospital, three counties did not 
contain a community health center or home health agency, four counties did not have a 
staff/group model HMO, and seven counties did not include a skilled nursing facility.  
The most critical missing organization for this study is hospitals.  The use of hospital 
discharge data to construct outcomes means that counties without a hospital cannot be 





there were three counties that did not contain a hospital.  Across all years, 14 markets 
lacked hospitals and therefore lacked discharge data, resulting in a loss of 14 market-year 
observations.  The final analytic dataset included 450 market-year observations.  
Measurement 
Outcome Variable Overview   
The outcome variable of interest is the rate of ACSH, where ACSH are defined as 
hospitalizations for conditions that could potentially be cared for in an ambulatory care 
setting (Billings, 1993; IOM, 1993).   Outcomes are constructed from hospitalizations 
related to eleven conditions identified as potentially avoidable: (1) adult asthma; (2) 
angina without procedure; (3) bacterial pneumonia; (4) chronic obstructive pulmonary 
disease; (5) congestive heart failure; (6) dehydration; (7) diabetes short-term 
complications; (8) diabetes long-term complications; (9) hypertension; (10) perforated 
appendix; and (11) uncontrolled diabetes.  These eleven conditions were selected based 
on their incidence, consensus regarding their avoidability, and their prevalence in the 
ACSH literature (Kruzikas et al. 2004).   
Discharges are identified from the OSHPD discharge abstracts using the 
International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision (ICD-9), published by the World 
Health Organization.  Appendix 2 is a complete list of the ICD-9 codes used to identify 
these hospitalizations.  Calculation of ACSH rates focus on discharges with a primary 
diagnosis matching one of the ICD-9 codes included in Appendix 2.  The use of the 
primary diagnosis is important to ensure that the analytic sample focuses on 
hospitalizations that are potentially avoidable with appropriate ambulatory care.  In other 





was the principal cause of the hospitalization and not incidental to the hospital stay.  All 
outcomes are calculated as the number of discharges per 1,000 market residents.  
Outcome Variable: Acute care ACSH vs. Chronic care ACSH   
Given the number of ambulatory care sensitive conditions to be considered, 
studies typically consolidate the analysis and presentation of results.  One of the most 
common analytic consolidations is based on whether the underlying condition is acute or 
chronic in nature (Agency for Health Care Research and Quality 2007; Chang, Mirvis, 
and Waters 2008).  Acute care ACSH are those admissions that are emergent but could 
have been treated by a health care professional on an outpatient basis.  Admissions 
included in the acute care ACSH category relate to bacterial pneumonia, dehydration, and 
perforated appendix.   In contrast, chronic care ACSH are admissions that result from 
some ongoing health issue.  Chronic care ACSH admissions include angina, adult 
asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, congestive heart failure, diabetes with 
short-term complications, diabetes with long-term complications, hypertension, and 
uncontrolled diabetes.     
The rates of acute care ACSH and chronic care ACSH outcomes are calculated as 
the annual number of discharges per 1,000 market residents.  To construct these 
outcomes, discharges with a primary diagnosis related to a specific ambulatory care 
sensitive condition are first summed to the hospital-level (Figure 2).  Next, these 
condition-specific discharges are summed across all hospitals in a market to derive a 
market-level count of discharges.  Condition-specific discharges within the acute care 
ACSH and chronic care ACSH categories are summed across all hospitals in a market to 





residents and then multiplied by 1,000.  One outcome per year is calculated for both the 






Figure 2:  Derivation of ACSH Rate1 
Using primary diagnosis only, filter admissions by 
ICD-9 & DRG codes related to ACS conditions2 
All hospital admissions 
N = 3,609,282 (2005) 
All ACSH 




1 These steps were applied initially across all of the 11 conditions identified as potentially avoidable.  Numbers 
in this figure are for hypertension (most frequent condition) in 2005 (most current year in sample).   
2 This step takes into consideration exclusionary criteria for those conditions where hospitalization is likely to be 
clinically indicated (e.g. immunosuppressed).  A complete list of ICD-9 codes is included as Appendix 2. 
Aggregate admissions to individual hospital 
(based on OSHPD ID) 
Number of ACSH in county  
County-level Rate of ACSH  
Sum across all hospitals in county to get 
market-level total. 
Number of ACSH for an individual hospital  
 
  
Divide by number of residents in county 






Outcome Variable: Aggregated ACSH   
Another set of analyses examines the effects of market structure on the rate of 
combined or aggregated ACSH.  The purpose of this analysis is to evaluate whether 
aggregated rates of ACSH vary with market structure in ways similar to specific clinical 
conditions.  The aggregated ACSH outcome is simply the combined rates of acute care 
ACSH and chronic care ACSH.  One outcome per year is calculated.   
Explanatory Variables 
Explanatory variables tested in the project can be grouped into two general 
categories: provider supply and inter-organizational relationships.  All explanatory 
variables are time-variant across the study period.              
Provider capacity.  Provider capacity relates to the number of providers available 
in a market relative to the consumer resource base.  Six variables for the six provider 
types considered in the study are constructed at the market-level (market j) for each year 
of the study (time t).  The capacity variables are calculated as the number of health care 
organizations in a market divided by the market level population.  For example, the total 
number of home health agencies in a market is divided by the total number of market 
residents.  To facilitate interpretation and comparisons with other provider supply 
research, these measures are multiplied by 1,000 (e.g., number of home health agencies 
per 1,000 residents): 
                ∑(number of organizationsjt)    *1,000 






To test for a non-linear relationship between provider capacity and ACSH, all six 
provider capacity variables are squared to create quadratic terms.   
Provider composition.  Provider composition variables relate to the number of 
primary care organizations in a market relative to hospitals.  Five ratio variables are 
created for community health centers, health maintenance organizations, home health 
agencies, nursing homes, and physician organizations.  All five variables are constructed 
at the market-level (market j) for each year of the study (time t).       
∑(number of organizationsjt)       
∑(number of hospitalsjt) 
 
Inter-organizational Relationships.  The study focuses on two types of inter-
organizational relationships, horizontal integration between hospitals and vertical 
integration between hospitals and physician organizations, nursing homes, and insurance 
companies.        
Horizontal integration.  Horizontal integration focuses on multi-hospital system 
affiliation.  A market-level measure of horizontal integration is constructed as the 
proportion of hospitals in a market that belong to a multi-hospital system with more than 
one hospital in that same market.  To create this measure, a dichotomous indicator is first 
created for all hospitals in a market that reflects whether the hospital belongs to a system 
and whether that system has more than one hospital in the market (1=belongs to system 
with more than one hospital in the market).  Next, this dichotomous measure is summed 





Vertical integration.  Three specific types of vertical integration are considered in 
the study:  (1) physician-hospital relationships; (2) hospital ownership of a skilled nursing 
facility; and (3) hospital ownership of a health plan.      
Hospital-physician relationship.  The AHA Annual Survey asks respondents to 
indicate whether a hospital is related to any of eight different types of physician 
organizations:  (1) independent physician association (IPA); (2) group practice without 
walls (GPWW); (3) open physician-hospital organization (OPHO); (4) closed physician-
hospital organization (CPHO); (5) management service organization (MSO); (6) 
integrated salary model (ISM); (7) equity model; and (8) foundation (Appendix 3).  Each 
item is coded dichotomously where a value of 1 indicates the hospital is related to that 
type of physician organization.  The physician-hospital relationship variable is calculated 
as the number of hospitals in a market with any type of physician relationship divided by 
the total number of hospitals in a market.   
Hospital ownership of a health plan.  The AHA Annual Survey asks respondents 
to indicate whether a hospital has developed or holds “an equity interest” in three types of 
insurance products: (1) a health maintenance organization; (2) a preferred provider 
organization; and (3) an indemnity fee for service plan.  These insurance products can be 
provided independently by the hospital, through an affiliation with a health system, 
through a network, or through some other joint venture with an insurer.  A dichotomous, 
hospital-level variable is initially created if a hospital is engaged in any of these 
relationships for any of these insurance products.  For example, if a hospital 
independently offers a health maintenance organization and partners with an insurance 





coded as 1.  A market-level, hospital-health plan relationship variable is calculated as the 
number of hospitals in a market with an equity interest in a health plan, divided by the 
number of hospitals in a market. 
Hospital ownership of a skilled nursing facility.  The AHA Annual Survey asks 
respondents to indicate how many staffed skilled nursing home beds that the hospital had 
available during the year.  A dichotomous, hospital-level variable is initially created if a 
hospital has any skilled nursing home beds set up and staffed for use during the year.  A 
market-level, hospital-nursing home relationship variable is calculated as the number of 
hospitals that have at least one skilled nursing home bed set up and staffed for use during 
the year, divided by the number of hospitals in a market.   
Control Variables  
Five groups of control variables are included to account for factors identified in 
previous research.  One group of control variables focuses on population characteristics 
of a local market to control for the predisposing, enabling, and need characteristics of 
local market residents.  A second group of control variables is used to control for health 
service utilization in a market.   A third group of control variables is used to control for 
physician supply in the inter-organizational relationship analysis.  This third group of 
control variables is not included in the provider supply analysis because the effect of 
physician supply is captured in the explanatory variables being tested.  A fourth control 
variable is used to control for hospital competition in the inter-organizational relationship 
analysis.  Finally, the fifth group of control variables is included to control for temporal 





Gender.  Gender differences in rates of ACSH are controlled for with one 
continuous variable that reflects the proportion of market residents who are male.  Data 
from the ARF are used to construct this variable.   
Race/ethnicity.  Two continuous variables are included to control for differences 
in racial and ethnic composition across markets: the percentage of African-American 
residents and the percentage of Hispanic residents.  Both variables are drawn from the 
ARF dataset. 
Urban market.  All models include a continuous control variable that indicates the 
percentage of residents living in an area of the county classified as urban.  This variable 
is drawn from the ARF dataset.  
Socioeconomic status (SES).   Socioeconomic status (SES) is measured as a 
composite score of four different market characteristics: percentage of population older 
than 15 years with high school diploma, percentage of population below poverty, 
percentage of population unemployed, and the percentage of population that is uninsured.  
A composite score is used to capture the multidimensional aspects of SES while 
maintaining parsimony in the regression models.  The composite score is constructed by 
first calculating a z-score for each of the four characteristics, which standardizes these 
characteristics by removing the units.  The second step includes summing across the four 
z-scores to derive the composite score for each market.  The percentage of population 
below poverty, the percentage of population unemployed, and the percentage of 
population uninsured are reverse scored so that higher values of the composite score 
reflect higher SES.  All four variables used to construct the index are taken from the ARF 





Health status.  Four continuous variables are included as proxies for health status 
of market residents.  First, the average mortality rate due to cardiovascular disease (e.g., 
hypertension, atherosclerosis) is included to control for chronic conditions related to the 
circulatory system.  The average mortality rate is included in the ARF and is calculated as 
the 3-year average mortality rate at the county-level.  Similar county-level controls are 
available for respiratory disease (e.g., COPD), influenza and pneumonia, and diabetes.  
All four health status variables are drawn from the ARF dataset.            
Age.  Three continuous variables are used to control for the effects of age: (1) the 
percentage of market residents between the ages of 0 to 14; (2) the percentage of market 
residents between the ages of 15 to 64; and (3) the percentage of market residents over 
the age of 65.  The percentage of market residents between the ages of 0 to 14 serves as 
the reference group.  All three variables are calculated from data from the ARF dataset.     
Physician supply.  The study includes two continuous physician supply variables.  
Primary care physician supply control is calculated as the number of practicing, office-
based primary care physicians (i.e., family practice, internal medicine, pediatrics) per 
1,000 market residents.  Similarly, the specialist supply control variable is calculated as 
the number of practicing, office-based specialist physicians per 1,000 market residents.  
Both variables are derived from the ARF dataset.     
Use of health services.  A control variable for the use of health services is 
constructed by summing across the number community health center services, the 
number of outpatient hospital services, and the number of home health agency services 
provided by all organizations in a market in a calendar year.  This total is then divided by 





services per 1,000 variable.  The variable was limited to these four provider types 
because physician organization and staff/group model HMO utilization data were not 
available.     
Hospital competition.  The inter-organizational relationship regressions also 
include a control for hospital competition.  The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) was 
used to assess market concentration.  The HHI variable is constructed as: 
HHI = ∑ Pi 
where Pi is the market share of the ith hospital with respect to the total number of beds set 
up and staffed for use in a market.  The Herfindahl Index ranges from zero to one, where 
a value of one indicates a completely concentrated and monopolistic market and values 
approaching zero indicate highly competitive markets.  Data used to construct the HHI is 
taken from the AHA Annual Survey.    
Year.  Eight dummy variables are created to account for temporal trends in ACSH 




The unit of analysis for the study is the market-year discharge rate for ACSH.  
Study outcomes are measured as the number of ACSH per 1,000 market residents.  Initial 
diagnostics show a normal distribution for the outcomes.  However, repeated 
measurement of the same observations over time present problems of autocorrelation 
among the observations.  Autocorrelation violates the OLS assumption of independence 
and can bias standard errors downward, resulting in overestimation of the statistical 





linear mixed models (McCullagh and Nelder 1989; Nelder and Wedderburn 1972).  
Linear mixed models provide an approach to modeling continuous outcome variables 
under conditions where the residuals are normally distributed but may not be independent 
or have constant variance (West, Welch, and Galecki 2007).  Linear mixed models 
accommodate these situations by separately estimating parameter covariance.  Three 
separate covariance structures were initially evaluated: (1) compound symmetric; (2) 
autoregressive order one; and (3) unstructured.  The compound symmetric structure 
resulted in the lowest Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) and Schwarz’ Bayesian 
Criterion (SBC) and therefore provided the best fit for the models under consideration 
(Littell et al. 1996).      
SAS PROC MIXED is used for all regression analyses (SAS Institute Inc. 2004).    
Model Specifications 
The relationship between market structure and ACSH is evaluated with two 
general categories of models:  provider supply and inter-organizational relationships.  
The decision to model these relationships separately was based on several considerations.  
First, several of the independent variables of interest were highly collinear because they 
assessed different aspects of the same phenomenon (e.g., provider supply).  Another 
methodological consideration was the number of independent variables relative to the 
number of observations, which affects the power of the analysis to detect significant 
relationships.  Combining all independent variables into a single regression model would 
have resulted in approximately 40 predictor variables in the same model, which was 
concerning given that the study included only 450 market-year observations.  Finally, 





underlying arguments for how these different sets of independent variables might affect 
ACSH presented a natural break and an opportunity to model these relationships more 
parsimoniously.  Thus, two models are used to evaluate the provider supply relationship 
with ACSH and one model is used to assess the relationship between inter-organizational 
relationships and ACSH.  These models are run using three different sets of outcomes: 
acute care ACSH, chronic care ACSH, and aggregate ACSH.  In total, across both 
categories of models and the three sets of outcomes, nine regression models were used to 
assess the study relationships: 
(3 models x 2 acute/chronic ACSH outcomes) +  
(3 models x 1 aggregated ACSH outcome)]  
 
The following sections describe these models in more detail.  Bolded items represent the 
explanatory variables being tested in the study.   
Provider Supply Models 
The first set of provider supply models examines the non-linear relationship 
between provider capacity and rates of ACSH.  In total, twelve provider capacity 
explanatory variables are tested.  Six variables relate to the first-order provider capacity 
terms; another six variables relate to the quadratic provider capacity terms.   
Rate of ACSHjt = β1(CHC jt) +  β2(CHCjt*CHCjt) + β3 (HHAjt) + 
β4(HHAjt*HHAjt) + β5(HMO jt)   +  β6(HMO jt*HMO jt)  +  β7(HOSP jt)   +  
β8(HOSP jt*HOSP jt)  +  β9(NHjt)  + β10(NHjt*NHjt)  + β11(PO jt)  + β12(PO jt*PO 
jt)  + β13(MALEjt)  + β14(BLACKjt)  + β15(HISPjt)  + β16(URBANjt)  + β17(SESjt)  





β21(DIABDEATHSjt) + β22(PERCAGE1564jt)   + β23(PERCAGEOVER65jt)    +  
β24(OUTPT_SERVjt)   +  β25(YEAR99jt)  +  β26(YEAR00jt)   +  β27(YEAR01jt)   +  
β28(YEAR02jt)   +  β29(YEAR03jt)   +  β30(YEAR04jt)  +  β31(YEAR05jt)   
  
A second set of provider supply regression models examines the relationship 
between ratios of ‘coordinative provider organizations’ to hospitals and the rate of 
ACSH.  Five provider composition explanatory variables are tested in this model. 
Rate of ACSHjt = β1(CHC-to-Hospital jt)  +  β2(HHA-to-Hospitaljt) + β3(HMO-
to-Hospital jt)   +  β4(NH-to-Hospitaljt)  + β5(PO-to-Hospitaljt)  + β6(MALEjt)  + 
β7(BLACKjt)  + β8(HISPjt)  + β9(URBANjt)  + β10(SESjt)  + β11(CIRCDEATHSjt)  
+ β12(RESPDEATHSjt)  +  β13(PNEUMDEATHSjt)  +  β14(DIABDEATHSjt) + 
β15(PERCAGE1564jt)   + β16(PERCAGEOVER65jt)    +  β17(OUTPT_SERVjt)   +  
β18(YEAR99jt)  +  β19(YEAR00jt)   +  β20(YEAR01jt)   +  β21(YEAR02jt)   +  
β22(YEAR03jt)   +  β23(YEAR04jt)  +  β24(YEAR05jt)   
 
Inter-Organizational Relationship Models 
 A final set of regression models is used to evaluate the relationship between 
horizontal and vertical integration and ACSH.  All four inter-organizational relationship 
variables are tested in the same regression model.  This set of models also adds three 
control variables:  primary care physician supply, specialist physician supply, and 
hospital competition.     
Rate of ACSHjt = β1(PROP_SYS jt) +  β2(PROP_INSjt) + β3(PROP_SNF jt)   + 





β9(URBANjt)  + β10(SESjt)  + β11(CIRCDEATHSjt)  + β12(RESPDEATHSjt)  +  
β13(PNEUMDEATHSjt)  +  β14(DIABDEATHSjt) + β15(PERCAGE015jt)   + 
β16(PERCAGEOVER65jt)   + β17(PCPSUPPLYjt)   + 
β18(SPECIALISTSUPPLYjt)    β19(OUTPT_SERVjt)   +  β20(HOSP_HERFjt)   +   
β21(YEAR99jt)  +  β22(YEAR00jt)   +  β23(YEAR01jt)   +  β24(YEAR02jt)   +  








 This chapter presents the results of the empirical analysis.  The chapter is divided 
into four sections.  The first section is descriptive and provides a profile of California 
markets.  The second section presents results of the bivariate analysis.  The third section 
discusses the results of the multivariate hypothesis tests.  The fourth and final section 
summarizes the findings of the study. 
Profile of California Primary Care Markets, 1998-2005 
There are 58 California counties, or primary care markets, in California.  The 
following discussion primarily focuses on the descriptive statistics across these markets 
in the year 1998, the first year of the study, but also describes the changes that occurred 
between 1998 and 2005, the final year of the study.  It is worth noting again that not all 
markets include the organizations considered in the study, with hospitals representing the 
most critical missing organization because of the use of discharge data to derive ACSH 
outcomes.  At least one county was missing a hospital for each year of the study.  Thus, 
the sample size for the following descriptive statistics is less than 58 observations.    
Ambulatory Care Sensitive Hospitalizations (ACSH) 
In 1998, there was an average of 11.78 ACSH discharges per 1,000 residents 
across 57 California markets (Table 5).  On average, ACSH represented 13.5% of all 





frequent than acute care ACSH discharges, with markets averaging 6.31 chronic care 
ACSH discharges per 1,000 residents in 1998 compared to nearly 4.94 acute care ACSH 
discharges per 1,000 residents.  The average discharge rate decreased over the study 
period by approximately 5 percent.  Likewise, ACSH represented a declining percentage 
of total discharges over time, decreasing from 13.5 percent in 1998 to 12.2 percent in 
2005.  Declining ACSH rates were driven by chronic care ACSH, where the rate declined 
7.6 percent over the study period.  In contrast, the rate of acute care ACSH increased 3.2 



































Table 5:  ACSH outcomes by year  
N




% of total 
discharges
Acute ACSH
   1998 57 4.94 2.21 1.17-11.67 5.7%
   1999 57 5.34 2.14 2.18-11.24 5.6%
   2000 56 4.76 1.92 1.41-10.30 5.3%
   2001 56 5.16 2.08 0.29-10.56 5.6%
   2002 57 5.40 1.94 1.13-10.39 5.6%
   2003 57 5.62 2.17 0.86-11.54 5.6%
   2004 55 4.93 1.87 1.42-10.35 5.2%
   2005 55 5.10 1.83 0.95-10.80 5.4%
% change: 1998-2005 +3.2% -0.3%
Chronic ACSH
   1998 57 6.31 2.69 0.93-15.80 7.9%
   1999 57 6.25 2.41 0.93-14.84 7.2%
   2000 56 5.75 2.28 1.32-13.25 6.7%
   2001 56 5.89 2.33 1.15-12.17 7.1%
   2002 57 6.59 2.49 0.28-12.95 7.6%
   2003 57 6.57 2.59 0.55-13.20 7.4%
   2004 55 6.00 2.18 1.71-10.68 6.9%
   2005 55 5.83 2.10 1.00-9.93 6.9%
% change: 1998-2005 -7.6% -1.0%
Total ACSH
   1998 57 11.78 4.85 2.49-28.33 13.5%
   1999 57 12.08 4.43 3.50-26.60 12.6%
   2000 56 10.97 4.22 3.09-23.10 12.0%
   2001 56 11.43 4.31 1.43-23.00 12.7%
   2002 57 12.34 4.36 1.41-23.66 13.1%
   2003 57 12.50 4.67 2.28-23.68 12.9%
   2004 55 11.23 4.003.20--20.95 12.0%
   2005 55 11.18 3.74 1.97-19.09 12.2%





Rates of ACSH reflect considerable variation across clinical conditions (Table 6).  
At the high end, pneumonia averaged 2.24 discharges per 1,000 residents, followed by 
congestive heart failure (1.75 discharges per 1,000 residents) and chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease (1.33 discharges per 1,000 residents).  In aggregate, these three 
conditions constituted 5.6 percent of the total hospital discharges in a market in 1998.  At 
the other extreme were discharges related to uncontrolled diabetes and perforated 
appendix, with an average of 0.08 and 0.09 discharges per 1,000 residents in 1998, 
respectively.  The average discharge rate for perforated appendix experienced the largest 
increase over the study period, increasing from 0.09 discharges per 1,000 residents in 
1998 to nearly 0.24 discharges per 1,000 residents in 2005.  In contrast, uncontrolled 
diabetes experienced the largest decline over the study period, decreasing from 0.08 
discharges per 1,000 residents to less than 0.01 discharges per 1,000 market residents.   
Table 6:  Condition-specific ACSH outcomes, 1998 
Outcome N




% of total 
discharges
% change in mean 
from 1998-2005
Acute care ACSH
  Dehydration 57 0.68 0.39 0-2.03 0.7% -9.7%
  Perforated appendix 57 0.09 0.08 0-0.50 0.1% 157.0%
  Pneumonia 57 2.24 1.20 0.23-4.96 2.1% 1.6%
Chronic care ACSH
  Angina 57 0.35 0.26 0-1.23 0.3% -38.1%
  Adult asthma 57 0.51 0.31 0-1.67 0.7% -10.4%
  COPD 57 1.33 0.78 0-4.95 1.4% -25.7%
  CHF 57 1.75 0.82 0-3.70 2.1% -1.7%
  Diabetes, short-term complications 57 0.17 0.11 0-0.62 0.2% 11.5%
  Diabetes, long-term complications 57 0.33 0.17 0-0.90 0.5% 18.8%
  Uncontrolled diabetes 57 0.08 0.09 0-0.61 0.1% -96.1%





Provider supply   
Staff/group model HMOs were the most prevalent provider type across all 
markets.  On average, there were 0.11 staff/group model HMOs per 1,000 market 
residents, followed by community health centers with an average of 0.05 health centers 
per 1,000 market residents in 1998 (Table 7).  Physician organizations were the least 
prevalent provider type, with an average of 0.01 organizations per 1,000 residents.  
Interestingly, these numbers contrast with the absolute number of organizations, where 
skilled nursing facilities and home health agencies are the most prevalent provider types.  
The divergence between the overall number of organizations and the per capita numbers 
is due to different distributions across urban and rural markets.  The presence of HMOs 
and community health centers in rural markets results in large provider supplies per 
capita.  For example, the presence of one community health center in Sierra County, with 
a population of 3,555 residents, equates to 0.28 CHCs per 1,000 residents in 1998.  
Community health centers were the only provider type to experience per capita 
growth over the study period, increasing 2.1 percent from 1998 to 2005.  Home health 
agencies experienced the largest decline, decreasing 41.7 percent between 1998 and 
2005, followed by skilled nursing facilities and hospitals.  The supply of physician 
organizations and staff/group model HMOs experienced more modest decreases across 
the study period, declining 11.1 percent and 4.4 percent, respectively. 
Staff/group model HMOs were also the most prevalent provider type relative to 
hospitals, with an average of 3.73 HMOs for every hospital in 1998.  Skilled nursing 
facilities and community health centers display similar provider supply ratios, averaging 





organizations were the least prevalent type relative to hospitals with an average of 0.90 
organizations for every one hospital.  Skilled nursing facilities showed the largest shift in 
these ratios over the study period, increasing 37.7 percent to 3.47 nursing facilities for 
every hospital in 2005.  In contrast, the HMO-to-hospital ratio and the HHA-to-hospital 





Table 7:  Profile of California markets, 1998-2005 
N Mean Std Dev. Range N Mean Std Dev. Range
Percentage 
change in mean 
from 1998-2005
Provider supply
  Providers per 1,000 residents
    CHCs per 1,000 residents 57 0.05 0.06 0-0.28 55 0.05 0.05 0-0.29 2.1%
    HHAs per 1,000 residents 57 0.04 0.03 0-0.12 55 0.02 0.02 0-0.09 -41.7%
    HMOs per 1,000 residents 57 0.11 0.15 0-0.63 55 0.11 0.14 0-0.63 -4.4%
    Hospitals per 1,000 residents 57 0.03 0.05 0-0.28 55 0.03 0.04 0-0.21 -16.1%
    SNFs per 1,000 residents 57 0.03 0.02 0-0.07 55 0.02 0.02 0-0.06 -22.6%
    POs per 1,000 residents 57 0.01 0.01 0-0.03 55 0.01 0.01 0-0.03 -11.1%
  Providers per hospital
    CHC-to-hospital ratio 57 2.32 1.74 0-9.0 55 2.36 1.26 0.33-7.0 1.5%
    HHA-to-hospital ratio 57 2.13 1.28 0-7.0 55 1.21 0.87 0-5.0 -43.1%
    HMO-to-hospital ratio 57 3.73 2.34 0-8.0 55 1.99 1.46 0-8.0 -46.6%
    SNF-to-hospital ratio 57 2.52 2.01 0-9.14 55 3.47 2.42 0-5.63 37.7%
    PO-to-hospital ratio 57 0.90 0.88 0-4.0 55 0.86 0.88 0-4.0 -5.1%
Inter-organizational Relationships
  Proportion from same system 57 0.17 0.26 0-1.0 55 0.23 0.30 0-1.0 35.9%
  Proportion own insurance product 57 0.18 0.28 0-1.0 55 0.12 0.20 0-0.75 -30.3%
  Proportion own SNF 57 0.30 0.33 0-1.0 55 0.28 0.32 0-1.0 -5.7%
  Proportion with phys. relationship 57 0.43 0.34 0-1.0 55 0.31 0.29 0-1.0 -27.9%
Controls
  % Male 57 0.51 0.02 0.48-0.63 55 0.50 0.02 0.47-0.63 -2.0%
  % Black 57 0.03 0.04 0.01-0.15 55 0.03 0.03 0.01-0.15 0.0%
  % Hispanic 57 0.23 0.15 0.04-0.72 55 0.21 0.14 0.04-0.66 -8.7%
  % with college education 57 0.14 0.07 0.06-0.38 55 0.13 0.07 0.05-0.38 -7.1%
  % Urban 57 0.70 0.29 0-1.0 55 0.65 0.28 0-1.0 -7.1%
  % below poverty 57 0.13 0.05 0.05-0.23 55 0.12 0.03 0.06-0.21 -7.7%
  % Uninsured 57 0.18 0.04 0.09-0.30 55 0.17 0.04 0.10-0.28 -5.6%
  % Unemployed 57 0.04 0.02 0.02-0.09 55 0.03 0.01 0.02-0.09 -25.0%
  3-year heart disease mortality rate per 1,000 residents 57 3.64 14.98 0.90-112.69 55 8.59 25.95 0.82-119.64 136.0%
  3-year pneumonia mortality rate per 1,000 residents 57 2.47 7.69 0.27-29.17 55 3.47 7.70 0.14-50.05 40.5%
  3-year respiratory mortality rate per 1,000 residents 57 1.02 3.87 0.26-29.17 55 2.17 6.33 0.21-33.64 112.7%
  3-year diabetes mortality rate per 1,000 residents 57 0.18 0.07 0-0.32 55 0.19 0.06 0-0.35 5.6%
  % ages 0-14 57 0.22 0.04 0.12-0.29 55 0.20 0.03 0.13-0.26 -6.8%
  % ages 15-64 57 0.66 0.03 0.61-0.74 55 0.68 0.03 0.62-0.78 3.3%
  % ages 65 and over 57 0.13 0.03 0.07-0.19 55 0.12 0.03 0.07-0.19 -5.6%
  PCPs per 1,000 residents 57 5.46 15.07 0.11-100.51 55 9.74 19.09 0.18-103.60 78.3%
  Specialists per 1,000 residents 57 4.09 11.61 0.05-69.63 55 9.54 18.74 0.07-92.75 133.5%
  # of total outpatient services per 1,000 residents 57 2522.30 1232.19 835.18-6040.62 55 2321.04 1228.95 849.83-6332.18 -8.0%








The proportion of system-affiliated hospitals that shared the market with another 
hospital from the same system was 0.17 in 1998 (Table 7).  The proportion of same-
system hospitals sharing the same market increased over the study period, increasing 35.9 
percent to 0.23 in 2005.  In 1998, 18 percent of all hospitals had an ownership interest in 
an insurance product.  This number declined by 30.3 percent over the study period, and 
by 2005 only 12 percent of all hospitals in a market owned an insurance product.  In 
contrast, the percentage of hospitals that owned a nursing home was relatively stable 
across the study period.  In 1998, 30 percent of all hospitals owned a nursing home.  This 
percentage declined 5.7 percent to 28 percent of all hospitals in 2005.  Over 43 percent of 
all hospitals maintained some formal relationship with a physician organization in 1998.  
Overall, the percentage of hospitals using some form of formal relationship with 
physicians declined nearly 28 percent over the study period.   
Population characteristics   
The primary care markets included in the study were predominantly urban.  On 
average, 70% of all market residents were classified as urban in 1998; a percentage that 
declined to 65% in 2005.  Approximately 50% of all market residents were males in 1998 
and 2005.  African-Americans represented 3% of all market residents, on average, in both 
1998 and 2005.  The percentage of Hispanics in a market declined slightly from an 
average of 23% in 1998 to 21% in 2005.  Less than 15% of all market residents had a 
college education or more for both 1998 and 2005.  Approximately 13% and 4% of all 





respectively.  Slightly less than 20% of all market residents were uninsured in both 1998 
and 2005.       
Summary of Market Descriptives  
In sum, this profile presents a picture of considerable variation across California 
markets.  This variation is most apparent in the range of provider supply and inter-
organizational relationships across markets.  For example, some markets had over 0.63 
HMOs per 1,000 residents while other markets did not have an HMO.  These markets 
also underwent substantial changes over the study period.  For instance, four of the 
provider types experienced double digit decreases in provider supply over the study 
period.  Interestingly, the only provider type to experience an increase in supply was 
community health centers, a provider type with a unique focus on underserved areas and 
populations.  The set of relationships maintained by hospitals also underwent substantial 
changes over the study period.  The proportion of same-system hospitals in a market 
increased over the study period while the proportion of hospitals with a formal physician 
relationship, an ownership interest in a nursing home, and an ownership interest in an 
insurance product declined over the same time period.  These trends are consistent with 
other studies indicating a relaxation of vertical integration strategies that were prevalent 
in the mid to late 1990s, opting instead for more horizontally integrated strategies 
concentrated within the same market (Cuellar and Gertler 2006; Cuellar and Gertler 
2003; Lesser and Ginsburg 2000).  
Considerable variation is also observed for ACSH rates.  For example, in 2005 the 
maximum ACSH rate for aggregated outcomes in a market was nearly ten times as large 





rates across clinical conditions, with the rate of pneumonia-related ACSH 28 times larger 
than the rate of uncontrolled diabetes-related ACSH.  Also interesting is the change in 
these rates over the study period.  For most conditions, especially chronic care conditions, 
the rate of discharge decreased over the study period.  However, discharge rates increased 
for a number of conditions, with the net effect being a dampening of change over time.  
Contrasting patterns of change raise questions about whether aggregated rates of ACSH 
that combine high and low rates across clinical conditions and increasing and decreasing 
rates over time diminish underlying variation.                        
Bivariate Correlations 
 Bivariate correlation analysis was conducted to evaluate the baseline relationships 
between study variables and examine potential multicollinearity in the multivariate 
models due to high correlations.  These results are shown in Tables 8 and 9.  Correlation 
coefficients greater than 0.095 or less than -0.095 are significant.   
Provider supply 
 Only two of the six provider supply per 1,000 resident variables were 
significantly correlated with all three outcomes (Table 8).  HHAs per 1,000 residents 
were positively correlated with all three outcomes, while POs per 1,000 residents were 
negatively correlated with all three outcomes.  These results suggest that an increasing 
supply of home health agencies is associated with higher rates of ACSH, while an 
increasing supply of physician organizations is associated with lower rates of ACSH.  
Community health centers per 1,000 residents and HMOs per 1,000 residents were 
significantly and negatively correlated with chronic care ACSH and aggregated ACSH, 





per 1,000 residents were positively correlated with the rate of acute care ACSH and 
aggregated ACSH, but were not statistically correlated with the rate of chronic care 
ACSH.   
 In terms of provider composition, both staff/group model HMOs and physician 
organizations relative to hospitals were negatively correlated with all three ACSH rates.  
The community health center-to-hospital ratio was negatively correlated with the acute 
care ACSH rate and the aggregated ACSH rate.  The home health agency-to-hospital 
ratio was positively correlated with the chronic care ACSH rate. 
ACSH outcomes were significantly associated with many of the population 
characteristics.  All four health status control variables and the number of outpatient 
services per 1,000 residents were positively correlated with all three ACSH outcomes.  In 
contrast, socioeconomic status was negatively correlated with all three ACSH outcomes.  
Variables controlling for gender, race/ethnicity, age, and urban residence were weakly 
and inconsistently correlated with the three outcomes. 
 Inter-organizational Relationships 
 The proportion of hospitals with a physician relationship was positively correlated 
with all three ACSH rates (Table 9).  These results suggest that the rate of ACSH 
increases as the proportion of hospitals with a formal physician relationship increases.  In 
contrast, the proportion of market hospitals that own an insurance product was not 
significantly correlated with any of the outcomes.  Similarly, the proportion of hospitals 
that own a nursing home was not significantly correlated with any of the outcomes.  The 





market was negatively correlated with acute care ACSH and aggregate ACSH outcomes, 
but failed to reach statistical significance for chronic care ACSH.   
Summary of Bivariate Correlations   
 Together, the bivariate correlations show that a number of factors are associated 
with ACSH rates and that it is important to control for these factors during multivariate 
analysis.  For example, the bivariate results show that five provider types were 
significantly correlated with ACSH rates.  Two of the four inter-organizational 
relationships were significantly associated with ACSH rates, while a number of 
population characteristics were significantly associated with ACSH rates.  The bivariate 
results also suggest some divergence from the relationships predicted in the hypotheses.  
For instance, three provider types (community health centers, staff/group model HMOs, 
physician organizations) were negatively associated with ACSH rates and in the direction 
predicted; in contrast, two provider types (nursing homes, home health agencies) were 
positively associated with ACSH rates and in the opposite direction predicted.  Similarly, 
the proportion of same-system hospitals was negatively associated with ACSH rates and 
in the same direction as predicted, while the proportion of hospitals with a formal 
physician relationship was positively correlated with ACSH rates and in the opposite 
direction predicted.  Together, these contrasting relationships provide an early indication 
that the relationship between provider supply and inter-organizational relationships may 







Table 8:  Pearson zero-order correlations for provider supply 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
1. Acute ACSH -
2. Chronic ACSH 0.83 -
3. Aggregate ACSH 0.95 0.96 -
4. CHCs per 1,000 -0.01 -0.20 -0.12 -
5.  HHAs per 1,000 0.35 0.15 0.26 0.21 -
6. HMOs per 1,000 0.01 -0.19 -0.09 0.43 0.43 -
7. Hospitals per 1,000 0.08 -0.10 -0.02 0.58 0.24 0.65 -
8. SNFs per 1,000 0.12 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.12 -0.09 0.10 -
9. POs per 1,000 -0.28 -0.11 -0.19 -0.49 -0.36 -0.56 -0.41 -0.08 -
10. CHC-to-hospital ratio -0.12 -0.05 -0.10 0.26 -0.18 -0.30 -0.33 0.01 0.02 -
11. HHA-to-hospital ratio -0.03 0.10 0.04 -0.33 0.27 -0.38 -0.43 0.05 0.16 0.23 -
12. SNF-to-hospital ratio -0.19 0.01 -0.09 -0.39 -0.29 -0.55 -0.45 0.33 0.36 0.33 0.49 -
13. Staff/group HMO-to-hospital ratio -0.10 -0.27 -0.19 0.29 0.27 0.54 0.16 -0.03 -0.30 0.04 -0.06 -0.30 -
14. PO-to-hospital ratio -0.33 -0.12 -0.23 -0.48 -0.42 -0.54 -0.43 -0.09 0.87 0.17 0.30 0.55 -0.29 -
15. % Male -0.09 -0.12 -0.09 0.33 -0.06 0.24 0.06 -0.14 -0.18 0.23 -0.22 -0.29 0.24 -0.25 -
16.  % African-American -0.12 0.15 0.03 -0.22 -0.27 -0.40 -0.30 -0.07 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.34 -0.39 0.24 0.19 -
17. % Hispanic -0.20 0.05 -0.07 -0.31 -0.28 -0.32 -0.31 -0.06 0.40 0.11 0.12 0.18 -0.17 0.33 0.03 0.23 -
18. % Urban -0.13 0.15 0.01 -0.58 -0.41 -0.75 -0.58 0.03 0.59 0.23 0.33 0.56 -0.59 0.57 -0.20 0.49 0.50 -
19. SES index -0.12 -0.26 -0.20 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.17 0.00 -0.05 -0.12 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.03 -0.08 -0.76 -0.16 -
20. Heart disease mortality rate 0.23 0.17 0.21 0.13 0.13 0.18 0.31 0.08 -0.22 -0.04 -0.19 -0.18 0.05 -0.19 0.23 -0.04 -0.19 -0.29 0.18 -
21. Respiratory disease mortality rate 0.25 0.15 0.20 0.06 0.18 0.14 0.30 0.08 -0.17 -0.07 -0.13 -0.14 -0.03 -0.14 0.10 -0.04 -0.15 -0.24 0.13 0.77 -
22. Pneumonia mortality rate 0.31 0.31 0.32 -0.01 0.13 0.06 0.32 0.12 -0.12 -0.13 -0.08 -0.09 -0.24 -0.09 0.02 0.05 -0.07 -0.15 0.10 0.81 0.72 -
23.  Diabetes mortality rate 0.21 0.25 0.24 0.00 0.08 -0.12 -0.02 0.23 -0.03 -0.06 -0.03 -0.01 -0.12 -0.13 -0.15 0.07 0.17 0.10 -0.39 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 -
24. % ages 0 to 14 -0.08 0.11 0.02 -0.25 -0.22 -0.27 -0.23 0.01 0.24 0.04 0.17 0.21 -0.13 0.24 -0.14 0.20 0.77 0.41 -0.77 -0.24 -0.18 -0.12 0.26 -
25. % ages 15 to 64 -0.23 -0.17 -0.20 0.10 -0.13 0.02 -0.03 -0.11 0.05 0.22 0.00 0.01 -0.10 0.03 0.41 0.16 -0.17 0.09 0.44 0.03 -0.01 0.06 -0.34 -0.35 -
26. % ages 65+ 0.34 0.05 0.20 0.37 0.54 0.44 0.49 0.19 -0.45 -0.31 -0.11 -0.32 0.22 -0.49 -0.20 -0.44 -0.65 -0.56 0.45 0.20 0.16 0.11 0.09 -0.60 -0.12 -
27. # of outpatient services per 1,000 0.47 0.24 0.37 0.37 0.33 0.30 0.43 0.13 -0.27 -0.09 -0.29 -0.40 0.06 -0.44 0.20 -0.27 -0.37 -0.36 0.15 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.09 -0.43 0.11 0.50 -  
Note:  Correlations greater than 0.095 or less than -0.095 are significant at p < 0.05. 





Table 9:  Pearson zero-order correlations for inter-organizational relationships 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
1. Acute ACSH -
2. Chronic ACSH 0.83 -
3. Aggregate ACSH 0.95 0.96 -
4. Proportion from same system -0.19 -0.02 -0.10 -
5. Proportion own insurance product -0.05 0.03 -0.02 0.27 -
6. Proportion own SNF 0.09 0.01 0.05 -0.24 0.08 -
7. Proportion with phys. relationship 0.22 0.28 0.27 0.05 0.29 0.00 -
8.  % Male -0.09 -0.12 -0.09 -0.01 -0.12 0.04 -0.18 -
9.  % African-American -0.12 0.15 0.03 0.38 0.39 -0.12 0.13 0.19 -
10. % Hispanic -0.20 0.05 -0.07 0.02 -0.06 -0.12 0.08 0.03 0.23 -
11. % Urban -0.13 0.15 0.01 0.45 0.29 -0.22 0.21 -0.20 0.49 0.50 -
12. SES index -0.12 -0.26 -0.20 0.20 0.22 0.14 -0.08 0.03 -0.08 -0.76 -0.16 -
13. Heart disease mortality rate 0.23 0.17 0.21 -0.04 -0.11 -0.02 -0.08 0.23 -0.04 -0.19 -0.29 0.18 -
14. Respiratory disease mortality rate 0.25 0.15 0.20 -0.04 -0.07 0.01 -0.03 0.10 -0.04 -0.15 -0.24 0.13 0.77 -
15. Pneumonia mortality rate 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.05 -0.04 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.05 -0.07 -0.15 0.10 0.81 0.72 -
16. Diabetes mortality rate 0.21 0.25 0.24 -0.04 -0.11 0.03 0.05 -0.15 0.07 0.17 0.10 -0.39 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 -
17. % ages 0 to 14 -0.08 0.11 0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.13 0.15 -0.14 0.20 0.77 0.41 -0.77 -0.24 -0.18 -0.12 0.26 -
18. % ages 15 to 64 -0.23 -0.17 -0.20 0.18 0.10 0.01 -0.07 0.41 0.16 -0.17 0.09 0.44 0.03 -0.01 0.06 -0.34 -0.35 -
19. % ages 65+ 0.34 0.05 0.20 -0.27 -0.07 0.23 -0.06 -0.20 -0.44 -0.65 -0.56 0.45 0.20 0.16 0.11 0.09 -0.60 -0.12 -
20. PCPs per 1,000 0.25 0.28 0.28 0.13 -0.03 -0.05 -0.03 0.07 0.13 -0.04 -0.05 0.11 0.83 0.71 0.95 0.00 -0.13 0.07 0.07 -
21. Specialists per 1,000 0.22 0.26 0.25 0.16 -0.02 -0.07 -0.03 0.09 0.17 -0.02 -0.01 0.10 0.80 0.68 0.91 -0.01 -0.13 0.08 0.03 0.99 -
22. # of outpatient services per 1,000 0.47 0.24 0.37 -0.25 -0.12 0.21 -0.02 0.20 -0.27 -0.37 -0.36 0.15 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.09 -0.43 0.11 0.50 0.12 0.08 -
23. Hospital Herfindahl Index -0.04 -0.27 -0.16 -0.52 -0.36 0.05 -0.07 0.29 -0.43 -0.22 -0.68 -0.03 0.07 0.00 -0.20 -0.08 -0.14 -0.08 0.27 -0.24 -0.25 0.16 -  
Note:  Correlations greater than 0.095 or less than -0.095 are significant at p < 0.05. 






Analysis of the bivariate correlations is helpful for identifying potential issues of 
multicollinearity that may exist in multivariate models.  High multicollinearity can result 
in high variance and inflated standard errors and an increased likelihood of committing a 
Type II error (i.e., failure to reject the null hypothesis).  However, multicollinearity does 
not always result in inflated standard errors and the actual effects require additional 
examination (Gujarati 1995; O'Brien 2007).    
The bivariate correlational analysis highlighted fifteen correlations that were 
sufficiently strong (i.e., greater than 0.5 or less than -0.5) to warrant additional analysis.   
These correlations were limited to the control variables.  Specifically, three primary care 
physician per 1,000 coefficients, four specialist physician per 1,000 coefficients, six 
percentage of urban resident coefficients, and two pneumonia mortality rate per 1,000 
coefficients exceeded the 0.5 level.   To test the effects of these correlations on the 
standard errors, two sets of regression models were run for each potentially problematic 
variable, for a total of eight regressions.  One model included a full set of covariates, 
while the second model omitted the highly correlated variable.  For example, two 
regression models for the primary care physician per 1,000 residents variable were run, 
one with the full set of control variables and a second model with all predictors except the 
primary care physician per 1,000 residents variable.  If strong correlations with the 
primary care physician per 1,000 residents variable are creating problems of 
multicollinearity, then the removal of this variable should result in a substantial decrease 
in the standard errors for the remaining covariates in the second model.  Tables 10 and 11 





aggregated ACSH outcome.  Comparisons of the models indicate that the effects of 
covariate correlation are minimal.  The removal of the strongly correlated variables only 
slightly changes the standard errors and suggests that issues of multicollinearity will not 
substantially impact hypothesis testing.  Therefore, the analysis proceeded with the full 





Table 10:  Regression results for testing multicollinearity – physician supply 
β SE β SE β SE β SE
% Male 0.044 ** 0.018 0.044 ** 0.018 0.044 ** 0.018 0.044 ** 0.018
% African-American -0.015 0.015 -0.015 0.015 -0.015 0.015 -0.015 0.015
% Hispanic -0.022 **** 0.006 -0.022 **** 0.006 -0.022 **** 0.006 -0.023 **** 0.006
% Urban 0.006 ** 0.003 0.006 ** 0.003 0.006 ** 0.003 0.006 ** 0.003
SES index -88.616 **** 16.628 -88.628 **** 16.603 -88.616 **** 16.628 -88.477 **** 16.616
Heart disease mortality rate -0.040 ** 0.020 -0.040 ** 0.019 -0.040 ** 0.020 -0.040 ** 0.020
Respiratory disease mortality rate -0.021 0.018 -0.022 0.017 -0.021 0.018 -0.023 0.017
Pneumonia mortality rate 0.285 * 0.149 0.298 *** 0.094 0.285 * 0.149 0.307 ** 0.128
Diabetes mortality rate -0.987 2.067 -0.973 2.061 -0.987 2.067 -0.930 2.055
% residents ages 0-14 (Referent) - - - - - - - -
% residents ages 15-64 -12.627 16.399 -12.607 16.374 -12.627 16.399 -12.659 16.394
% residents ages 65 and over 28.925 28.006 28.750 27.916 28.925 28.006 28.294 27.922
PCPs per 1,000 0.012 0.110 - - 0.012 0.110 -0.015 0.051
Specialists per 1,000 -0.023 0.080 -0.015 0.037 -0.023 0.080 - -
# of outpatient services per 1,000 0.001 **** 2.0E-04 0.001 **** 2.0E-04 0.001 **** 2.0E-04 0.001 **** 2.01E-04
Hospital Herfindahl Index -4.347 *** 1.382 -4.37 *** 1.37 -4.347 *** 1.382 -4.34 *** 1.38
1998 (Referent) - - - - - - - -
1999 -0.050 0.304 -0.045 0.302 -0.050 0.304 -0.044 0.303
2000 -0.663 ** 0.309 -0.662 ** 0.308 -0.663 ** 0.309 -0.662 ** 0.308
2001 0.329 0.317 0.327 0.316 0.329 0.317 0.321 0.316
2002 0.702 ** 0.329 0.700 ** 0.329 0.702 ** 0.329 0.689 ** 0.326
2003 0.899 ** 0.353 0.894 ** 0.350 0.899 ** 0.353 0.876 ** 0.343
2004 -0.218 0.374 -0.225 0.369 -0.218 0.374 -0.245 0.361
2005 0.133 0.400 0.129 0.398 0.133 0.400 0.113 0.393
Intercept -23.561 19.904 -23.566 19.875 -23.561 19.904 -23.367 19.888
N 450 450 450 450




Health service use controls
Total ACSH Total ACSH
With primary care physicians 
per 1,000
Without primary care 
physicians per 1,000
With specialist physicians 
per 1,000






Table 11:  Regression results for testing multicollinearity – pneumonia mortality & percentage of urban residents 
β SE β SE β SE β SE
% Male 0.044 ** 0.018 0.041 ** 0.018 0.044 ** 0.018 0.035 ** 0.017
% African-American -0.015 0.015 -0.012 0.016 -0.015 0.015 -0.005 0.015
% Hispanic -0.022 **** 0.006 -0.022 **** 0.006 -0.022 **** 0.006 -0.018 *** 0.006
% Urban 0.006 ** 0.003 0.005 * 0.003 0.006 ** 0.003 - -
SES index -88.616 **** 16.628 -85.859 **** 16.754 -88.616 **** 16.628 -71.816 **** 15.074
Heart disease mortality rate -0.040 ** 0.020 -0.044 ** 0.020 -0.040 ** 0.020 -0.035 * 0.020
Respiratory disease mortality rate -0.021 0.018 -0.019 0.018 -0.021 0.018 -0.021 0.018
Pneumonia mortality rate 0.285 * 0.149 - - 0.285 * 0.149 0.220 0.150
Diabetes mortality rate -0.987 2.067 -1.117 2.070 -0.987 2.067 -0.942 2.069
% residents ages 0-14 (Referent) - - - - - - - -
% residents ages 15-64 -12.627 16.399 -14.647 16.550 -12.627 16.399 -26.188 * 15.687
% residents ages 65 and over 28.925 28.006 28.120 28.383 28.925 28.006 4.886 26.890
PCPs per 1,000 0.012 0.110 0.174 ** 0.070 0.012 0.110 0.019 0.111
Specialists per 1,000 -0.023 0.080 -0.101 0.069 -0.023 0.080 -0.022 0.081
# of outpatient services per 1,000 0.001 **** 2.0E-04 0.001 **** 2.0E-04 0.001 **** 2.0E-04 0.001 **** 2.04E-04
Hospital Herfindahl Index -4.347 *** 1.382 -4.45 *** 1.39 -4.347 *** 1.382 -5.53 **** 1.31
1998 (Referent) - - - - - - - -
1999 -0.050 0.304 -0.096 0.304 -0.050 0.304 -0.059 0.304
2000 -0.663 ** 0.309 -0.664 ** 0.309 -0.663 ** 0.309 -0.657 ** 0.309
2001 0.329 0.317 0.331 0.318 0.329 0.317 0.275 0.316
2002 0.702 ** 0.329 0.667 ** 0.329 0.702 ** 0.329 0.644 * 0.328
2003 0.899 ** 0.353 0.895 ** 0.354 0.899 ** 0.353 0.850 ** 0.353
2004 -0.218 0.374 -0.215 0.375 -0.218 0.374 -0.281 0.374
2005 0.133 0.400 0.088 0.400 0.133 0.400 0.029 0.397
Intercept -23.561 19.904 -19.389 20.017 -23.561 19.904 -0.222 17.262
N 450 450 450 450




Health service use controls
Total ACSH Total ACSH
With pneumonia mortality rate 
per 1,000
Without pneumonia 
mortality rate per 1,000 With percent urban residents






Multivariate Models & Hypothesis Tests 
The following sections describe the results of the multivariate models along with 
a discussion of how these results relate to the study hypotheses.  Three models 
corresponding to the three outcomes are presented for each set of hypothesized 
relationships.  The discussion is divided into the two aspects of market structure being 
evaluated: provider supply and inter-organizational relationships.  Results related to the 
control variables conclude this section and are discussed generally across both aspects of 
market structure to reduce redundancy.   
Provider supply 
 The first set of regressions test non-linear relationships between provider capacity 
and ACSH.  The results of these regression models are shown in Table 12.  Only one 
provider type is consistently associated with ACSH.  The number of hospitals per 1,000 
residents was significantly and positively associated with the rate of acute care ACSH 
(β= 73.83, p<0.01) and aggregate ACSH (β=127.05, p<0.05).  The quadratic term for 
hospitals per 1,000 residents was also significantly associated with these two outcomes.  
The hospital capacity quadratic term was negatively associated with the rate of acute care 
ACSH (β= -267.28, p<0.001) and aggregate ACSH (β= -492.92, p<0.01).  These results 
show that the rate of ACSH initially increases as hospital capacity increases; however, 
after a certain capacity in a market is reached, the rate of ACSH begins decreasing.  The 
inflection point where the rate of ACSH begins decreasing is 0.13 hospitals per 1,000 
market residents.  In other words, increasing hospital capacity is associated with 
increasing rates of ACSH until markets reach an average capacity of 0.13 hospitals per 





results also show that the rate of acute care ACSH declines as community health center 
capacity (β= -15.87, p<0.05) and staff/group model HMO capacity (β= -8.04, p<0.05) 
increases.          
 Hypotheses 1a-1f predicted that ACSH rates would exhibit a U-shaped 
relationship with primary care organization capacity in a market.  The rationale behind 
these hypotheses was that an increasing number of providers would initially open up 
more points of access, but at high levels of provider supply, coordination would be 
compromised.  In this case, a hypothesis was considered supported if the first-order 
regression term was negatively associated with the ACSH rate and the second-order 
regression term was positively associated with the ACSH rate at the 0.10 significance 
level or smaller.  The results of the analysis do not support this relationship.  






Table 12:  Non-linear effects of provider capacity on ACSH 
β SE β SE β SE
CHCs per 1,000 residents -15.87 ** 7.88 -0.24 10.16 -17.74 16.81
  CHCs per 1,000*CHCs per 1,000 39.25 33.69 -1.22 43.44 43.95 71.87
HHAs per 1,000 residents -2.83 10.34 2.26 13.29 -2.16 21.91
  HHAs per 1,000*HHAs per 1,000 64.22 81.78 -59.93 105.03 16.85 172.96
HMOs per 1,000 residents -8.04 ** 3.21 -3.15 4.27 -11.93 7.37
  HMOs per 1,000*HMOs per 1,000 3.62 17.53 3.27 23.38 8.91 40.48
Hospitals per 1,000 residents 73.83 *** 22.74 35.81 29.88 127.05 ** 50.67
  Hospitals per 1,000*Hospitals per 1,000 -267.28 **** 77.89 -158.19 102.70 -492.92 *** 174.92
SNFs per 1,000 residents 0.16 4.55 -4.16 5.83 -5.11 9.57
  SNFs per 1,000*SNFs per 1,000 -21.76 21.41 -0.64 27.40 -20.38 44.95
POs per 1,000 residents -79.21 75.58 -53.73 100.45 -133.61 172.97
  POs per 1,000*POs per 1,000 1830.39 2398.01 1,667.83 3,159.30 4,294.14 5,372.07
% Male 0.02 ** 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 * 0.02
% African-American -0.01 0.01 4.4E-03 0.01 -4.4E-03 0.02
% Hispanic -0.01 *** 2.9E-03 -0.01 ** 3.8E-03 -0.02 *** 0.01
% Urban 2.5E-03 1.5E-03 3.6E-03 * 2.1E-03 0.01 * 0.00
SES index -33.57 **** 8.48 -35.95 *** 11.32 -73.78 **** 19.61
Heart disease mortality rate -0.02 *** 0.01 -0.03 *** 0.01 -0.05 *** 0.02
Respiratory disease mortality rate -8.9E-04 0.01 -0.03 *** 0.01 -0.03 * 0.02
Pneumonia mortality rate 0.10 ** 0.05 0.20 *** 0.06 0.29 *** 0.10
Diabetes mortality rate -2.03 * 1.06 0.32 1.36 -0.41 2.24
% residents ages 0-14 (Referent) - - - - - -
% residents ages 15-64 -4.19 7.91 -6.50 10.56 -8.10 18.30
% residents ages 65 and over 11.60 13.06 9.50 17.59 24.96 30.85
Health service use control
# of outpatient services per 1,000 3.56E-04 **** 1.0E-04 6.45E-04 **** 1.3E-04 1.0E-03 **** 2.2E-04
1998 (Referent) - - - - - -
1999 0.23 0.15 -0.32 * 0.19 -0.15 ** 0.32
2000 -0.10 0.16 -0.53 ** 0.21 -0.70 0.34
2001 0.54 *** 0.18 -0.18 0.23 0.20 0.38
2002 0.52 *** 0.17 0.28 0.22 0.59 0.36
2003 0.76 **** 0.18 0.31 0.23 0.81 ** 0.38
2004 0.13 0.19 -0.17 0.25 -0.30 0.41
2005 0.46 ** 0.21 -0.20 0.27 -0.01 0.44
Intercept -9.98 9.19 -3.97 12.31 -19.89 21.43
N 450 450 450









The second set of provider supply models examined the relationship between provider 
composition and rates of ACSH (Table 13).  Three provider types were consistently 
associated with the ACSH outcomes.  The home health agency-to-hospital ratio was 
significantly and negatively associated with the rate of acute care ACSH (β= -0.15, 
p<0.10), chronic care ACSH (β= -0.30, p<0.01), and aggregate ACSH (β= -0.50, p<0.01).  
Similarly, the skilled nursing facility-to-hospital ratio was negatively associated with the 
rate of acute care ACSH (β= -0.09, p<0.10), chronic care ACSH (β= -0.17, p<0.05), and 
aggregate ACSH (β= -0.30, p<0.05).  Finally, the ratio of physician organizations-to-
hospitals was negatively associated with the rate of acute care ACSH (β= -0.39, p<0.10), 
chronic care ACSH (β= -0.48, p<0.10), and aggregate ACSH (β= -0.85, p<0.10).   
 Hypotheses 2a-2e predicted that higher ratios of ‘coordinative primary care 
organizations’ relative to hospitals would be associated with lower rates of ACSH.  These 
hypotheses were considered supported if the coefficient was negatively associated with 
the ACSH rate at the 0.10 significance level or smaller.  The results of the analysis 
provide support for three of the five predicted relationships.  Specifically, the results 
support hypothesis 2b (home health agencies), hypothesis 2c (skilled nursing facilities), 
and hypothesis 2d (physician organizations).  These results indicate that ACSH rates 
decrease as the number of home health agencies, skilled nursing facilities, and physician 
organizations increase relative to the number of hospitals in a market.  The effect size and 
significance levels also suggest that the relationship with ACSH is strongest for chronic 
care ACSH and aggregated ACSH.  Together, these results suggest that the composition 





the effect may depend upon the type of organization and the types of ACSH being 





Table 13:  Effects of provider composition on ACSH 
β SE β SE β SE
CHC-to-hospital ratio -0.11 0.07 -3.7E-03 0.09 -0.15 0.16
HHA-to-hospital ratio -0.15 * 0.09 -0.30 *** 0.11 -0.50 *** 0.18
Staff/group HMO-to-hospital ratio 0.02 0.09 -0.01 0.11 0.04 0.19
SNF-to-hospital ratio -0.09 * 0.06 -0.17 ** 0.07 -0.30 ** 0.12
PO-to-hospital ratio -0.39 * 0.22 -0.48 * 0.28 -0.85 * 0.48
% Male 0.01 0.01 -1.9E-03 0.01 0.02 0.02
% African-American -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -2.2E-03 0.02
% Hispanic -0.01 **** 2.6E-03 -0.01 *** 3.4E-03 -0.02 **** 0.01
% Urban 4.9E-03 **** 1.2E-03 0.01 **** 1.6E-03 0.01 **** 2.8E-03
SES index -39.49 **** 7.61 -38.27 **** 10.04 -81.56 **** 17.37
Heart disease mortality rate -0.03 **** 0.01 -0.02 ** 0.01 -0.05 *** 0.02
Respiratory disease mortality rate 0.01 0.01 -0.03 *** 0.01 -0.02 0.02
Pneumonia mortality rate 0.12 **** 0.03 0.15 **** 0.04 0.26 **** 0.08
Diabetes mortality rate -2.38 ** 0.97 0.06 1.20 -1.16 1.98
% residents ages 0-14 (Referent) - - - - - -
% residents ages 15-64 -0.80 7.28 -5.32 9.58 -4.24 16.59
% residents ages 65 and over 18.81 12.24 10.87 16.37 33.33 28.67
Health service use control
# of outpatient services per 1,000 3.34E-04 **** 9.5E-05 5.78E-04 **** 1.2E-04 9.28E-04 **** 1.97E-04
1998 (Referent) - - - - - -
1999 0.07 0.15 -0.54 *** 0.19 -0.54 * 0.31
2000 -0.31 * 0.16 -0.76 **** 0.20 -1.17 **** 0.32
2001 0.18 0.19 -0.68 *** 0.24 -0.73 * 0.39
2002 0.30 * 0.17 -0.04 0.21 0.00 0.35
2003 0.56 *** 0.17 0.04 0.22 0.31 0.35
2004 -0.06 0.18 -0.42 * 0.23 -0.78 ** 0.37
2005 0.21 0.20 -0.49 * 0.25 -0.57 0.41
Intercept -11.44 8.85 -0.86 11.71 -17.46 20.33
N 450 450 450
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01; ****p < 0.001
Time trend controls







     
Inter-organizational Relationships 
 A final set of regression models was used to assess the effects of inter-
organizational relationships on the rates of ACSH (Table 14).  The proportion of market 
hospitals with a formal physician relationship was the only covariate significantly 
associated with the rate of ACSH; the proportion of hospitals with a formal physician 
relationship was positively associated with the rate of acute care ACSH (β=0.31, p<0.10) 
and aggregate ACSH (β=0.66, p<0.10).  These results show that the rate of acute care 
ACSH and aggregate ACSH increase as the proportion of market hospitals with a formal 
physician relationship increases.   
Hypothesis 4 predicted that a formal relationship between a hospital and a 
physician organization would be negatively associated with ACSH rates.  In this case, the 
hypothesis was considered supported if the covariate was negatively associated with the 
ACSH rate at the 0.10 significance level or smaller.  The physician-hospital relationship 
covariate was positively associated with all three ACSH rates and opposite of what was 
predicted in hypothesis 4; thus, this hypothesis was not supported by the analysis.  
Hypothesis 3 predicted that the proportion of same-system hospitals in a market would be 
negatively associated with the ACSH rates.  The results of the analysis were not 
statistically significant and do not support this hypothesis.  Similarly, hypotheses 5 and 6 
predicted the proportion of hospitals with an ownership interest in an insurance product 
and a nursing home would be negatively associated with ACSH rates.  The results of the 





In aggregate, the inter-organizational analysis suggests that most formal 
relationships between hospitals and other health care organizations do not significantly 
affect ACSH rates.  Among the four relationships considered in the study, a formal 
relationship between hospitals and physicians seems to be the most important 
consideration.  However, contrary to what was expected, a formal relationship between 
hospitals and physicians actually increases ACSH rates.  Similar to the provider 
composition models, the effects of the relationship seem to differ by the type of ACSH 
considered, with the relationship significant only for rates of acute care ACSH and 





Table 14:  Effects of inter-organizational relationships on ACSH  
β SE β SE β SE
Proportion hospitals-same system -0.09 0.27 -0.02 0.34 -0.06 0.57
Proportion hospitals-own insurance -0.16 0.33 -0.61 0.42 -0.87 0.69
Proportion hospitals-own nursing home -0.27 0.19 -0.27 0.24 -0.62 0.40
Proportion hospitals-any phys. relationship 0.31 * 0.17 0.27 0.22 0.66 * 0.36
% Male 0.02 *** 0.01 0.02 * 0.01 0.04 ** 0.02
% African-American -0.01 * 0.01 2.0E-03 0.01 -0.01 0.02
% Hispanic -0.01 **** 2.5E-03 -0.01 *** 0.00 -0.02 **** 0.01
% Urban 2.5E-03 ** 1.2E-03 3.2E-03 ** 1.5E-03 0.01 ** 2.7E-03
SES index -40.59 **** 7.30 -41.26 **** 9.50 -83.74 **** 16.65
Heart disease mortality rate -0.02 ** 0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.04 * 0.02
Respiratory disease mortality rate 2.6E-03 0.01 -0.02 * 0.01 -0.02 0.02
Pneumonia mortality rate 0.16 ** 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.27 * 0.15
Diabetes mortality rate -2.11 ** 1.02 0.01 1.28 -0.78 2.12
% residents ages 0-14 (Referent) - - - - - -
% residents ages 15-64 -4.85 7.24 -10.65 9.38 -15.78 16.36
% residents ages 65 and over 16.49 11.97 11.55 15.67 28.47 27.80
PCPs per 1,000 -0.06 0.05 0.10 0.07 0.03 0.11
Specialists per 1,000 0.04 0.04 -0.10 ** 0.05 -0.04 0.08
# of outpatient services per 1,000 3.7E-04 **** 9.7E-05 6.2E-04 **** 1.2E-04 1.0E-03 **** 2.04E-04
Hospital Herfindahl Index -1.84 *** 0.65 -2.46 *** 0.83 -4.69 **** 1.42
1998 (Referent) - - - - - -
1999 0.26 * 0.15 -0.32 * 0.19 -0.12 0.31
2000 -0.15 0.15 -0.49 ** 0.19 -0.73 ** 0.31
2001 0.52 *** 0.16 0.00 0.20 0.37 0.33
2002 0.56 **** 0.16 0.50 ** 0.21 0.84 ** 0.34
2003 0.74 **** 0.17 0.54 ** 0.22 1.01 ** 0.36
2004 0.10 0.18 0.08 0.23 -0.10 0.38
2005 0.38 * 0.19 0.13 0.24 0.23 0.40
Intercept -11.86 8.67 -5.96 11.29 -20.35 19.83
N 450 450 450
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01; ****p < 0.001
Physician supply controls
Market use and competition controls
Time trend controls








 The strongest and most robust results for control variables were observed for the 
socioeconomic status (SES) index, the percentage of Hispanic residents in a market, and 
the number of outpatient services per 1,000 residents.  The SES index was strongly and 
negatively significant for all three ACSH rates across all relationships tested in the study.  
These results indicate that the rate of ACSH declines as the economic and educational 
status of individuals increases.  Similarly, the relationship between the percentage of 
Hispanic residents and ACSH was consistently negative across all three ACSH rates.  In 
contrast, the number of outpatient services per 1,000 residents in a market is positively 
associated with the three ACSH rates.  
Three other control variables that displayed relatively consistent results across the 
outcomes were the percentage of urban residents, heart disease mortality rate, and gender.  
The percentage of residents living in urban areas was consistently associated with higher 
rates of ACSH.  However, the effect size was typically small.  Similarly, the percentage 
of male residents was consistently associated with higher rates of ACSH.  In contrast, 
higher mortality rates for heart disease were associated with lower rates of ACSH.  The 
hospital Herfindahl Index was also consistently and negatively associated with the rates 
of ACSH, indicating that as hospital competition declines, rates of ACSH decrease as 
well.  
Summary of Multivariate Models 
The findings of this study indicate that some health care system characteristics 
have a significant effect on ACSH rates and may play an important role in improving 





outcomes, with three of the five provider ratios (home health agency-to-hospital ratio, 
skilled nursing facility-to-hospital ratio, physician organization-to-hospital ratio) 
significantly and negatively associated with ACSH rates.  In contrast, provider capacity 
did not exhibit robust results across the provider types considered in the study, nor were 
these relationships non-linear.  These results suggest that certain aspects of provider 
supply may be more important for improving ACSH rates.  Also notable was the pattern 
of results across the different outcomes, with significant relationships between market 
structure and ACSH rates more often related to acute care rates or aggregated rates.  For 
example, hospital capacity was significantly and non-linearly associated with the acute 
care ACSH rate and aggregated ACSH rate but was not significantly associated with 
chronic care ACSH rates.  Similarly, the proportion of hospitals in a market with a formal 
relationship with a physician organization was significantly and positively associated 
with the acute care ACSH rate and the aggregated ACSH rate but not with the chronic 
care hospitalization rate.  This pattern suggests that the effects of some market 
characteristics may pertain more to certain types of ambulatory conditions.    
The multivariate analysis also highlights the value of incorporating multiple 
perspectives when examining ACSH, which is consistent with recommendations to 
consider multiple explanations when explaining small area variations (Davis et al. 2000; 
Stano 1991).  For example, the effects of the health care system characteristics were 
significant even after controlling for the effects of population characteristics, many of 
which were also significantly associated with ACSH rates.  Consistent with previous 
research, the results support the importance of enabling characteristics, with SES being 





The results also suggest that the use of outpatient health services may actually increase 
inpatient utilization, a somewhat counterintuitive result that has some support in the 
literature  (Gill, Mainous, and Nsereko 2003; Weinberger, Oddone, and Henderson 
1996).  Interestingly, the relationships between ACSH rates, race/ethnicity, and 
geographic location contrast with previous ACSH research.  Most research describes 
minorities as having more barriers to access, which ostensibly leads to more significant 
health problems that manifest in inpatient stays (Cable 2002; Chang, Mirvis, and Waters 
2008; Laditka and Laditka 2006).  A similar relationship is argued to exist for people who 
live in rural areas (DeLia 2003; Laditka and Laditka 1999; Penfold et al. 2008).  The 
results of this study suggest that larger proportions of these types of residents in a market 
are actually associated with lower ACSH rates.   
Sensitivity Analysis 
ACSH research typically combines all clinical conditions into one aggregated 
ACSH outcome.  However, given that most of the relationships being tested in this study 
have not been explored in previous research, the main analysis was supplemented with a 
sensitivity analysis to determine whether the direction and statistical significance of the 
relationships vary across individual conditions and whether aggregation may obscure 
underlying variation.   
The sensitivity analysis first entailed running the previous models using the 
eleven condition specific rates of ACSH as outcomes.  The results of these regression 
models are included in Tables 15, 16, and 17.  For provider capacity, the condition 
specific models are generally consistent with the aggregated models.  Hospital capacity 





and pneumonia hospitalizations.  Once again, these relationships were in the opposite 
direction predicted, increasing initially as the number of hospitals increased and then 
decreasing after some level of hospital capacity was reached.  Interestingly, community 
health center capacity displayed a non-linear relationship with several ACSH rates when 
examined on a condition-specific basis, whereas the aggregated models did not show any 
significant relationships.  For dehydration and long-term complications of diabetes 
hospitalization rates, the relationship was in the direction predicted, declining initially as 
capacity increased and then increasing after some level of health center capacity was 
reached.  In contrast, health center capacity was related to hypertension hospitalization 
rates in the opposite manner, increasing initially and then declining at higher levels of 
capacity.  In sum, these results suggest that provider capacity may have a non-linear 
relationship with ACSH rates; however, the relationship may be limited to select clinical 
conditions.  The results also suggest that the direction of the relationship depends upon 
the clinical condition.  Condition-specific results for the provider composition models tell 
a similar story.  The same provider types are generally significant in both the condition-
specific models and the aggregated models; however, the significant relationships are 
limited to select clinical conditions, specifically angina, asthma, and congestive heart 
failure.   
Condition-specific, inter-organizational relationship models provide an interesting 
contrast to the aggregated outcome models.  Unlike the aggregated outcome models, 
where only the hospital-physician relationship was significant, the condition-specific 
models indicate that the proportion of hospitals that own a nursing home and the 





several condition-specific outcomes.  Specifically, the proportion of hospitals that own a 
nursing home was negatively associated with hospitalization rates for perforated 
appendix, angina, asthma, and hypertension.  The same proportion was positively 
associated with the rate of uncontrolled diabetes hospitalizations.  The proportion of 
hospitals that own an insurance product was negatively associated with hospitalization 
rates for congestive heart failure, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and 
uncontrolled diabetes.  In contrast, the proportion of hospitals with a formal physician 
relationship was positively associated with hospitalization rates for pneumonia, angina, 
asthma, and congestive heart failure, which is consistent with the aggregated outcome 
models.   
Similar to the provider supply models, the condition-specific, inter-organizational 
relationship models highlight that significant relationships may exist, but they may be 
isolated to certain clinical conditions.  Furthermore, positive associations for some types 
of relationships (e.g., hospital-physician) and negative associations for others (e.g., own 
an insurance product and own a nursing home) for the same clinical condition suggest 
that different types of relationships may present conflicting demands on hospitals.  
Finally, from a methodological standpoint, the sensitivity analysis suggests that strong 
relationships for certain clinical conditions may drive significance at an aggregated level.  
For instance, a strong relationship between the proportion of hospitals with a formal 
physician relationship and the pneumonia hospitalization rate (β=0.26, p<0.01) appears to 
be what resulted in a significant relationship at the aggregated level, given that the 
proportion was not significantly related to the other two acute care conditions 





Table 15:  Sensitivity analysis of the non-linear effects of provider supply on condition-specific ACSH 
β SE β SE β SE
Explanatory variables
CHCs per 1,000 residents -4.77 ** 1.89 -1.33 ** 0.62 -4.61 4.48
  CHCs per 1,000*CHCs per 1,000 20.98 *** 8.08 3.26 2.66 -3.77 19.18
HHAs per 1,000 residents -0.49 2.49 -0.35 0.83 7.70 5.94
  HHAs per 1,000*HHAs per 1,000 10.18 19.68 4.91 6.57 -11.42 47.11
HMOs per 1,000 residents -0.53 0.75 -0.59 *** 0.23 -4.15 ** 1.69
  HMOs per 1,000*HMOs per 1,000 1.08 4.11 0.20 1.23 -0.35 9.22
Hospitals per 1,000 residents 5.04 5.38 4.39 *** 1.67 29.74 ** 12.34
  Hospitals per 1,000*Hospitals per 1,000 -25.92 18.39 -14.86 *** 5.65 -101.74 ** 41.94
SNFs per 1,000 residents -0.63 1.10 -0.04 0.37 -1.23 2.65
  SNFs per 1,000*SNFs per 1,000 -3.92 5.16 0.13 1.75 1.00 12.45
POs per 1,000 residents -12.99 17.76 -0.98 5.34 -9.20 39.96
  POs per 1,000*POs per 1,000 285.04 566.53 36.08 173.71 -173.13 1,291.18
% Male 3.3E-03 * 1.9E-03 1.7E-03 *** 5.9E-04 0.01 *** 4.4E-03
% African-American -2.7E-03 * 1.6E-03 -7.2E-04 4.6E-04 -4.2E-03 3.5E-03
% Hispanic -9.3E-04 6.6E-04 -3.8E-04 * 1.9E-04 -0.01 **** 1.5E-03
% Urban 7.6E-04 ** 3.6E-04 2.2E-04 ** 1.0E-04 1.0E-03 7.9E-04
SES index -5.42 *** 1.99 -1.47 ** 0.59 -18.51 **** 4.44
Heart disease mortality rate -4.1E-03 ** 2.0E-03 -1.2E-03 * 6.5E-04 -0.01 ** 4.7E-03
Respiratory disease mortality rate 1.0E-03 2.0E-03 -2.3E-03 **** 6.7E-04 -0.01 4.8E-03
Pneumonia mortality rate 0.03 ** 0.01 3.0E-03 3.3E-03 0.04 * 0.02
Diabetes mortality rate -0.33 0.26 -0.22 ** 0.09 -0.34 0.61
% residents ages 15-64 -1.34 1.86 -0.66 0.56 -3.97 4.16
% residents ages 65 and over 3.79 3.04 0.49 0.88 6.18 6.69
# of outpatient services per 1,000 3.7E-05 2.4E-05 -2.9E-06 8.0E-06 1.2E-04 ** 5.8E-05
1999 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.36 **** 0.09
2000 0.03 0.04 0.04 *** 0.01 0.11 0.09
2001 0.07 * 0.04 0.11 **** 0.01 0.24 ** 0.11
2002 0.13 *** 0.04 0.12 **** 0.01 0.25 ** 0.10
2003 0.13 *** 0.04 0.21 **** 0.01 0.36 **** 0.10
2004 0.04 0.05 0.18 **** 0.02 -0.03 0.11
2005 0.04 0.05 0.19 **** 0.02 0.27 ** 0.12
Intercept -1.85 2.15 -0.66 0.63 -5.44 4.77
N 450 450 450








Table 15:  Sensitivity analysis of the non-linear effects of provider supply on condition-specific ACSH (cont) 
β SE β SE β SE β SE
Explanatory variables
CHCs per 1,000 residents -2.74 ** 1.28 1.54 1.33 -3.95 3.51 0.45 3.03
  CHCs per 1,000*CHCs per 1,000 6.63 5.49 -5.50 5.69 9.32 15.02 -3.01 12.96
HHAs per 1,000 residents 1.53 1.73 0.77 1.74 -2.21 4.63 5.88 4.02
  HHAs per 1,000*HHAs per 1,000 -16.08 13.80 -2.10 13.79 -14.15 36.68 -38.53 31.97
HMOs per 1,000 residents 0.25 0.44 -0.30 0.55 -1.86 1.37 1.69 * 1.12
  HMOs per 1,000*HMOs per 1,000 1.99 2.38 1.29 3.01 -1.90 7.47 10.26 6.09
Hospitals per 1,000 residents 0.59 3.31 1.30 3.88 15.82 9.87 -12.53 8.22
  Hospitals per 1,000*Hospitals per 1,000 -7.50 11.11 -6.99 13.31 -69.17 ** 33.65 23.43 27.88
SNFs per 1,000 residents -1.09 0.79 -1.34 * 0.77 -1.82 2.05 -0.31 1.80
  SNFs per 1,000*SNFs per 1,000 2.28 3.71 4.99 3.60 5.28 9.65 -7.75 8.48
POs per 1,000 residents 2.83 10.33 10.18 12.96 -43.85 32.32 11.71 26.42
  POs per 1,000*POs per 1,000 165.16 339.91 -438.49 409.57 1,317.16 1,036.45 -415.69 857.61
% Male 3.1E-03 *** 1.2E-03 7.6E-06 1.4E-03 7.9E-06 3.6E-03 0.01 ** 2.9E-03
% African-American 3.8E-04 8.7E-04 1.3E-03 1.2E-03 4.5E-04 2.9E-03 -2.0E-03 2.3E-03
% Hispanic -2.4E-04 3.6E-04 -3.8E-04 4.9E-04 -1.9E-03 1.2E-03 -3.4E-03 **** 9.6E-04
% Urban -1.2E-04 2.0E-04 4.8E-04 * 2.6E-04 9.3E-04 6.4E-04 1.1E-03 ** 5.2E-04
SES index -1.68 1.14 -3.75 ** 1.46 -8.00 ** 3.61 -11.47 **** 2.93
Heart disease mortality rate -1.5E-03 1.3E-03 -9.4E-04 1.5E-03 -0.01 3.8E-03 -0.01 *** 3.2E-03
Respiratory disease mortality rate -1.4E-03 1.4E-03 -2.4E-03 * 1.4E-03 -0.01 ** 3.7E-03 -0.01 *** 3.3E-03
Pneumonia mortality rate 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 ** 0.02 0.06 **** 0.02
Diabetes mortality rate 0.60 *** 0.18 0.12 0.18 -0.15 0.48 0.21 0.42
% residents ages 15-64 0.47 1.08 -0.45 1.36 0.25 3.37 -4.88 * 2.75
% residents ages 65 and over 2.25 1.67 1.73 2.25 6.85 5.48 1.00 4.39
# of outpatient services per 1,000 8.7E-06 1.7E-05 5.4E-05 *** 1.7E-05 1.5E-04 **** 4.5E-05 1.2E-04 *** 3.9E-05
1999 -0.01 0.03 0.02 0.03 -0.20 *** 0.07 0.14 ** 0.06
2000 -0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.03 -0.14 * 0.07 0.04 0.06
2001 -0.08 ** 0.03 -0.03 0.03 -0.17 ** 0.08 0.16 ** 0.07
2002 -0.11 **** 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.08 0.14 ** 0.07
2003 -0.08 *** 0.03 0.04 0.03 3.9E-03 0.08 0.07 0.07
2004 -0.10 *** 0.03 -0.05 0.03 -0.02 0.09 -0.16 ** 0.08
2005 -0.10 *** 0.04 -0.02 0.04 0.00 0.09 -0.15 * 0.08
Intercept -2.17 1.21 -0.71 1.58 -1.11 3.89 -1.79 3.14
N 450 450 450 450







Table 15:  Sensitivity analysis of the non-linear effects of provider supply on condition-specific ACSH (cont) 
Uncontrolled diabetes
β SE β SE β SE β SE
Explanatory variables
CHCs per 1,000 residents 2.39 ** 1.19 0.94 0.62 -2.97 *** 0.97 0.01 0.18
  CHCs per 1,000*CHCs per 1,000 -11.43 ** 5.10 -2.07 2.64 15.13 **** 4.15 0.45 0.76
HHAs per 1,000 residents 1.88 1.57 1.23 0.89 1.93 1.32 0.49 * 0.29
  HHAs per 1,000*HHAs per 1,000 -17.17 12.41 -13.38 * 7.41 -6.81 10.55 -3.15 2.71
HMOs per 1,000 residents -0.26 0.48 0.25 0.18 0.31 0.32 0.05 0.05
  HMOs per 1,000*HMOs per 1,000 -0.05 2.61 1.56 * 0.94 0.10 1.74 0.15 0.25
Hospitals per 1,000 residents -0.96 3.41 -2.10 1.40 -1.26 2.45 0.05 0.39
  Hospitals per 1,000*Hospitals per 1,000 4.95 11.65 4.57 4.60 -2.08 8.19 -1.12 1.26
SNFs per 1,000 residents -1.10 0.69 -0.66 0.45 -0.84 0.61 -0.43 ** 0.18
  SNFs per 1,000*SNFs per 1,000 3.53 3.26 0.68 2.16 2.44 2.87 1.79 ** 0.90
POs per 1,000 residents 2.15 11.26 4.27 3.97 2.21 7.54 0.63 0.97
  POs per 1,000*POs per 1,000 -132.63 358.93 -111.17 133.36 -121.68 249.51 -15.18 32.90
% Male 1.4E-03 1.2E-03 -2.0E-05 4.7E-04 3.1E-04 8.5E-04 -2.1E-04 1.3E-04
% African-American 6.9E-04 1.0E-03 2.8E-04 3.0E-04 -4.0E-05 6.2E-04 9.7E-07 6.8E-05
% Hispanic -2.9E-04 4.2E-04 -4.1E-04 *** 1.3E-04 -5.4E-04 ** 2.6E-04 -2.0E-05 3.1E-05
% Urban 3.2E-04 2.3E-04 1.5E-04 ** 7.3E-05 5.6E-04 **** 1.4E-04 2.0E-05 1.8E-05
SES index -2.93 ** 1.26 -1.00 ** 0.44 -2.75 *** 0.83 -0.15 0.11
Heart disease mortality rate -3.4E-03 ** 1.3E-03 -5.3E-04 6.2E-04 -5.8E-04 9.7E-04 1.5E-04 2.2E-04
Respiratory disease mortality rate -1.6E-03 1.3E-03 1.2E-03 8.6E-04 -2.1E-03 * 1.1E-03 -3.3E-04 4.0E-04
Pneumonia mortality rate 0.02 ** 0.01 2.3E-03 2.4E-03 0.01 *** 4.6E-03 6.1E-04 5.9E-04
Diabetes mortality rate 0.20 0.16 0.08 0.10 -0.17 0.14 0.09 *** 0.04
% residents ages 15-64 -0.74 1.18 -0.77 * 0.45 -1.19 0.79 0.06 0.13
% residents ages 65 and over 0.86 1.93 -0.25 0.61 1.02 1.20 0.14 0.15
# of outpatient services per 1,000 2.7E-05 * 1.5E-05 9.8E-06 8.1E-06 3.8E-05 *** 1.3E-05 -5.4E-07 2.4E-06
1999 -0.08 **** 0.02 -0.09 **** 0.02 0.06 *** 0.02 -0.07 **** 0.01
2000 -0.11 **** 0.02 -0.08 **** 0.02 0.07 *** 0.02 -0.06 **** 0.01
2001 -0.06 ** 0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.09 **** 0.02 -0.08 **** 0.01
2002 1.5E-03 0.03 0.06 **** 0.02 0.13 **** 0.02 -0.02 ** 0.01
2003 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.11 **** 0.02 -0.07 **** 0.01
2004 -0.09 *** 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.14 **** 0.03 -0.07 **** 0.01
2005 -0.07 ** 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.15 **** 0.03 -0.08 **** 0.01
Intercept -0.78 1.36 0.40 0.46 -0.07 0.88 0.05 0.12
N 450 450 450 450
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01; ****p < 0.001
Short-term complications of 
diabetes







Table 16:  Sensitivity analysis of the effects of provider ratios on condition-specific ACSH 
β SE β SE β SE
Explanatory variables
CHC-to-hospital ratio -0.013 0.018 -0.011 * 0.006 -0.078 * 0.042
HHA-to-hospital ratio -0.028 0.021 -0.002 0.007 -0.022 0.050
Staff/group HMO-to-hospital ratio -0.025 0.014 -0.002 0.005 0.000 0.049
SNF-to-hospital ratio 0.024 * 0.020 -0.002 0.006 -0.041 0.033
PO-to-hospital ratio -0.044 0.051 0.005 0.016 -0.201 * 0.122
% Male 0.002 0.002 0.002 *** 0.001 0.009 * 0.005
% African-American -0.001 0.002 -0.001 * 4.5E-04 -0.004 0.004
% Hispanic -0.001 * 0.001 -4.6E-04 *** 1.8E-04 -0.007 **** 0.001
% Urban 0.001 **** 0.000 3.6E-04 **** 8.3E-05 0.003 **** 0.001
SES index -5.724 *** 1.760 -1.702 *** 0.538 -23.538 **** 4.217
Heart disease mortality rate -0.004 ** 0.002 -0.001 ** 0.001 -0.013 *** 0.004
Respiratory disease mortality rate 0.002 0.002 -0.002 *** 0.001 -0.001 0.005
Pneumonia mortality rate 0.024 *** 0.008 0.005 ** 0.002 0.050 *** 0.019
Diabetes mortality rate -0.380 0.237 -0.197 ** 0.080 -0.674 0.568
% residents ages 15-64 -0.553 1.691 -0.435 0.523 -0.351 4.051
% residents ages 65 and over 3.908 2.797 0.721 0.840 12.760 * 6.703
# of outpatient services per 1,000 3.3E-05 2.3E-05 -3.0E-06 7.6E-06 9.1E-05 *** 5.5E-05
1999 -0.005 0.037 0.016 0.013 0.269 0.089
2000 -0.013 0.039 0.031 ** 0.013 -0.023 0.094
2001 -0.019 0.047 0.102 **** 0.016 0.085 0.112
2002 0.079 * 0.042 0.113 **** 0.014 0.118 0.099
2003 0.076 * 0.043 0.204 **** 0.014 0.242 ** 0.102
2004 -0.015 0.045 0.180 **** 0.015 -0.139 0.107
2005 -0.025 0.049 0.189 **** 0.017 0.151 0.118
Intercept -2.047 2.043 -0.920 0.623 -8.229 4.894
N 450 450 450
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01; ****p < 0.001
Acute care ACSH





Table 16:  Sensitivity analysis of the effects of provider ratios on condition-specific ACSH (cont) 
β SE β SE β SE β SE
Explanatory variables
CHC-to-hospital ratio -0.039 **** 0.012 0.013 0.012 -0.026 0.032 -0.011 0.029
HHA-to-hospital ratio -0.018 0.015 -0.034 ** 0.014 -0.129 **** 0.038 -0.051 0.034
Staff/group HMO-to-hospital ratio 0.025 * 0.012 -0.010 0.015 0.012 0.038 0.033 0.033
SNF-to-hospital ratio -0.022 ** 0.010 -0.019 ** 0.009 -0.037 0.025 -0.041 * 0.022
PO-to-hospital ratio 0.065 ** 0.032 -0.035 0.037 -0.166 * 0.095 -0.081 0.082
% Male 0.003 ** 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.004 0.004 0.003
% African-American 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.002
% Hispanic -3.0E-04 3.4E-04 0.000 4.4E-04 -0.003 ** 0.001 -0.003 **** 0.001
% Urban 2.3E-04 1.6E-04 0.001 *** 2.1E-04 0.002 **** 0.001 0.001 **** 0.000
SES index -2.131 ** 1.056 -3.851 *** 1.300 -9.827 *** 3.339 -12.297 **** 2.825
Heart disease mortality rate -0.002 0.001 -3.7E-04 0.001 -0.003 0.003 -0.009 *** 0.003
Respiratory disease mortality rate -0.001 0.001 -0.002 * 0.001 -0.008 ** 0.003 -0.009 *** 0.003
Pneumonia mortality rate 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.025 * 0.015 0.062 **** 0.013
Diabetes mortality rate 0.625 **** 0.168 0.054 0.161 0.014 0.426 0.009 0.384
% residents ages 15-64 1.086 1.037 0.047 1.242 0.984 3.195 -3.449 2.716
% residents ages 65 and over 3.082 * 1.629 1.867 2.103 7.553 5.370 2.106 4.482
# of outpatient services per 1,000 -2.3E-06 1.6E-05 4.9E-05 *** 1.6E-05 1.2E-04 *** 4.2E-05 9.6E-05 *** 3.7E-05
1999 -0.028 0.026 -0.010 0.025 -0.270 **** 0.066 0.067 0.060
2000 -0.034 0.028 -0.058 ** 0.026 -0.213 *** 0.070 -0.045 0.063
2001 -0.123 **** 0.033 -0.084 *** 0.032 -0.284 **** 0.084 -0.004 0.076
2002 -0.136 **** 0.030 -0.026 0.028 -0.074 0.074 0.021 0.067
2003 -0.111 **** 0.030 0.001 0.029 -0.065 0.076 -0.042 0.069
2004 -0.118 **** 0.032 -0.093 *** 0.030 -0.077 0.080 -0.275 **** 0.073
2005 -0.125 **** 0.035 -0.062 * 0.034 -0.068 0.089 -0.270 **** 0.080
Intercept -2.896 1.219 -0.461 1.514 -1.532 3.885 -1.610 3.277
N 450 450 450 450
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01; ****p < 0.001
Chronic care ACSH





Table 16:  Sensitivity analysis of the effects of provider ratios on condition-specific ACSH (cont) 
Uncontrolled diabetes
β SE β SE β SE β SE
Explanatory variables
CHC-to-hospital ratio 0.007 0.011 0.005 0.005 -0.004 0.009 1.1E-04 0.002
HHA-to-hospital ratio -0.035 *** 0.013 -0.002 0.008 0.002 0.011 0.001 0.003
Staff/group HMO-to-hospital ratio 0.008 0.013 -4.8E-04 0.004 -0.004 0.009 1.8E-04 0.001
SNF-to-hospital ratio -0.015 * 0.009 -0.013 ** 0.005 -0.018 ** 0.008 -0.005 ** 0.002
PO-to-hospital ratio -0.034 0.032 0.010 0.011 -0.026 0.023 0.001 0.004
% Male 0.000 0.001 -2.0E-05 4.4E-04 1.2E-04 0.001 -1.5E-04 1.4E-04
% African-American 0.001 0.001 2.7E-04 2.7E-04 4.9E-04 * 0.001 3.2E-05 8.0E-05
% Hispanic -3.9E-04 3.8E-04 -3.8E-04 **** 1.1E-04 -4.1E-04 **** 2.4E-04 -1.0E-05 3.2E-05
% Urban 0.001 *** 1.8E-04 1.2E-04 ** 5.4E-05 0.001 *** 1.2E-04 1.1E-05 1.7E-05
SES index -3.377 *** 1.129 -0.902 ** 0.376 -2.269 0.755 -0.181 0.121
Heart disease mortality rate -0.003 *** 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 2.2E-04 2.4E-04
Respiratory disease mortality rate -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.001 -3.5E-04 3.8E-04
Pneumonia mortality rate 0.015 *** 0.005 0.003 * 0.002 0.005 0.003 4.5E-04 0.001
Diabetes mortality rate 0.116 0.147 0.044 0.093 -0.212 0.131 0.089 ** 0.037
% residents ages 15-64 -0.412 1.081 -0.602 0.414 -0.701 0.755 0.135 0.141
% residents ages 65 and over 1.396 1.807 -0.472 0.544 0.540 1.149 0.227 0.168
# of outpatient services per 1,000 1.8E-05 1.4E-05 8.5E-06 7.1E-06 2.9E-05 ** 1.2E-05 -2.1E-06 2.4E-06
1999 -0.104 **** 0.023 -0.092 **** 0.016 0.048 ** 0.021 -0.072 **** 0.007
2000 -0.142 **** 0.024 -0.082 **** 0.017 0.042 * 0.022 -0.068 **** 0.007
2001 -0.095 *** 0.029 -0.025 0.019 0.030 0.026 -0.083 **** 0.008
2002 -0.033 0.026 0.053 *** 0.017 0.084 **** 0.023 -0.022 *** 0.008
2003 -0.018 0.026 0.013 0.018 0.066 *** 0.024 -0.072 **** 0.008
2004 -0.109 **** 0.028 0.017 0.018 0.089 **** 0.025 -0.075 **** 0.008
2005 -0.091 *** 0.031 0.009 0.020 0.098 **** 0.027 -0.079 **** 0.008
Intercept -0.589 1.312 0.424 0.429 -0.059 0.870 -0.011 0.136
N 450 450 450 450
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01; ****p < 0.001
Chronic care ACSH
Hypertension
Short-term complications of 
diabetes






Table 17:  Sensitivity analysis of the effects of inter-organizational relationships on condition-specific ACSH 
β SE β SE β SE
Explanatory variables
Proportion hospitals-same system -0.005 0.065 0.023 0.022 0.066 0.158
Proportion hospitals-own insurance 0.042 0.079 0.042 0.027 -0.019 0.192
Proportion hospitals-own nursing home -0.053 0.046 -0.027 * 0.015 -0.099 0.111
Proportion hospitals-any phys. relationship 0.032 0.041 -0.003 0.014 0.259 *** 0.100
% Male 0.003 * 0.002 0.001 ** 0.001 0.013 *** 0.004
% African-American -0.003 * 0.002 -0.001 ** 4.6E-04 -0.006 * 0.004
% Hispanic -0.001 * 0.001 -4.0E-04 ** 1.8E-04 -0.007 **** 0.001
% Urban 0.001 ** 2.7E-04 2.6E-04 *** 8.3E-05 0.002 ** 6.5E-04
SES index -5.683 *** 1.711 -1.592 *** 0.524 -24.638 **** 4.082
Heart disease mortality rate -0.003 0.002 -0.002 ** 0.001 -0.007 0.005
Respiratory disease mortality rate -1.8E-04 0.002 -0.002 *** 0.001 -0.002 0.005
Pneumonia mortality rate 0.030 * 0.016 0.006 0.005 0.072 * 0.038
Diabetes mortality rate -0.280 0.244 -0.167 ** 0.083 -0.766 0.591
% residents ages 15-64 -1.160 1.699 -0.461 0.528 -2.414 4.062
% residents ages 65 and over 3.139 2.796 0.558 0.840 12.894 * 6.651
PCPs per 1,000 -0.022 * 0.012 -0.002 0.004 -0.022 0.030
Specialists per 1,000 0.022 ** 0.009 0.003 0.003 0.011 0.022
# of outpatient services per 1,000 4.5E-05 * 2.3E-05 -1.9E-06 7.7E-06 8.8E-05 5.6E-05
Hospital Herfindahl Index -0.172 0.154 -0.049 0.049 -0.994 *** 0.369
1999 0.033 0.036 0.023 * 0.012 0.336 **** 0.088
2000 0.014 0.036 0.034 *** 0.012 0.021 0.088
2001 0.050 0.038 0.110 **** 0.013 0.226 ** 0.092
2002 0.108 *** 0.039 0.118 **** 0.013 0.218 ** 0.095
2003 0.088 ** 0.042 0.202 **** 0.014 0.319 *** 0.101
2004 -0.013 0.044 0.178 **** 0.015 -0.060 0.106
2005 -0.010 0.046 0.175 **** 0.016 0.198 * 0.112
Intercept -1.909 2.032 -0.710 0.620 -8.478 4.845
N 450 450 450
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01; ****p < 0.001
Acute care ACSH





Table 17:  Sensitivity analysis of the effects of inter-organizational relationships on condition-specific ACSH (cont) 
β SE β SE β SE β SE
Explanatory variables
Proportion hospitals-same system -0.005 0.046 2.8E-04 0.046 0.105 0.120 -0.053 0.104
Proportion hospitals-own insurance -0.056 0.056 -0.016 0.056 -0.266 * 0.145 -0.222 * 0.127
Proportion hospitals-own nursing home -0.077 ** 0.032 -0.067 ** 0.032 -0.074 0.084 -0.026 0.073
Proportion hospitals-any phys. relationship 0.085 *** 0.029 0.072 ** 0.029 0.183 ** 0.075 0.095 0.066
% Male 0.003 ** 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.007 *** 0.003
% African-American -6.0E-05 9.7E-04 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.002
% Hispanic 3.9E-05 3.7E-04 -2.8E-04 4.1E-04 -0.003 ** 0.001 -0.003 **** 0.001
% Urban -1.4E-04 1.8E-04 3.8E-04 1.9E-04 0.001 ** 0.001 0.001 *** 0.000
SES index -0.659 1.107 -3.529 *** 1.190 -10.515 *** 3.173 -12.562 **** 2.581
Heart disease mortality rate -0.001 0.002 -3.0E-04 0.002 -0.002 0.004 -0.004 0.003
Respiratory disease mortality rate -0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.007 * 0.004 -0.002 0.003
Pneumonia mortality rate 0.003 0.010 0.007 0.011 0.009 0.029 0.033 0.024
Diabetes mortality rate 0.726 **** 0.173 0.060 0.171 -0.011 0.447 -0.198 0.390
% residents ages 15-64 0.285 1.114 -0.579 1.183 -0.778 3.148 -4.210 2.584
% residents ages 65 and over 1.860 1.778 1.625 1.941 7.277 5.196 3.915 4.171
PCPs per 1,000 -0.008 0.009 0.004 0.009 0.016 0.023 0.067 **** 0.020
Specialists per 1,000 0.009 0.007 -0.004 0.006 -0.014 0.017 -0.070 **** 0.015
# of outpatient services per 1,000 8.6E-07 1.6E-05 5.9E-05 **** 1.6E-05 1.4E-04 *** 4.2E-05 7.3E-05 ** 3.6E-05
Hospital Herfindahl Index -0.117 0.103 -0.175 0.107 -0.799 *** 0.284 -0.303 0.237
1999 -0.016 0.026 0.019 0.025 -0.187 *** 0.066 0.097 * 0.058
2000 -0.030 0.026 -0.022 0.026 -0.118 * 0.067 -0.008 0.058
2001 -0.073 *** 0.027 0.000 0.027 -0.097 0.069 0.148 ** 0.061
2002 -0.108 **** 0.028 0.042 0.028 0.088 0.072 0.167 *** 0.063
2003 -0.092 *** 0.030 0.068 ** 0.029 0.076 0.076 0.123 * 0.067
2004 -0.111 **** 0.031 -0.026 0.031 0.056 0.080 -0.092 0.070
2005 -0.125 **** 0.033 0.016 0.033 0.070 0.085 -0.089 0.074
Intercept -1.679 1.311 -0.782 1.413 -2.353 3.769 -2.970 3.060
N 450 450 450 450








Table 17:  Sensitivity analysis of the effects of inter-organizational relationships on condition-specific ACSH (cont) 
Uncontrolled diabetes
β SE β SE β SE β SE
Explanatory variables
Proportion hospitals-same system -0.018 0.042 -0.016 0.024 -0.025 0.035 0.003 0.009
Proportion hospitals-own insurance -0.016 0.052 -0.012 0.032 0.035 0.044 -0.023 * 0.013
Proportion hospitals-own nursing home -0.051 * 0.030 0.007 0.017 0.007 0.025 0.014 ** 0.007
Proportion hospitals-any phys. relationship 0.039 0.027 0.004 0.017 0.008 0.023 0.007 0.007
% Male 0.002 0.001 4.0E-04 4.1E-04 0.001 0.001 -1.2E-04 1.3E-04
% African-American 0.001 0.001 2.9E-04 2.7E-04 5.6E-05 0.001 2.7E-05 8.3E-05
% Hispanic -3.1E-04 3.5E-04 -3.6E-04 **** 1.0E-04 -4.8E-04 ** 2.3E-04 -1.0E-05 3.1E-05
% Urban 4.1E-04 ** 1.6E-04 1.2E-04 ** 5.3E-05 3.2E-04 *** 1.1E-04 -8.4E-06 1.7E-05
SES index -2.971 *** 1.034 -0.999 *** 0.362 -2.709 **** 0.722 -0.159 0.122
Heart disease mortality rate -0.003 * 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 9.9E-05 2.6E-04
Respiratory disease mortality rate -0.001 0.001 0.002 * 0.001 -0.002 * 0.001 -3.3E-04 3.9E-04
Pneumonia mortality rate 0.013 0.010 -1.3E-04 0.004 0.003 0.007 -0.001 0.002
Diabetes mortality rate 0.144 0.159 -0.009 0.095 -0.213 0.135 0.068 * 0.037
% residents ages 15-64 -0.961 1.038 -0.490 0.409 -0.835 0.753 0.083 0.141
% residents ages 65 and over 1.006 1.667 -0.260 0.515 0.596 1.122 0.121 0.164
PCPs per 1,000 0.005 0.008 0.009 * 0.005 -0.004 0.007 0.001 0.002
Specialists per 1,000 -0.005 0.006 -0.009 ** 0.004 0.005 0.005 -1.9E-04 0.001
# of outpatient services per 1,000 2.7E-05 * 1.5E-05 5.8E-06 7.1E-06 3.2E-05 *** 1.2E-05 -1.5E-07 2.4E-06
Hospital Herfindahl Index -0.061 0.096 -0.029 0.036 -0.192 *** 0.071 -0.006 0.012
1999 -0.075 *** 0.024 -0.088 **** 0.016 0.058 *** 0.020 -0.073 **** 0.007
2000 -0.106 **** 0.024 -0.077 **** 0.016 0.050 ** 0.021 -0.068 **** 0.007
2001 -0.024 0.025 0.003 0.017 0.065 *** 0.021 -0.076 **** 0.007
2002 0.029 0.026 0.064 **** 0.017 0.086 **** 0.022 -0.024 *** 0.007
2003 0.044 0.027 0.027 0.017 0.064 *** 0.023 -0.072 **** 0.007
2004 -0.048 * 0.028 0.032 * 0.018 0.085 **** 0.024 -0.075 **** 0.008
2005 -0.018 0.030 0.035 * 0.019 0.093 **** 0.026 -0.078 **** 0.008
Intercept -0.868 1.226 0.093 0.417 -0.291 0.851 0.029 0.138
N 450 450 450 450
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01; ****p < 0.001
Chronic care ACSH
Hypertension
Short-term complications of 
diabetes






A final step in the sensitivity analysis focused on determining whether the 
direction and statistical significance varied when condition-specific results were 
compared to the aggregated results.  Four mutually exclusive indicators were constructed 
to provide a comprehensive summary of the direction and significance of all study 
relationships:  (1) positive-significant; (2) negative-significant; (3) positive-
nonsignificant; and (4) negative-nonsignificant.  Each relationship for each regression 
model was coded dichotomously for these four indicators.  For example, if community 
health centers per 1,000 residents were negatively and significantly associated with the 
number of congestive heart failure ACSH, then the negative-significant indicator for the 
CHC per 1,000 residents-congestive heart failure relationship would be coded as “1” and 
all other indicators would be coded as zero.  Next, totals were created for each of these 
indicators by summing across all relationships.  Two sets of relationship totals were 
created, one for the eleven condition-specific models and another for the three aggregated 
ACSH models.   
Across the condition-specific regression models, 22.6 percent of the explanatory 
variable relationships were significant (Table 18).  Negative-significant relationships 
were more prevalent among these models (15.2%) compared to positive-significant 
results (7.4%).  In comparison, 26.9 percent of the explanatory variable relationships in 
the aggregated ACSH models were significant (Table 19).  In this case, 19.0 percent of 
the relationships were negative-significant while 7.9 percent were positive-significant.   
Another issue for consideration was whether aggregation conceals contrasting 
directions that exist at the condition-specific level.  Comparisons between the direction of 





differences in the percentage of positive versus negative relationships.  Over 31 percent 
of the explanatory variable relationships were in the positive direction for the aggregated 
models; over 44 percent of these same variables were positively associated with the 
outcomes in the condition-specific models.  The control variables exhibit relatively 
consistent direction across the aggregated and condition-specific models.     
In sum, these comparisons suggest that aggregation of condition-specific ACSH 
outcomes has some effect on the statistical significance and direction of the explanatory 
variables of interest.  In most cases, aggregation appears to suppress statistical 
significance, resulting in a more conservative assessment of these relationships.  
Comparison of the signs of the covariates indicates that aggregated outcome models show 
a larger percentage of negative relationships relative to the condition-specific models.  In 
other words, variables in aggregated outcome models are more likely to take on negative 
values compared to models using condition-specific outcomes, indicating that covariates 
reverse direction when moving from a condition-specific model to an aggregated model.  
Specifically, nearly 13 percent of the covariates reverse direction, with most (8.5 percent) 















CHCs per 1,000 residents 1 4 4 2
CHCs per 1,000 residents*CHCs per 1,000 residents 2 1 4 4
HHA per 1,000 residents 1 0 7 3
HHA per 1,000 residents*HHA per 1,000 residents 0 1 2 8
HMOs per 1,000 residents 1 2 4 4
HMOs per 1,000 residents*HMOs per 1,00 residents 1 0 7 3
Hospitals per 1,000 residents 2 0 5 4
Hospitals per 1,000 residents*Hospitals per 1,000 residen 0 3 3 5
SNF per 1,000 residents 0 2 0 9
SNF per 1,000 residents*SNF per 1,000 residents 1 0 8 2
POs per 1,000 residents 0 0 7 4
POs per 1,000 residents*POs per 1,000 residents 0 0 4 7
CHC-to-hospital 0 3 4 4
HHA-to-hospital 0 3 2 6
HMO-to-hospital 1 0 5 5
SNF-to-hospital 1 7 0 3
PO-to-hospital 1 2 3 5
Proportion hospitals-same system 0 0 5 6
Proportion hospitals-own insurance 0 3 3 5
Proportion hospitals-own nursing home 1 4 2 4
Proportion hospitals-any phys. relationship 4 0 6 1
% Male 13 0 13 7
% African-American 1 5 17 10
% Hispanic 0 19 2 12
% Urban 23 0 7 3
SES index 0 27 0 6
Heart disease mortality rate 0 12 5 16
Respiratory disease mortality rate 1 12 4 16
Pneumonia mortality rate 15 0 16 2
Diabetes mortality rate 6 3 11 13
% residents ages 15-64 0 2 9 22
% residents ages 65 and over 3 0 27 3
# of outpatient services per 1,000 18 0 8 7
PCPs per 1000 2 1 4 4
Specialists per 1000 1 2 4 4
Hospital Herfindahl 0 3 0 8
1999 8 12 8 5
2000 6 13 5 9
2001 10 11 5 7
2002 16 6 8 3
2003 14 6 10 3
2004 7 12 4 10
2005 9 11 7 6
Total # of relationships 891
Total # of explanatory relationships 231 Total # of control relationships 660
  -% positive & significant 7.4%   -% positive & significant 23.2%
  -% negative & significant 15.2%   -% negative & significant 23.8%
  -% positive & nonsignificant 36.8%   -% positive & nonsignificant 26.4%















CHCs per 1,000 residents 0 1 0 2
CHCs per 1,000 residents*CHCs per 1,000 residents 0 0 2 1
HHA per 1,000 residents 0 0 1 2
HHA per 1,000 residents*HHA per 1,000 residents 0 0 2 1
HMOs per 1,000 residents 0 1 0 2
HMOs per 1,000 residents*HMOs per 1,00 residents 0 0 3 0
Hospitals per 1,000 residents 2 0 1 0
Hospitals per 1,000 residents*Hospitals per 1,000 residents 0 2 0 1
SNF per 1,000 residents 0 0 1 2
SNF per 1,000 residents*SNF per 1,000 residents 0 0 0 3
POs per 1,000 residents 0 0 0 3
POs per 1,000 residents*POs per 1,000 residents 0 0 3 0
CHC-to-hospital 0 0 0 3
HHA-to-hospital 0 3 0 0
HMO-to-hospital 0 1 0 2
SNF-to-hospital 1 1 1 0
PO-to-hospital 0 3 0 0
Proportion hospitals-same system 0 0 0 3
Proportion hospitals-own insurance 0 0 0 3
Proportion hospitals-own nursing home 0 0 0 3
Proportion hospitals-any phys. relationship 2 0 1 0
% Male 5 0 3 1
% African-American 0 1 3 5
% Hispanic 0 9 0 0
% Urban 8 0 1 0
SES index 0 9 0 0
Heart disease mortality rate 0 8 0 1
Respiratory disease mortality rate 0 4 2 3
Pneumonia mortality rate 8 0 1 0
Diabetes mortality rate 0 3 3 3
% residents ages 15-64 0 0 0 9
% residents ages 65 and over 0 0 9 0
# of outpatient services per 1,000 9 0 0 0
PCPs per 1000 0 0 2 1
Specialists per 1000 0 1 1 1
Hospital Herfindahl 0 3 0 0
1999 1 5 2 1
2000 0 6 0 3
2001 2 2 4 1
2002 5 0 3 1
2003 6 0 3 0
2004 0 2 3 4
2005 2 1 3 3
Total # of relationships 243
Total # of explanatory relationships 63 Total # of control relationships 180
  -% positive & significant 7.9%   -% positive & significant 25.6%
  -% negative & significant 19.0%   -% negative & significant 30.0%
  -% positive & nonsignificant 23.8%   -% positive & nonsignificant 23.9%






This chapter presented the empirical analysis used to assess the relationship 
between market structure and ACSH.  In total, nine different regression models were 
used to assess 15 hypotheses, yielding a total of 63 explanatory covariate effects across 
the models.  A hypothesis was considered supported if it was statistically significant at 
the 0.10 significance level or smaller and in the direction predicted.  Fourteen of the 
relationships were statistically significant; however, only nine of these relationships were 
in the direction hypothesized (Table 20).  The most consistent support was observed for 
the provider composition relationships (Hypotheses 2a-2e), where three of the five 
provider types were significantly and negatively associated with ACSH rates.  In contrast, 
the provider capacity (Hypotheses 1a-1f) and inter-organizational relationships 
(Hypotheses 3-6) with ACSH rates were largely nonsignificant; in those cases where they 
were significant, the relationship was in the opposite direction predicted.   
In general, the pattern of results suggests that the relationship between market 
structure and ACSH is more nuanced than initially expected and likely cannot be 
explained in broad strokes.  The next chapter will explore some of these nuances and 
relate the results to the initial research questions that motivated the study.  The discussion 













Hypothesis 1a The rate of ACSH will exhibit a U-shaped, non-monotonic relationship with the supply of community health centers in a market.     ns ns ns
Hypothesis 1b The rate of ACSH will exhibit a U-shaped, non-monotonic relationship with the supply of home health agencies in a market.     ns ns ns
Hypothesis 1c The rate of ACSH will exhibit a U-shaped, non-monotonic relationship with the supply of staff/group HMOs in a market.     ns ns ns
Hypothesis 1d The rate of ACSH will exhibit a U-shaped, non-monotonic relationship with the supply of hospitals in a market.     - - -
Hypothesis 1e The rate of ACSH will exhibit a U-shaped, non-monotonic relationship with the number of nursing homes in a market.     ns ns ns
Hypothesis 1f The rate of ACSH will exhibit a U-shaped, non-monotonic relationship with the supply of physician organizations in a market.     ns ns ns
Hypothesis 2a The rate of ACSH in a market will be negatively associated with the community health center-to-hospital ratio. ns ns ns
Hypothesis 2b The rate of ACSH in a market will be negatively associated with the home health agency-to-hospital ratio. + + +
Hypothesis 2c The rate of ACSH in a market will be negatively associated with the skilled nursing facility-to-hospital ratio. + + +
Hypothesis 2d The rate of ACSH in a market will be negatively associated with the physician organization-to-hospital ratio. + + +
Hypothesis 2e The rate of ACSH in a market will be negatively associated with the staff/group model HMO-to-hospital ratio. ns ns ns
Hypothesis 3 The rate of ACSH in a market will be negatively associated with the proportion of hospitals in a market that belong to the same system. ns ns ns
Hypothesis 4
The rate of ACSH in a market will be negatively associated with the 
proportion of hospitals in a market with a formal physician 
relationship.
- ns -
Hypothesis 5 The rate of ACSH in a market will be negatively associated with the proportion of hospitals that own an insurance product. ns ns ns
Hypothesis 6 The rate of ACSH in a market will be negatively associated with the proportion of hospitals that own a nursing home. ns ns ns
'+': Statistically significant results in direction predicted.
'-': Statistically significant results in the opposite direction predicted.







Discussion and Conclusion 
 How does market structure affect ambulatory care sensitive hospitalizations 
(ACSH)?  That is the general research question that motivated this study.  This chapter 
discusses the study’s findings with respect to this question.  The chapter also discusses 
the implications of these findings for future research, management, and policy.  The 
chapter begins with a discussion of the study’s results with respect to the specific 
research questions that guided the empirical analysis.  The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of the limitations of the study.   
Research Questions & Explanation of Results 
Are more providers associated with better ACSH outcomes?    
 Most ACSH research has assumed a linear relationship between provider supply 
and ACSH.  The first part of this study tested this assumption by examining whether a 
non-linear relationship more aptly described the association between provider supply and 
ACSH.  The argument was that higher levels of provider supply might reflect more 
complex market conditions, which in turn would be associated with higher coordination 
costs and higher rates of ACSH.  In general, the study’s findings do not support this 
relationship.  Hospitals were the only provider type with a significant non-linear 
relationship with ACSH rates.  Furthermore, the relationship was in the opposite direction 






some level of hospital supply is reached, the rate of ACSH begins decreasing.  The other 
provider types did not display significant, non-linear relationships with ACSH rates.   
 These results raise several questions.  First, why is increasing hospital capacity 
initially associated with higher rates of ACSH, followed by lower rates of ACSH?  One 
potential explanation is that the relationship between hospital capacity and ACSH rates 
differs across different types of markets.  Although small area variation studies have 
generally found an increasing supply of hospital beds in a market to be associated with 
higher inpatient utilization rates (Fisher et al. 1994; Fisher et al. 2000; Goodman et al. 
1994; Laditka, Laditka, and Probst 2005), the effects of hospital capacity may differ 
across urban and rural markets (Ansari et al. 2003; Laditka, Laditka, and Probst 2005; 
Schreiber and Zielinski 1997).  And while the study did control for the percentage of 
urban residents in a market, it is possible that the relationship between hospital capacity 
and ACSH is entirely different in urban markets compared to rural markets, which would 
not be captured by the control variable.  In other words, the mechanism by which hospital 
capacity affects ACSH in urban markets may be different than the mechanism in rural 
markets.   
To examine this possibility further, the analytic dataset was split into two separate 
samples.  One sample was made up exclusively of urban markets (37 counties), defined 
as those counties with at least one urban cluster of at least 10,000 residents (Bureau of 
Health Professions 2006).  The second sample consisted of the remaining 19 rural 
markets, defined as those counties with no clusters of 10,000 of more residents.  The 






as the combined sample, with the exception of the control variable for the percentage of 
urban market residents.   
The results do, in fact, show different relationships between hospital capacity and 
ACSH rates across the two types of markets.  Hospital capacity in rural markets exhibits 
a significant, non-linear relationship with the rate of acute care ACSH (Table 21).  In this 
case, the first-order regression term is positively associated with the acute care ACSH 
rate (β=100.88, p<0.05), while the second-order quadratic term is negatively associated 
with the acute care ACSH rate (β= -395.79, p<0.05).  These results indicate that the rate 
of acute care ACSH in rural markets initially increases as hospital capacity increases, but 
begins declining after some level of hospital capacity is reached.  In contrast, hospital 
capacity in urban markets continues to be positively related to ACSH rates across all 
levels of hospital capacity (Table 22).  Interestingly, several other provider types, such as 
staff/group model HMOs and physician organization, also display different relationships 
with ACSH rates across the two types of markets.             
In summary, the results of this supplementary analysis are consistent with 
previous research that suggests the effects of provider supply on ACSH differ across 
urban and rural markets.  It is a little surprising that the most robust results indicate that 
hospital capacity is associated with higher rates of ACSH, given that the findings of the 
main analysis, when urban and rural markets are analyzed together, indicate that ACSH 
rates eventually decrease as hospital capacity increases.  It is possible that the relationship 
between hospital capacity and ACSH depends upon market factors beyond the rural-
urban distinction made in this analysis.  A more thorough examination of these 






suggest that it is important to consider if and how different market factors may condition 
the relationship between market structure and ACSH.  Such considerations may also 
provide new insights into the causal mechanisms that underlie the relationship between 
market structure and ACSH.     
Table 21:  Non-linear effects of provider capacity on ACSH, rural markets only 
β SE β SE β SE
CHCs per 1,000 residents -4.19 12.29 19.47 15.98 20.13 24.59
  CHCs per 1,000*CHCs per 1,000 -6.00 50.04 -84.04 64.87 -114.70 99.98
HHAs per 1,000 residents 5.84 15.72 40.42 * 20.72 41.78 31.57
  HHAs per 1,000*HHAs per 1,000 -55.16 120.41 -412.62 ** 159.85 -433.08 * 242.35
HMOs per 1,000 residents -10.06 * 5.61 7.82 5.63 -1.57 10.05
  HMOs per 1,000*HMOs per 1,000 85.08 ** 35.04 25.03 38.26 113.67 * 64.97
Hospitals per 1,000 residents 100.88 ** 46.66 -73.10 47.43 21.19 85.19
  Hospitals per 1,000*Hospitals per 1,000 -395.79 ** 160.12 185.71 161.68 -191.89 291.58
SNFs per 1,000 residents -2.47 6.24 -0.83 8.44 -4.97 12.63
  SNFs per 1,000*SNFs per 1,000 -10.79 27.70 -12.45 37.43 -20.31 56.05
POs per 1,000 residents 1170.88 *** 432.07 326.03 427.96 1,290.90 779.68
  POs per 1,000*POs per 1,000 -73752.00 *** 25421.00 -27,781.00 25,912.00 -88,215.00 * 46,485.00
% Male 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.07
% African-American 0.00 0.06 -3.6E-03 0.07 -1.6E-02 0.12
% Hispanic 0.00 1.2E-02 0.00 1.0E-02 0.00 0.02
SES index -91.65 **** 31.31 -13.04 33.25 -111.76 * 57.46
Heart disease mortality rate 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.04
Respiratory disease mortality rate 2.8E-03 0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.02
Pneumonia mortality rate -0.22 * 0.12 0.08 0.14 -0.13 0.23
Diabetes mortality rate -2.72 * 1.45 1.15 1.92 0.28 2.92
% residents ages 0-14 (Referent) - - - - - -
% residents ages 15-64 48.65 35.62 6.26 38.38 68.52 65.41
% residents ages 65 and over 116.71 * 59.01 27.28 58.82 157.20 105.18
Health service use control
# of outpatient services per 1,000 2.24E-04 2.0E-04 1.18E-03 **** 2.5E-04 1.4E-03 **** 3.9E-04
1998 (Referent) - - - - - -
1999 0.06 0.28 -0.85 ** 0.39 -0.74 0.58
2000 -0.78 ** 0.32 -1.13 ** 0.43 -1.93 *** 0.64
2001 -0.26 0.35 -1.30 *** 0.47 -1.72 ** 0.71
2002 -0.50 0.33 -1.17 *** 0.44 -1.97 *** 0.66
2003 -0.17 0.37 -1.20 ** 0.48 -1.74 ** 0.73
2004 -1.26 *** 0.43 -1.67 *** 0.55 -3.35 **** 0.85
2005 -0.76 0.46 -1.91 *** 0.59 -3.10 **** 0.91
Intercept -87.60 45.66 -8.81 53.61 -111.69 86.94
N 144 144 144




Acute care ACSH Chronic care ACSH Total ACSH
 






Table 22:  Non-linear effects of provider capacity on ACSH, urban markets only 
β SE β SE β SE
CHCs per 1,000 residents -13.43 17.33 -9.47 21.45 -38.23 37.65
  CHCs per 1,000*CHCs per 1,000 229.18 190.84 161.05 234.55 545.45 412.16
HHAs per 1,000 residents 20.52 19.01 23.48 23.29 40.00 40.95
  HHAs per 1,000*HHAs per 1,000 -204.27 329.33 -398.57 401.13 -442.24 706.10
HMOs per 1,000 residents -50.22 **** 10.38 -54.06 **** 14.02 -105.20 **** 24.14
  HMOs per 1,000*HMOs per 1,000 -6238.81 **** 1227.65 -4,367.10 *** 1,629.10 -10,875.00 **** 2,817.27
Hospitals per 1,000 residents 251.05 **** 50.17 390.74 **** 61.39 643.89 **** 107.96
  Hospitals per 1,000*Hospitals per 1,000 22183.00 **** 5247.25 12,092.00 * 6,899.09 35,324.00 *** 11,952.00
SNFs per 1,000 residents -6.98 12.50 -14.79 15.21 -21.90 26.77
  SNFs per 1,000*SNFs per 1,000 351.77 * 181.84 336.62 221.36 652.75 * 389.69
POs per 1,000 residents -162.65 ** 80.29 -290.31 *** 105.19 -454.85 ** 182.32
  POs per 1,000*POs per 1,000 5162.21 ** 2280.54 8,545.57 *** 2,920.91 14,205.00 *** 5,089.06
% Male 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02
% African-American -0.01 0.01 8.2E-03 0.01 3.5E-03 0.01
% Hispanic -0.01 ** 2.6E-03 0.00 3.6E-03 -0.01 * 0.01
SES index -8.31 7.43 -15.72 9.98 -25.05 17.20
Heart disease mortality rate -0.06 * 0.03 -0.12 *** 0.04 -0.17 ** 0.08
Respiratory disease mortality rate -3.1E-03 0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.05
Pneumonia mortality rate 0.07 0.05 0.09 0.06 0.17 0.11
Diabetes mortality rate 3.10 * 1.74 0.55 2.13 3.60 3.75
% residents ages 0-14 (Referent) - - - - - -
% residents ages 15-64 -12.56 * 6.60 -14.68 * 8.83 -28.56 * 15.23
% residents ages 65 and over -9.28 13.72 -1.43 18.70 -10.67 32.13
Health service use control
# of outpatient services per 1,000 6.09E-04 **** 1.1E-04 5.59E-04 **** 1.4E-04 1.2E-03 **** 2.4E-04
1998 (Referent) - - - - - -
1999 0.17 0.14 -0.22 0.18 -0.11 0.31
2000 0.18 0.15 -0.26 0.18 -0.12 0.32
2001 0.97 **** 0.24 0.30 0.29 1.20 ** 0.51
2002 0.94 **** 0.18 0.87 **** 0.21 1.73 **** 0.38
2003 1.25 **** 0.18 1.06 **** 0.22 2.19 **** 0.39
2004 0.75 **** 0.19 0.47 ** 0.23 1.08 *** 0.41
2005 1.01 **** 0.22 0.56 ** 0.27 1.44 *** 0.48
Intercept 6.69 8.58 9.63 11.43 14.62 19.74
N 292 292 292











A second question raised by the provider capacity results is why more 
organizations did not display significant non-linear relationships with ACSH rates?  One 
possibility is that declining provider capacity over the study period reduced the likelihood 
of observing a significant relationship between provider capacity and ACSH rates.  The 
descriptive statistics show that all provider types, with the exception of community health 
centers, declined over the study period, in most cases double digit decreases.  It is 
possible that a decline in provider capacity reflects a correction of the supply and demand 
relationships across markets.  If this was the case, then these corrections may have muted 
the strength of the relationship between provider capacity and ACSH that were based on 
assumptions of high capacity and market complexity.         
A second possibility relates to the market definition used in the study and the size 
of the provider community.  Some small area variation analysts argue that larger 
geographic markets dampen provider supply variation and conceal its effects on 
variations in care (Wennberg 1984; Wennberg, Fisher, and Skinner 2002).  For example, 
Laditka and Johnston (1999) found a significant relationship between women living in 
areas of high Medicaid enrollment and avoidable maternity admissions when examined at 
the intra-county level of analysis, but no significant relationship when examined at the 
county level.  The dampening effects of larger market size may be heightened on 
activities that are inherently local in nature, such as coordination of care.  Unfortunately, 
market structure data is not readily available at more fine-grained levels such as the zip 
code, which prevents empirical testing of this explanation.  Nevertheless, most ACSH 
studies use the county as the market definition and still find significant results.  Likewise, 






condition-specific regression models.   Furthermore, others have directly evaluated the 
effects of market definition versus other design characteristics (e.g., multivariate 
modeling versus bivariate analyses; techniques that control for rare events) and 
concluded that methodological considerations have a more substantial effect on small 
area variation outcomes than market definition (McLaughlin et al. 1989).  Based on these 
considerations, it does not seem likely that the market definition is responsible for the 
non-significant results.               
Perhaps the most likely explanation is simply that increasing provider capacity is 
the more important consideration for ACSH, rather than control and coordination of care.  
In other words, the effects of increasing provider capacity, such as opening more points 
of access and getting more people into the system, outweigh the costs associated with 
coordinating care among these providers.  Under such circumstances, the relationship 
between provider capacity and ACSH might best be characterized as linear, which is 
what the results of this study indicate for several provider types and conditions.     
Is provider composition associated with ACSH?   
 Provider composition models examined a different aspect of provider supply, one 
less focused on supply relative to demand and more focused on supply relative to other 
provider organizations in a market.  The premise of this analysis was that provider 
composition may be an important structural characteristic of markets if control and 
coordination costs are the mechanism by which market structure affects ACSH.   
 This study argues that hospitals differ in important ways that potentially make 
them facilitators or barriers to improving ACSH rates.  Hospitals may not offer the types 






considered in the study, hindering their ability to improve ACSH rates.  Similarly, 
hospitals may behave differently because of conflicting financial motivations.  Arguably 
hospitals have the most to lose by preventing admissions related to ambulatory care 
sensitive conditions, with over 12 percent of all admissions in this study being ACSH and 
nearly $29 billion spent annually for ACSH in the U.S. (Russo, Jiang, and Barrett 2007).  
Studies finding hospital supply associated with higher rates of ACSH support the idea 
that hospitals may face constraints or have different motivations to curb admissions 
related to ambulatory care sensitive conditions (Laditka, Laditka, and Probst 2005; 
Penfold et al. 2008; Schreiber and Zielinski 1997).  The findings of this study indicate 
that the supply of ambulatory care organizations relative to hospital supply is an 
important consideration for ACSH, providing additional support that hospitals may 
behave differently with respect to ACSH.  More generally, the findings suggest that 
provider composition is an important consideration for understanding how provider 
resources can be best utilized to improve ACSH.   
It is also worth noting that the pattern of results once again indicates that the 
effects of provider supply are limited to certain provider types.  Three of the five provider 
composition ratios, home health agencies, skilled nursing facilities, and physician 
organizations, were negatively associated with ACSH rates.  One explanation for the 
observed pattern of results relates to the competitive and collaborative dynamics that may 
have evolved in these markets during this time period.  Competition across different 
provider types may hinder coordination between certain provider types that would 
improve ACSH.  The study controlled for the effects of competition between hospitals; 






challenges include judgments about appropriate substitute products or services and 
whether the same market definition (e.g., zip code, county, MSA) is most relevant across 
different industries (Baker 2001).  Even so, the effects of competition might be inferred 
from the service overlap that likely exists among the significant provider types.  Two of 
the three significant provider types, nursing homes and home health agencies, generally 
are more oriented toward long-term care needs of community residents.  Services offered 
by these organizations may be in less direct competition with the services offered by 
hospitals (Intrator, Zinn, and Mor 2004; Soulen, Duggan, and DeAngelis 1994).  In fact, 
as the descriptives in this study show, hospitals often have a formal relationship with 
these provider types.  In contrast, hospitals are increasingly offering outpatient services 
that compete with more traditional primary care provider types (e.g., physicians, 
staff/group model HMOs, community health centers) (Kohn 2000; Lesser and Ginsburg 
2000; Snail and Robinson 1998).  The net effect of these dynamics may be that 
organizations that are in more direct competition are less likely to collaborate in a market, 
which may have resulted in nonsignificant relationships for these provider types.      
Is provider supply associated with ACSH when multiple provider types are 
considered simultaneously?   
 Another consideration in this study was whether provider supply relationships 
persist after controlling for the effects of other provider types.  The motivation for 
examining multiple provider types simultaneously was to more accurately reflect the 
fragmented and duplicative nature of health service delivery in the U.S.  Although this 
was not the first study to include multiple provider types simultaneously, it is the most 






provider capacity and those assessing provider composition, provide support for the idea 
that multiple provider types are associated with ACSH, even when modeled 
simultaneously.   
The provider composition findings also call attention to the important role of 
long-term care providers in improving ACSH rates and access more generally.  A 
growing number of elderly and chronically-ill patients in the U.S. is increasing the 
demand for long-term care services provided by organizations such as nursing homes and 
home health agencies.  Long-term care organizations have traditionally played an 
important transitional role for patients leaving a hospital.  The transitional roles of these 
organizations are especially relevant for researchers interested in ACSH given the types 
of patients most likely to utilize long-term care services as well as concerns about 
avoidable hospital readmissions.  Therefore, it is surprising that little research has 
examined the relationship between long-term care provider types and ACSH, with only 
four studies identified that included nursing homes and no studies that included home 
health agencies.   
A comparison between the provider capacity and provider composition models 
also indicates that the significance of a provider type may depend upon how supply is 
measured.  Provider capacity models showed hospitals positively associated with ACSH 
rates, while community health centers and staff/group model HMOs were negatively 
associated with ACSH rates.  In contrast, provider composition models showed home 
health agencies, skilled nursing facilities, and physician organizations negatively 
associated with ACSH rates.  Such contrasts suggest that provider supply may consist of 






dimensions.  These contrasts may also reflect different mechanisms by which supply 
affects access to care.  For instance, this study suggested that provider composition better 
reflects the potential for inter-organizational coordination, while provider capacity more 
accurately reflects patients’ ability to gain access to the health system.  Such distinctions 
may be necessary in future research to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the 
relationship between provider supply and ACSH.              
How do inter-organizational relationships between provider types in a market affect 
ACSH?   
 Proliferation of the number and types of health care providers has given rise to 
greater fragmentation in health care delivery in the U.S.  The challenges presented by 
greater fragmentation only magnify the importance of coordination for improving 
outcomes of care.  A critical precursor to coordination is an actual relationship between 
providers in a market.  Therefore, one of the questions asked in this study was whether 
inter-organizational relationships improve coordination and lower rates of ACSH.   
In aggregate, the analysis did not reveal consistent results to support the role of 
inter-organizational relationships.  The only relationship that was statistically significant 
was the relationship between physicians and hospitals.  Contrary to what was initially 
predicted, the study found that formal relationships between hospitals and physicians 
were associated with higher rates of ACSH.  There may be several explanations for why 
this relationship was in the opposite direction predicted.  First, improvements in ACSH 
rates via a hospital-physician relationship are predicated on clinical integration that 
improves coordination of care and a number of studies have documented low clinical 






Conrad and Shortell 1996; Shortell, Gillies et al. 2000).  Even so, under conditions of 
poor integration, it seems more likely that the results would have shown a weak or 
nonsignificant relationship with ACSH.  Another possibility is that formal relationships 
between physician organizations and hospitals are used for securing patient resources 
more so than for coordinating care, which is supported by a number of studies 
documenting hospital-physician integration being associated with higher hospital costs 
and utilization (Alexander and Morrisey 1988; Morrisey, Alexander, and Ohsfeldt 1990; 
Wheeler, Wickizer, and Shortell 1986).    
 Similar to hospital-physician relationships, objectives other than coordination of 
care may explain why relationships between hospitals and other organizations were not 
significantly associated with ACSH rates.  For example, analysts have noted a number of 
motivations for system affiliation, such as economies of scale and scope, increased access 
to capital, greater control over external uncertainties, and the potential for improved 
coordination (Alexander 1991; Dranove and Shanley 1995; Ermann and Gabel 1984; 
Luke, Ozcan, and Olden 1995; Zuckerman 1979).  Markets dominated by organizations 
that prioritize other objectives above care coordination may find efforts to coordinate care 
less effective.  Or worse, other motivations work at cross-purposes with care coordination 
and undermine the effects of coordination on ACSH.  For example, if horizontal and 
vertical integration strategies are pursued primarily to counteract pressure from 
competitors or payers, then it is possible that these relationships could actually increase 
ACSH.   
 It is also possible that market factors moderate the relationship between inter-






2000s were a time of transition in how health services were financed and delivered (Kohn 
2000; Lesser and Ginsburg 2000; Snail and Robinson 1998).  They also suggest that such 
changes played an important role in providing the context for competition and 
collaboration.  Health plans were relaxing network restrictions and using less global 
capitation to reimburse providers.  Such changes may have attenuated the strength of 
existing relationships or even changed the objective of these relationships.   
The potential moderating effect of market characteristics on the association 
between inter-organizational relationships and ACSH was tested with two sets of 
interaction models.  Moderating variables for the interaction terms were chosen based on 
influential changes that were occurring during the study period.  One of the major drivers 
of change that led to the development of inter-organizational relationships during the late 
1990s and early 2000s was method of payment.  Specifically, the transfer of financial risk 
via capitation stimulated inter-organizational relationships that were believed to align 
interests across different types of providers.  Therefore, the first set of interaction models 
used the average capitation risk across all hospitals in a market as the moderating variable 
in the interaction terms.  This variable was taken from the American Hospital Association 
(AHA) Annual Survey and varied across all years of the study.  Average hospital 
capitation risk was interacted with all four inter-organizational relationship variables.  All 
interaction variables were mean centered to reduce collinearity before multiplying.   
As mentioned earlier, one potentially constraining factor on hospitals is their 
dependence on inpatient revenue.  In this case, dependence on inpatient revenue may 
have contrasting moderating effects.  On one hand, markets where hospitals are heavily 






effectiveness of inter-organizational relationships, resulting in higher ACSH rates.  On 
the other hand, markets where hospitals are heavily dependent on inpatient resources may 
utilize inter-organizational relationships to a greater extent but for purposes of securing 
more inpatient admissions.  To test these relationships, the second set of interaction 
models used the average inpatient revenue as a percentage of total hospital revenue as the 
moderating variable in the interaction terms.  This variable was constructed from 
financial data provided in the annual cost and utilization reports filed with the Office of 
Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD) and varied across all years of the 
study.  The average inpatient revenue variable was interacted with all four inter-
organizational relationship variables and all interaction variables were mean centered to 
reduce collinearity before multiplying.   
The results of the hospital capitation interaction models suggest that the average 
financial risk assumed by hospitals in a market does, in fact, moderate the relationship 
between certain types of inter-organizational relationships and ACSH rates (Table 23).  
Specifically, the results show that markets with more hospital capitation risk and a higher 
proportion of hospitals in the same system were associated with higher chronic care 
ACSH rates (β=0.23, p<0.10).  In contrast, markets with more hospital capitation risk and 
a higher proportion of market hospitals with an ownership interest in a nursing home 
were associated with lower rates of chronic care ACSH (β= -0.36, p<0.01) and aggregate 
ACSH (β= -0.44, p<0.05).   
Similar results were observed with the interaction models testing the conditional 
effects of inpatient revenue dependence (Table 24).  Markets with greater dependence on 






associated with higher rates of chronic care ACSH (β=6.67, p<0.01) and aggregate 
ACSH (β=9.37, p<0.05).  In contrast, acute care ACSH rates were negatively associated 
with interaction terms for the proportion of hospitals that own an insurance product (β -
4.65, p<0.10) and the proportion of hospitals that own a nursing home (β= -3.02, p<0.05).   
In combination, these results suggest that although market factors such as the 
level of hospital capitation risk and dependence on inpatient revenues may condition the 
relationship between inter-organizational relationships and ACSH rates, the effects are 
not uniform across all types of organizational relationships.  Specifically, interaction 
terms with the proportion of same-system hospitals in a market were generally positively 
associated with ACSH rates, while interaction terms with the proportion of hospitals that 
own an insurance product or a nursing home were negatively associated with ACSH 
rates.  These findings suggest that market factors moderate horizontal relationships 
differently than vertical relationships.  Future research is needed to explore whether these 
differences are due to hospitals using these relationships for different strategic purposes 
or whether they vary because of specific attributes of the moderating market factor, or 






Table 23:  Effects of inter-organizational relationships on ACSH, hospital capitation 
interactions 
β SE β SE β SE
Proportion hospitals-same system -0.14 0.28 -0.05 0.34 -0.13 0.58
Proportion hospitals-own insurance -0.18 0.34 -0.76 * 0.41 -1.05 0.69
Proportion hospitals-own nursing home -0.29 0.20 -0.40 * 0.24 -0.77 * 0.41
Proportion hospitals-any phys. relationship 0.33 * 0.18 0.37 * 0.23 0.76 ** 0.38
Proportion hospitals-same system x Average 
hospital capitation risk
-0.04 0.11
0.23 * 0.14 0.19 0.23
Proportion hospitals-own insurance x Average 
hospital capitation risk
0.08 0.11
-0.08 0.14 0.01 0.23
Proportion hospitals-own nursing home x 
Average hospital capitation risk
-0.11 0.10
-0.36 *** 0.13 -0.44 ** 0.21
Proportion hospitals-any phys. relationship x 
Average hospital capitation risk
0.03 0.13
0.20 0.16 0.22 0.27
Average hospital capitation risk 0.00 0.05 -0.10 * 0.06 -0.09 0.09
% Male 0.02 *** 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.04 ** 0.02
% African-American -0.01 * 0.01 2.3E-03 0.01 -0.01 0.02
% Hispanic -0.01 **** 2.5E-03 -0.01 *** 0.00 -0.02 **** 0.01
% Urban 2.4E-03 ** 1.2E-03 2.7E-03 * 1.5E-03 0.00 * 2.7E-03
SES index -40.41 **** 7.34 -40.31 **** 9.55 -82.11 **** 16.74
Heart disease mortality rate -0.02 ** 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.04 * 0.02
Respiratory disease mortality rate 2.3E-03 0.01 -0.02 * 0.01 -0.02 0.02
Pneumonia mortality rate 0.15 ** 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.24 0.15
Diabetes mortality rate -2.18 ** 1.03 -0.15 1.27 -1.01 2.12
% residents ages 0-14 (Referent) - - - - - -
% residents ages 15-64 -4.71 7.27 -11.42 9.41 -16.55 16.43
% residents ages 65 and over 15.75 12.07 7.50 15.86 23.12 28.08
PCPs per 1,000 -0.05 0.05 0.13 * 0.07 0.06 0.11
Specialists per 1,000 0.04 0.04 -0.13 *** 0.05 -0.07 0.08
# of outpatient services per 1,000 3.7E-04 **** 9.8E-05 6.5E-04 **** 1.2E-04 1.1E-03 **** 2.05E-04
Hospital Herfindahl Index -1.85 *** 0.65 -2.67 *** 0.83 -4.90 **** 1.42
1998 (Referent) - - - - - -
1999 0.25 * 0.15 -0.34 * 0.19 -0.15 0.31
2000 -0.16 0.15 -0.49 ** 0.19 -0.73 ** 0.31
2001 0.53 *** 0.16 0.05 0.20 0.42 0.33
2002 0.54 *** 0.17 0.48 ** 0.20 0.81 ** 0.34
2003 0.71 **** 0.18 0.50 ** 0.22 0.94 ** 0.37
2004 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.24 -0.24 0.39
2005 0.33 0.20 0.03 0.25 0.07 0.42
Intercept -11.55 8.72 -3.77 11.36 -17.54 19.94
N 450 450 450




Market use and competition controls
Time trend controls








Table 24:  Effects of inter-organizational relationships on ACSH, inpatient revenue 
dependence interactions 
β SE β SE β SE
Proportion hospitals-same system -0.23 0.25 -0.21 0.32 -0.40 0.52
Proportion hospitals-own insurance -0.23 0.31 -0.57 0.39 -0.91 0.63
Proportion hospitals-own nursing home -0.55 *** 0.19 -0.39 * 0.23 -1.00 *** 0.38
Proportion hospitals-any phys. relationship 0.41 ** 0.17 0.35 * 0.21 0.84 ** 0.35
Proportion hospitals-same system x Percentage 
of hospital revenue that is inpatient
2.32 2.04
6.67 *** 2.54 9.37 ** 4.19
Proportion hospitals-own insurance x 




0.81 3.28 -4.02 5.36
Proportion hospitals-own nursing home x 




1.59 1.55 -1.09 2.54
Proportion hospitals-any phys. relationship x 
Percentage of hospital revenue that is inpatient
1.12 0.94
0.93 1.17 1.91 1.92
Percentage of hospital revenue that is inpatient 8.13 **** 1.08 12.19 **** 1.34 20.94 **** 2.27
% Male 0.03 **** 0.01 0.03 **** 0.01 0.08 **** 0.02
% African-American -0.02 *** 0.01 -5.1E-03 0.01 -0.03 * 0.02
% Hispanic -0.01 **** 2.5E-03 -0.01 *** 0.00 -0.02 **** 0.01
% Urban 8.1E-04 1.2E-03 7.0E-04 1.5E-03 0.00 2.6E-03
SES index -41.17 **** 7.23 -42.68 **** 8.93 -85.85 **** 16.06
Heart disease mortality rate -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.02
Respiratory disease mortality rate 3.8E-03 0.01 -0.02 * 0.01 -0.02 0.02
Pneumonia mortality rate 0.16 ** 0.07 0.11 0.08 0.28 * 0.14
Diabetes mortality rate -2.53 *** 0.96 -0.70 1.20 -2.08 1.97
% residents ages 0-14 (Referent) - - - - - -
% residents ages 15-64 -8.51 7.13 -15.17 * 8.81 -25.04 15.76
% residents ages 65 and over 14.22 12.01 11.40 14.80 25.84 27.15
PCPs per 1,000 -0.07 0.05 0.10 0.06 0.02 0.10
Specialists per 1,000 0.05 0.04 -0.11 ** 0.05 -0.04 0.07
# of outpatient services per 1,000 3.9E-04 **** 9.1E-05 7.0E-04 **** 1.1E-04 1.1E-03 **** 1.88E-04
Hospital Herfindahl Index -1.84 *** 0.62 -2.18 *** 0.77 -4.61 **** 1.32
1998 (Referent) - - - - - -
1999 0.28 * 0.14 -0.25 0.18 -0.03 0.29
2000 -0.08 0.14 -0.28 0.18 -0.43 0.29
2001 0.62 *** 0.15 0.27 0.19 0.74 ** 0.31
2002 0.68 **** 0.16 0.77 **** 0.20 1.25 **** 0.32
2003 0.88 **** 0.17 0.82 **** 0.21 1.44 **** 0.34
2004 0.24 0.17 0.41 * 0.22 0.39 0.36
2005 0.65 **** 0.19 0.65 *** 0.24 1.04 *** 0.39
Intercept -14.34 8.61 -11.13 10.63 -27.36 19.17
N 450 450 450




Market use and competition controls
Time trend controls






A final explanation for why inter-organizational relationships were not 
statistically significant is found in the sensitivity analysis.  Several of the inter-
organizational relationships were significant and in the direction predicted when 
examined for specific conditions but not when aggregated into categories such as acute 
care and chronic care ACSH.  For example, the proportion of hospitals that owned a 
nursing home was negatively associated with the rate of ACSH for angina, asthma, and 
hypertension, yet there was no significant relationship when these conditions were 
aggregated into a chronic care ACSH rate.  Likewise, the proportion of hospitals that 
owned an insurance product was significantly associated with the rate of ACSH for 
congestive heart failure, COPD, and uncontrolled diabetes, but there was no significant 
relationship when these conditions were aggregated into a chronic care hospitalization 
rate.  These results suggest that inter-organizational relationships may be important, but 
their effects are likely contingent on the types of organizations involved and the condition 
being considered.  Future research is needed to explore whether there is something 
unique about the clinical condition, or whether certain aspects of the inter-organizational 
relationship and can be leveraged across other conditions.  
Summary of Findings 
 The findings of this study reinforce analysts’ recommendations that studies 
include and control for multiple types of factors that contribute to small area variations 
such as ACSH.  After controlling for population characteristics and health service 
utilization, health system characteristics such as provider composition and certain types 
of inter-organizational relationships were significantly associated with ACSH rates.  






organizations significantly associated with ACSH rates also reinforce a growing number 
of studies that show multiple provider types associated with ACSH, relationships that 
persist even after controlling for the effects of other provider types.  Finally, the findings 
suggest that the relationship between market structure and ACSH is nuanced and 
contingent upon many different factors.  For example, the study found that the 
relationship between provider supply and ACSH rates varies by how provider supply is 
measured, with some provider types significantly associated with ACSH rates when 
supply was measured relative to residents in a market and a different set of providers 
significantly associated with ACSH rates when supply was measured relative to other 
provider organizations in a market.  Another nuance was highlighted by the sensitivity 
analysis, which indicated that relationships that exist for specific conditions may 
disappear when analyzed at an aggregated level.  Overall, these findings highlight a 
number of important relationships and contingencies that should be considered in future 
research.  The following section explores these considerations in greater detail. 
Implications for Future ACSH Research 
 A perennial debate in health care is how to improve access to care.  One of the 
central tradeoffs discussed in these debates is that between insurance coverage and 
consumer demand versus care availability and provider supply.  Although intertwined 
and arguably complementary approaches for improving access, these options are 
typically framed as either-or decisions that stem, in part, from limited resources available 
to support both approaches.  Despite recent policy efforts to encourage movement on 
both fronts (Cunningham and Hadley 2004), resource considerations will likely continue 






health care system is presented with a situation where it may be expected to do more with 
fewer resources, or at least get more out of the resources that are currently available.  
This study has tried to highlight how the structure of primary care markets may affect 
ACSH, and by extension, facilitate discussion on how resources may be best configured 
to improve ACSH outcomes as well as access more generally.  The findings of this study 
highlight a number of places and ways to expand the ACSH research agenda.   
First, there is a need to revisit the access frameworks that guide empirical 
investigations of ACSH and examine other aspects of these frameworks.  Studies have 
catalogued a number of population characteristics that affect ACSH.  However, many of 
these characteristics are either immutable or serve as markers of underlying social 
conditions or behaviors that provide limited options for solutions other than broad scale 
policy changes such as expansion of insurance coverage.  While such policy efforts may 
be part of the solution, a growing body of research also suggests that there is more to the 
story than simply more or better access, (Friedman et al. 1999; Saha et al. 2007) 
emphasizing the need to look at how care is organized and delivered in our communities.  
The results of this study are consistent with this research and provide additional support 
for examining the relationship between health care system characteristics and ACSH.  
For example, findings that the supply of certain types of ambulatory care providers 
relative to hospitals has a negative effect on ACSH rates indicate that the composition of 
providers in a market may be as important as the overall supply.  These results also 
suggest that some types of organizations may be more important than others for 
improving ACSH rates, or worse, that some types of organizations may actually benefit 






explore other health system characteristics that might be deployed in more effective ways 
to improve outcomes of care.     
In addition to exploring other dimensions of access frameworks, there is an 
opportunity to integrate these dimensions.  One promising avenue for integrating these 
different dimensions was highlighted by results showing that market characteristics likely 
moderate the relationship between market structure and ACSH.  For example, the study 
found that the relationship between provider capacity and ACSH varied across rural and 
urban markets.  There are other factors that may condition the relationship and should be 
considered in future research.  For example, are the effects of provider supply or inter-
organizational relationships similar for different populations (e.g., Medicaid, uninsured, 
African-Americans, Hispanics)?  Does the dominance of certain organizational types 
(e.g., not-for-profit) in a market influence ACSH?   
In a similar vein, the ACSH research agenda should be expanded by refining the 
theoretical explanations used to explain ACSH.  Studies often do not explicitly identify 
the mechanism by which the health system or population characteristics may affect 
ACSH.  Too often there is a generic appeal to overly broad access frameworks and it is 
only when studies examine provider supply do theoretical explanations become more 
clearly specified (e.g., ‘more points of access’ that reduce disease progression).  The 
problem with such omissions is that they tell us little about the opportunities that exist to 
improve outcomes related to ambulatory care sensitive conditions.  Furthermore, the 
absence of an explicit theoretical basis limits our understanding of the generalizability of 






This study addressed this gap by using a control and coordination mechanism to 
explain how market structure may affect ACSH.  For example, one set of hypotheses 
argued that certain provider types may provide more coordinative care and more 
opportunities for transitional care that minimizes hospital readmissions.  These 
hypotheses were supported by results showing the supply of home health agencies, 
nursing homes, and physician organizations relative to hospitals in a market associated 
with lower ACSH rates.  Even so, the study did not directly measure coordination, but 
rather the market conditions that may set the stage for coordination.  Therefore, future 
research is needed to assess whether certain structural characteristics do, in fact, result in 
better or worse coordination.  Furthermore, given the broad range of activities involved in 
coordinating care, future research is needed to assess whether certain types of 
coordination are more or less effective.  For example, is discharge planning or 
case/disease management associated with lower rates of ACSH?  Do new technologies 
that emphasize communication amongst providers improve rates of ACSH?   
Another opportunity to extend the ACSH research literature is to explore whether 
the relationships examined in this study, as well as other health system characteristics, 
affect other measures of access in similar ways.  This study focused on ACSH as an 
indicator of access; however, access research encompasses a number of access measures, 
such as unnecessary emergency department visits, reports of unmet need, and having a 
usual source of care.  Relationship consistency across different access indicators not only 
has important implications for the management and policy recommendations that flow 
from these studies, but also affect the conclusions that can be drawn about these 






associated with multiple indicators of access may represent important leverage points for 
a health care system perpetually faced with scarce resource allocation decisions.  
Likewise, factors that are inconsistently associated with access, or even have contrasting 
effects on different access indicators, represent a significant opportunity to improve our 
understanding of places where we might expect less improvement.          
A final research implication that extends from this study relates to the use of 
aggregated rates of ACSH.  The supplemental analysis showed that the effects of market 
characteristics are not uniform across different ambulatory care sensitive conditions.  
Furthermore, the results indicate that aggregating outcomes may dampen underlying 
variation and obscure significant relationships.  Interestingly, aggregated measures of 
ACSH are relatively common in the literature.  It is unknown to what extent these studies 
conducted initial exploratory work to determine the appropriateness of aggregating these 
outcomes.  Even so, the results of this study suggest that caution is warranted when 
combining conditions into aggregated outcomes.  These cautions are especially justified 
when exploring new relationships that have little preexisting research to support 
aggregation.  Future research should consider starting with condition-specific outcomes 
before aggregating.         
Implications for Management & Policy 
This study has emphasized the importance of examining and controlling for 
multiple provider types to understand access to care and ACSH.  Results showing 
provider supply associated with ACSH rates for home health agencies, nursing homes, 
physician organizations, and even hospitals suggest that policy makers and managers 






the inter-organizational relationship models, at least when analyzed for specific 
conditions, show that relationships between different provider types may be facilitators 
(i.e., hospitals and nursing homes, hospitals and insurance companies) or barriers (i.e., 
hospitals and physician organizations) to access.  These findings suggest that there is 
more than one path to improving ACSH rates and that the evaluation of problems and 
solutions by policy makers and managers should account for multiple provider types in 
the market.         
That said, recommendations to consider for multiple provider types when 
examining primary care markets present challenges and opportunities.  On one hand, 
multiple moving parts in the form of different provider types introduce even greater 
complexity into policy questions of the ‘right’ level of provider supply.  On the other 
hand, the consideration of multiple provider types may offer additional options to fill 
recognized gaps in supply.  Similar tradeoffs exist for managers trying to make sense of 
their external environment.  More inclusive views of the primary care community will 
likely highlight a broader range of competitive threats or but may also open up new 
opportunities for collaboration.        
It is worth noting that the arguments and findings of this study are consistent with 
emerging frameworks of primary care that emphasize the importance of organizations in 
addition to individual professionals (Hogg et al. 2007; Starfield 2001; Starfield, Shi, and 
Macinko 2005).  The study’s findings and the recommendations that flow from them are 
also reminiscent of regional planning initiatives introduced in the late 1970s.  History 
suggests that regional planning is not likely to be adopted in any widespread manner; 






comprehensive perspectives are needed to appreciate both the complexity of the problems 
and the solutions that are required.  For example, analysts have argued for greater 
accountability among organizations that span traditional organizational boundaries 
(Fisher et al. 2009; Fisher et al. 2006).  Advocates of these approaches propose that 
physicians and hospitals be bundled together into ‘accountable care organizations’ for the 
purposes of measurement and reimbursement.  Likewise, community health alliances and 
coalitions are commonly used organizational forms for health education and health 
promotion in communities (Butterfoss, Goodman, and Wandersman 1993; Huxham 1996; 
Shortell et al. 2002; Wagner et al. 2000).  These organizations evolved out of a need to 
engage a wide range of stakeholders to improve the health of communities.   
These examples and the findings from this study highlight the need for 
practitioners and policy makers to look not only at the collection of organizations that 
make up a local health care market, but also at the manner in which these organizations 
may be linked to increase access, improve coordination, and enhance the overall delivery 
of health care in these communities.  Such considerations will require practitioners and 
policy makers to reconsider some of the fundamental rules of the health care game.  On 
the policy side, meaningful improvement will likely require policy makers to move on 
multiple fronts that alter both the organization and delivery of care as well as how that 
care is financed.  For example, policy efforts that simply address access to care or how 
care is delivered fail to address financing deficiencies that weaken alignment and 
accountability among providers.  On the practitioner side, efforts to establish greater 
alignment and accountability will likely require providers to change their conceptions of 






relationship is more nuanced and health care providers will need to find ways to balance 
these forces if the health of the community is to take its place as a priority in the health 
system.  The findings regarding hospital supply also raise some potential policy and 
managerial implications.  The results suggest that a desire for broad stroke policies must 
be balanced against a need for focused analysis and planning, especially if the goal is to 
improve outcomes of care and not just access to care.  For instance, the non-linear 
relationship between hospital capacity and ACSH rates suggests that the relationship 
between hospital supply may be moderated by some factor(s).  The analysis also suggests 
that hospitals have a different relationship with ACSH than other provider types, which is 
consistent with emerging ACSH research (Chang, Mirvis, and Waters 2008; Zhan et al. 
2004).  These findings suggest that policies aimed broadly at reducing ACSH by 
increasing provider supply may, in fact, increase the number of providers in a market, but 
raise questions of whether these are the right providers for a market.  Do policy changes 
result in the right mixture of providers for a particular market?  Such considerations are 
critical for developing national and state policy that meets local needs.   
Results of the sensitivity analysis also highlight some of the limitations of broad-
based policy and management solutions.  The findings indicate that certain provider types 
may be less adept at providing or coordinating care related to specific conditions.  
Likewise, certain types of inter-organizational relationships may be more important for 
care related to certain conditions.  Although more research is needed to determine more 
precisely what about these provider types and inter-organizational relationships make 
them more or less effective, they at least suggest that ‘one size fits all’ interventions 






and managers may want to proceed cautiously when considering how specific 
interventions affect other outcomes, including others related to access.  For example, 
studies finding increases in Medicaid coverage associated with higher ACSH rates 
demonstrate that changes likely have unintended consequences (Friedman et al. 1999; 
Saha et al. 2007).  Likewise, managers of health care organizations involved in strategic 
partnerships and community coalitions with an objective of getting more community 
residents into the health care system could very well observe higher rates of ACSH.  
Unintended consequences and conflicting activities are not necessarily new dilemmas for 
managers and policy makers, so the point here is not necessarily that these can or should 
be avoided.  Instead, the point is that decision makers need to be aware of these 
possibilities and they may need to demonstrate commitment and patience with their 
decisions before realizing any long-term benefit.    
Finally, there should be some consideration of whether the policies being 
developed go far enough to encourage meaningful change.  Earlier it was suggested that 
hospitals may face conflicting financial incentives regarding ACSH.  If hospitals truly do 
face conflicting incentives regarding ACSH, then there may also be a need for policy that 
aligns reimbursement in ways that attenuate these conflicts.  Reductions in Medicare 
reimbursement related to ‘never events’ and pay-for-performance programs are two 
examples of ways that policy is being utilized to realign incentives (Francis 2007; Pear 
2007; Rosenthal 2007; Wachter, Foster, and Dudley 2008).  However, it remains to be 
determined whether these programs ‘have enough teeth’ to have any real impact.  In other 
words, unless the financial benefits or penalties are significant enough to alter 






care, then hospitals may see little need to change from the status quo.  More research is 
needed to determine whether these conflicting incentives even exist, their significance for 
hospitals, whether they have any real impact on hospital decision making, and what 
impact these decisions may have on outcomes of care.     
Limitations 
Research projects are filled with decisions that present both opportunities and 
limitations.  This study is no exception.  The following discussion describes these 
limitations and suggests how future research may address these limitations.  Three 
general types of limitations are described:  (1) study context; (2) research design; and (3) 
data and measurement.   
Study Context 
There are two primary limitations with respect to the context of the study.  First, 
the focus on a single state limits the external validity of the results.  California was 
chosen because of its size, organizational demographics, and population diversity.  
California has also been the focus of an extensive body of health services research, 
including studies of ACSH.  Therefore, the focus on California provided an opportunity 
to build upon previous research as well validate results of the study.  Despite these 
advantages, California may be different from other states in ways that could limit the 
generalizability of the results.  For example, physician organizations and staff/group 
model HMOs are more prevalent in California than in most states (Gillies et al. 2003; 
Rittenhouse et al. 2004).  Likewise, the long-standing presence of group model HMOs 
like Kaiser Permanente means that the effects of these organizations may be confounded 






history that allows them to refine organizational processes, but they may also enjoy a 
greater sense of trust among consumers and other health care providers in a community.      
Studies documenting different ACSH rates across states support the importance of 
state-level factors that should be taken into consideration when generalizing results 
(Friedman et al. 1999; Laditka and Laditka 2004).  Studies of Medicaid coverage and 
program expansion provide examples of the types of state-level factors that might affect 
ACSH but differ across states (Bindman, Chattopadhyay, and Auerback 2008, 2008; Saha 
et al. 2007).  Interestingly though, even these studies have produced contradictory results 
and suggest that factors beyond policy and insurance coverage play an important role 
(Friedman et al. 1999; Porell 2001).  Therefore, although the organizational populations 
examined in this study and the prevalence of the relationships may differ across states, 
the importance of these relationships likely extends beyond California’s borders.            
A second potential contextual limitation pertains to the market definition used in 
the study.  Consistent with most other research in this area, the county was chosen as the 
geographic boundary of a primary care market.  However, as noted earlier, there is debate 
about the appropriate demarcation for a market (Baker 2001).  Many small area variation 
analysts suggest that larger markets dampen the effects of provider supply and suggest 
that markets be defined at the zip code level or smaller (Wennberg 1984; Wennberg, 
Fisher, and Skinner 2002).  If true, then the results reported in this study may be 
conservative.   
On the other hand, smaller market definitions may make hospitalization rates 
more sensitive to changes, especially for small markets.  Specifically, the use of a fixed 






market size, means that each hospitalization will have a greater effect on the overall 
hospitalization rate in a market.  To control for this issue, future studies should consider 
directly controlling for the size of the market.  Another concern that arises when using 
smaller market definitions is the issue of border-crossing.  When markets are defined to 
be smaller geographic areas, it increases the likelihood that consumers will receive 
services from health care providers in neighboring markets.  Although border-crossing 
can happen in either direction, generally it seems likely that consumers from smaller 
markets will be admitted to hospitals in larger markets due to provider supply and 
diversity of health service constraints imposed by smaller health care markets.  An 
extreme example of this situation is in markets where a provider is not located in the 
market (e.g., no acute care hospital in the market).  Assuming that most border-crossing 
does occur from smaller to larger markets, then estimates of larger market ACSH rates 
are deflated and estimates of smaller market ACSH rates are inflated in this study.  Future 
research could control for border-crossing in several ways.  First, researchers could test 
relationships using a larger geographic area to define the market.  For example, some 
market-level studies use the metropolitan statistical area or even the state as the market 
definition.  Second, researchers could directly control for border-crossing by creating a 
variable that reflects the proportion of admissions that occur from residents in different 
markets.  Third, the outcome could be operationalized so that border-crossing activities 
are reflected in the hospitalization rate.  For example, the rate could be calculated as the 
number of ambulatory care sensitive hospitalizations as a proportion of total 
hospitalizations.  Using the total number of market hospitalizations as the denominator, 






crossing activities in a market because both components of the rate reflect consumer and 
physician choices about which hospitals to receive care from.  In other words, to the 
extent border crossing is occurring for admissions related to ambulatory care sensitive 
conditions, it should be controlled for when both the numerator and denominators of the 
hospitalization rate reflect these occurrences.           
Another consideration with respect to the market definition is the types of 
organizations included in the analysis.  The study focused on six organizational types that 
previous research has examined or empirical reports have suggested as important for 
ACSH.  However, these organizations do not account for all care provided in a market 
and the study cannot make claims of exhaustiveness with respect to provider types.  Even 
among the organizations included in the study, a decision was made to focus on similar 
organizational types to make comparisons across providers more valid.  For example, the 
analysis was limited to short-term, acute care hospitals, thereby excluding specialty 
hospitals.  Perhaps more importantly, the physician organizations included in the study 
were limited to medical groups and independent physician associations with more than 
six physicians, thereby excluding small physician practices and solo practitioners.  These 
physicians are typically controlled for with a market-level, physician supply variable that 
includes all physicians in a market.  However, this study was interested in distinguishing 
between the different organizational settings that many physicians practice in (e.g., 
community health centers, physician organizations, health maintenance organizations), 
which ruled out the use of such an inclusive control variable.  Including a market-level, 
physician supply control variable along with the explanatory variables of interest would 






market-level, physician supply control variable (i.e., inter-organizational relationship 
regressions); however, future research should consider ways to include small and large 
physician settings in the analysis.    
Research Design 
Limitations with respect to outcome variable variation resulted in the adoption of 
a pooled, cross-sectional time series design.  The use of this design comes at the expense 
of stronger claims regarding the cause-and-effect relationship between market structure 
and ACSH rates and more generally can raise questions of endogeneity (Campbell and 
Stanley 1963; Spector 1981).  For example, higher ACSH rates could reflect greater 
morbidity among market residents, which could also affect utilization of outpatient health 
services, a case of omitted variable bias.  Although the study attempted to control for 
morbidity with market-level prevalence rates for several health conditions, these controls 
were not specific to the patients hospitalized for an ambulatory care sensitive condition 
nor did they exhaustively cover all of the health conditions included in the study.  
Another potential endogeneity concern relates to reverse causality.  An example from this 
study might pertain to the inter-organizational relationship analysis, where high ACSH 
rates could result in more organizations establishing inter-organizational relationships, 
either to decrease ACSH rates or capitalize on an opportunity to provide more services, 
instead of the other way around.  Although the study accounted for temporal trends with 
year control variables, future research can build on the results of this study by utilizing 
panel designs and more rigorous longitudinal techniques.  Panel studies can provide more 
insight into questions of how changes in market structure are associated with rates of 






Hospital discharge data is now routinely collected by most states.  Furthermore, over 35 
states submit this data to the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, which in turn 
makes the data available for research.  Although these studies will likely confront similar 
issues with respect to outcome variable variation over time, studies of multiple states may 
help overcome this limitation.           
Data and measurement 
The most significant data limitation relates to the dependence on discharge data to 
derive outcome variables.  This dependence means that two things need to occur before 
an outcome can be calculated for a market.  First, there needs to be a hospital in the 
market.  Second, patients need to be admitted to one of the hospitals in the market for an 
ambulatory care sensitive condition.  If a hospital is not present in a market, then an 
outcome variable cannot be constructed for that market, resulting in a loss of that 
observation.  In the case of this study, the absence of a market hospital resulted in at least 
one market being excluded each year from the analytic dataset.  The exclusion of these 
markets is problematic because they are on the extremely low end of the access 
continuum; therefore, they are important markets to study.  In other words, because 
ACSH is intended to be a reflection of the ambulatory care available in a market, the fact 
that it depends upon inpatient utilization may create a gap in our understanding of how 
good access is or is not in these markets.  Future studies that utilize hospital discharge 
data, or any hospital data for that matter, will confront similar challenges.   
There are several options available to address this limitation.  First, studies can 
utilize primary data collection such as surveys or interviews.  For example, Bindman and 






hospital data, to evaluate the relationship between provider supply, perceptions of access, 
and ACSH in California markets.  Another possibility is the use of administrative data 
that is organized around populations of patients in a market, instead of just those patients 
that receive hospital services.  Health plan data is commonly employed in these types of 
analysis.  For example, Falik and colleagues (2001) used administrative claims data 
across five states to evaluate whether Medicaid beneficiaries who receive most of their 
care from community health centers were more likely to experience an ACSH than 
beneficiaries receiving most of their care from other providers in the market.   
The primary measurement limitation relates to the measurement of provider 
supply.  The study weighted each individual organization equally by using counts of 
organizations in a market.  However, some providers may disproportionately contribute 
to the supply of health services in a market.  For example, a 500-bed hospital in a market 
may offer a larger number and a broader range of services than a 50-bed hospital in the 
same market.  The equal weight approach used in this study was chosen over weighted 
measurements for several reasons.  First, data were not available to weight all of the 
organizational types considered in the study (e.g., staff/group HMOs, physician 
organizations).  Second, for many provider types it is not clear what factor is most 
appropriate for weighting (e.g., number of services provided or patients seen, number of 
employees, revenues).  This is particularly problematic for provider types that have not 
received the same level of research attention that more traditional provider types such as 
hospitals, HMOs, and nursing homes have received.  Finally, from a very technical 
standpoint, the use of such weightings may reflect service supply more so than provider 







In 2007, Medicare stopped making payments to hospitals for ‘never events’.  The 
rationale behind this policy was that these procedures were unnecessary, representing 
poor quality care and a drain on a health care system already stretched thin.  Although not 
without its critics, the policy is only a recent manifestation of a longer trend in the U.S. 
health care system that expects more accountability from health care providers.  Over the 
past 25 years, the U.S. health care system has experienced a number of similar changes, 
such as the introduction of the Prospective Payment System and the ascendance of 
managed care in the 1980s and 1990s.  Whatever its guise, it seems that accountability is 
a concept that is here to stay.   
A common assumption underlying these changes is that policy makers and 
practitioners will find ways to do more with fewer resources.  Yet recommendations that 
extend from previous ACSH research often require more resources, typically in the form 
of new providers or more money to subsidize the expansion of health insurance 
programs.  This study examined whether different aspects of market structure were 
associated with better ACSH outcomes.  In doing so, it was hoped that we might begin to 
understand whether different configurations of existing health system resources might be 
better utilized to improve the quality of and access to ambulatory care.  The study’s 
findings indicate that the structure of a health care market does make a difference.  They 
also highlight that much remains to be understood about the mechanisms by which these 
structures affect access and the contingencies that may qualify their generalization across 






These findings present a double-edged sword for those who support greater 
provider accountability. On one hand, the findings suggest that existing resources may be 
(re)configured to improve outcomes and truly achieve better outcomes with the same or 
fewer resources.  On the other hand, the findings also indicate that simple solutions are 
not forthcoming and likely do not fit all markets equally.  The contrast highlights the 
balancing act that policy makers and practitioners must strike if they are to improve 





Appendix 1:  California Counties, 1998 
County Population Area (square miles) County Population Area (square miles)
Alameda 1,443,741 821 Orange 2,846,289 948
Alpine 1,208 743 Placer 248,399 1,503
Amador 35,100 605 Plumas 20,824 2,613
But te 203,171 1,677 Riverside 1,545,387 7,303
Calaveras 40,554 1,037 Sacramento 1,223,499 995
Colusa 18,804 1,156 San Benito 53,234 1,391
Contra Costa 948,816 802 San Bernardino 1,709,434 20,105
Del Norte 27,507 1,230 San Diego 2,813,833 4,526
El Dorado 156,299 1,788 San Francisco 776,733 232
Fresno 799,407 6,017 San Joaquin 563,598 1,426
Glenn 26,453 1,327 San Luis Obispo 246,681 3,616
Humboldt 126,518 4,052 San Mateo 707,161 741
Imperial 142,361 4,482 Santa Barbara 399,347 3,789
Inyo 17,945 10,227 Santa Clara 1,682,585 1,304
Kern 661,645 8,161 Santa Cruz 255,602 607
Kings 129,461 1,391 Shasta 163,256 3,847
Lake 58,309 1,329 Sierra 3,555 962
Lassen 33,828 4,720 Siskiyou 44,301 6,347
Los Angeles 9,519,338 4,752 Solano 394,542 907
Madera 123,109 2,153 Sonoma 458,614 1,768
Marin 247,289 828 Stanislaus 446,997 1,515
Mariposa 17,130 1,463 Sutter 78,930 609
Mendocino 86,265 3,878 Tehama 56,039 2,962
Merced 210,554 1,972 Trinity 13,022 3,208
Modoc 9,449 4,203 Tulare 368,021 4,839
Mono 12,853 3,132 Tuolumne 54,501 2,274
Monterey 401,762 3,771 Ventura 753,197 2,208
Napa 124,279 788 Yolo 168,660 1,023





Appendix 2:  ACSH primary diagnosis codes 
Type of preventable 
hospitalization ICD-9 codes Type of ACSH 
Angina 411.1; 411.81; 411.89; 413.0-
413.1; 413.9 
Acute 




Bacterial Pneumonia 481; 482.2; 482.30-482.32; 
482.39; 482.9; 483.0-483.1; 483.8; 
485; 486 
Acute 
COPD 491.0-491.1; 491.20-491.21; 
491.8-491.9; 492.0; 492.8;  
494-494.1; 496 
Chronic 
Congestive Heart Failure 398.91; 402.01; 402.11; 402.91;  
404.01; 404.03; 404.11; 404.13; 
404.91; 404.93; 428.0-428.1;  
428.20-428.23; 428.30-428.33;  
428.40-428.43; 428.9 
Chronic 
Dehydration 276.5; 276.50-276.52 Acute 





Diabetes with long term 
complications 
250.40-250.43; 250.50-250.53; 
250.60-250.63; 250.70-250.73;  
250.80-250.83; 250.90-250.93 
Chronic 
Diabetes uncontrolled 250.02-250.03 Chronic 
Hypertension 401.0; 401.9; 402.00; 402.10; 
402.90; 403.00; 403.10; 403.90; 
404.00; 404.10; 404.90 
Chronic 













An IPA is a legal entity that holds managed care 
contracts and contracts with physicians, usually in solo 
practice, to provide care either on a fee-for-services or 
capitated basis. The purpose of an IPA is to assist solo 





The hospital sponsors the formation of a physician group 
or provides capital to physicians to establish one. The 
group shares administrative expenses, although the 






A joint venture between the hospital and all members of 
the medical staff who wish to participate.  The open 
PHO can act as a unified agent in managed care 
contracting, own a managed care plan, own and operate 
ambulatory care centers or ancillary services projects, or 






A joint venture between the hospital and physicians who 
have been selected on the basis of cost-effectiveness 
and/or high quality.  The PHO can act as a unified agent 
in managed care contracting, own a managed care plan, 
own and operate ambulatory care centers or ancillary 






A corporation owned by the hospital or a 
physician/hospital joint venture that provides 
management services to one or more medical group 
practices.  As part of a full-service management 
agreement, the MSO purchases the tangible assets of the 
practices and leases them back, employs all non-
physician staff, and provides all supplies/administrative 




Physicians are salaried by the hospital or other entity of a 
health system to provide medical services for primary 
care and specialty care. 
Tight 
Equity Model An arrangement that allows established practitioners to 
become shareholders in a professional corporation in 
exchange for tangible and intangible assets of their 
existing practices. 
Tight 
Foundation A corporation, organized as a hospital affiliate or 
subsidiary, which purchases both tangible and intangible 
assets of one or more medical group practices.  
Physicians remain in a separate corporate entity but sign 
a professional services agreement with the foundation. 
Tight 
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